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Abstract
This study considers cross-national and inter-temporal variation in national oil
policies in Japan, France, and the United States. A test was performed of the extent to
which policies in these countries continue to emphasize national control over the
petroleum supply chain, or have adopted more liberal forms of market governance. It was
found that national petroleum policies converged on liberal outcomes in the 1980s and
1990s. In each country regulatory, trade and other policy instruments were restructured to
give the forces of supply and demand an increasingly important role in trade in crude oil
and petroleum products.
It was also found that convergence on liberal outcomes was partially reversed in
some countries, but not others. This was explained through the interests and policy
preferences of state actors with responsibility for setting oil policy, and domestic oil
firms. In two of the cases - the United States and Japan - policies promoting national
control remained in the interests of state actors and firms, meaning these policies were
restructured but not discarded in response to changes in the structure of the petroleum
market. In the case of France, policies supporting national control were jettisoned as
national firms became increasingly internationally competitive and disinterested in
obtaining state support.
It was argued that the findings are significant for our understanding of liberal
convergence in the advanced industrial states. Alternative explanations of this
phenomenon explain outcomes by arguing either that domestic actors have little capacity
to shape policy outcomes, or by assuming the policy preferences of domestic actors
uniformly match liberal policy outcomes. The findings presented here suggest: 1) the
policy preferences of domestic actors remain important; 2) the policy preferences of
domestic actors need not uniformly match liberal policy outcomes when inimical to
interests. This suggests that identifying whether changes in international markets or other
processes will lead to a convergence on liberal policy outcomes, or whether this process
is likely to be reversed, requires us to identify the effects of shifts in international markets
or other kinds of changes on the underlying interests and policy preferences of multiple
domestic political actors.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard J. Samuels
Title: Ford International Professor of Political Science
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Chapter One - Overview of Research Question and Dissertation Structure
"Far from being run along the lines of the free market, the energy sector has been one of
the few elements of a planned economy in many otherwise capitalist countries."'
Francis McGowan, 1996, p. 4
"Salami tactics are all very well, but we want to know how long the sausage is."2
German MEP on the European Commission's
push to liberalize public services
1. Introduction
The 1980s and 1990s saw a transformation of the relationship between
governments and markets in the advanced industrial states. With privatization and
liberalization the role of the state changed from an active participant to a passive
regulator of economic markets.3 This implied a shift in the balance between public and
private power identified by Shonfield some forty years ago. Shonfield argued that
governments of countries in the vanguard of Modern Capitalism were united in the
postwar years in adopting an interventionist strategy in order to achieve economic growth
with an equitable distribution of wealth.4 As Moss and others have noted, this expansion
of the state included not only promoting growth or redistribution, but extended to
intervening in markets in order to socialize risk. The rise of the social welfare state, for
example, increased the role of the state in protecting workers against volatility in
Francis McGowan, European Energy Policies in a Changing Environment (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1996), 4.
2 Mitchell P. Smith, States ofLiberalization : Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 2005), 1.
3 The literature on this shift is voluminous. For reviews see Covadonga Meseguer, "What Role for Learning? The
Diffusion of Privatization in OECD and Latin American Countries," Journal ofPublic Policy 24, no. 3 (2004). A recent
statement is made by Jonah D. Levy, The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age ofLiberalization
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). For a historical treatment of the ebbs and flows of liberalization
and protectionism see Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy
in the Second Millennium (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2007).
4 Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism; the Changing Balance of Public and Private Power (London: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p. 65.
markets, job loss, illness, or other unexpected events.5
Recent scholarship shows the shift in state-market relations noted above led to a
retrenchment and restructuring of this role of the state in socializing risks. Brooks, for
example, observes that defined benefit schemes in social welfare systems have steadily
replaced defined contributions schemes, making individuals increasingly responsible for
insuring themselves against risk. Avant has also documented the tendency for national
security services to increasing be provided by private sector agents. Levy defines this as a
shift to a "market supporting state," where state institutions have converged on promoting
the efficient operation of economic markets, and expanding the realm within which
markets operate.'
This study extends the examination of this transformation of state-market
relations to oil markets. For much of the twentieth century oil was subject to a set of
policies at odds with liberal forms of economic governance: national control over the
petroleum supply chain. Indeed, insuring against the risk of petroleum supply disruptions
by enhancing the control of national firms over oil was regarded as a core function of the
state once products derived from petroleum began to dominate fuel used in military
operations during the First World War, and oil products overtook coal as the dominant
fuels in the economies of the industrialized countries.
5 David A. Moss, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2002). The classic statement on welfare is Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, [1st Beacon
paperback ed. (Boston,: Beacon Press, 1957). See also John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982). On
national security as risk insurance see Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and
Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
6 Sarah M. Brooks, Social Protection and the Market in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009); Deborah D. Avant, The Marketfor Force: The Consequences ofPrivatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005).
The role of the state in insuring against volatility in oil markets derived not only
from its importance to industrial and military operations but also because, with a few
exceptions, oil reserves were located outside the geographic boundaries of major
petroleum consuming countries. Further, it proved impossible for governments to
internalize the production of petroleum products in sufficient volumes and at reasonable
cost through the application of policy.!
In this study I examine changes in the oil policies of three major petroleum
consuming countries: Japan, France and the United States. I ask whether policies in these
countries have shifted to emphasize market responses to ensuring the supply of petroleum
in the 1980s and 1990s, or whether policy responses continued to promote national
control. My findings reveal a puzzle. I discover that national petroleum policies in the
states examined in this study did indeed converge on liberal outcomes in the 1980s and
1990s.' In each of these countries, regulatory, trade and other policy instruments that had
been used to enhance national control over the petroleum supply chain were restructured
to give the forces of supply and demand an increasingly important role in trade in crude
oil and petroleum products.9
As petroleum prices began to increase from 2000-2001, however, I find that
convergence on liberal outcomes was partially reversed in some countries, but not others.
In France, which maintained a nationalist response to the problem of petroleum supplies
since the enactment of a French oil law in 1928, the sector was liberalized in the 1980s
7 Petroleum technically refers to both natural gas and crude oil. Following convention, it is used interchangeably with
crude oil in this study.
8 I define liberal convergence as an outcome in which the market progressively replaces government as the mechanism
through which resources are allocated.
9 I do not mean to imply that the oil market is perfectly competitive, nor that other policies were also abandoned, such
as those implemented in industries producing products that are partial substitutes for oil, such as nuclear, natural gas
and renewables.
and 1990s, and did not revert to policies promoting strategic control under conditions of
high oil prices. In Japan, on the other hand, policies designed to enhance national control
over the petroleum supply chain were also adjusted in the 1980s and 1990s. Protection of
domestic refiners was abolished and the level of support for Japanese firms operating
internationally was also reduced. Under conditions of high prices, however, intervention
upstream was reintroduced. This was also the case in the United States, where the
rejection of quotas and tariffs that increased the cost of international oil relative to that
produced domestically in the 1970s were abandoned, but less costly policies designed to
enhance domestic production in the name of energy independence remained a feature of
national petroleum policies.
In order to explain outcomes I focus on the interests and policy preferences of
state actors with responsibility for setting oil policy, and domestic oil firms. I argue that
in each of the cases examined in this study shifts in the structure of the petroleum market,
expressed through long-run crude oil prices, undermined policies designed to enhance
national control over oil policy. This led to their reexamination. In the United States and
Japan, I argue, policies that promoted strategic intervention were restructured in ways
that brought them increasingly in line with liberal outcomes, because firms and actors
within the state adjusted to the new market conditions, while also bargaining with other
societal and state actors affected by oil policies. The interests of both sets of actors
continued to be met through the promotion of national control, however, meaning these
policies were restructured but not discarded.
Policies supporting national control were wholly transformed in the case of
France, in contrast to Japan and the United States. State actors rejected existing policies
after they were undermined by the effects of changes in long-run oil prices and the
nationalizations of the 1970s. This was largely because the state had used national firms
as agents to enhance national control over petroleum, yet national firms themselves
sought independence as they became increasingly internationally competitive. When a
third set of actors, based in European institutions, began to assert themselves in the
national energy policies of member states they found that the interests of firms and state
actors in the petroleum sector had changed. Liberal convergence was the outcome, with
no reversion to strategic intervention as oil prices increased.
2. Significance of Findings
My findings, and the framework I develop for explaining them, are important
for empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, trade in fuels (of which oil is a
significant component) constitutes a significant share of non-manufacturing world
merchandise trade. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, for example, trade in fuels (of
which oil is the most significant component) vied with agricultural products for the
largest share of non-manufacturing merchandise trade.
Merchandise Trade in Agriculture and Fuels (1990-2006)
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This implies the distributional effects of policy interventions that shape these
flows are large both domestically and internationally, given most advanced industrial
states import the majority of the oil consumed domestically. The application of quotas
and tariffs in the United States from 1957 until 1979, for example, increased the price of
crude products relative to international prices, meaning a transfer of income from
consumers to producers. The scale of these transfers are borne out in the Cabinet Task
force put in place by President Richard Nixon in 1969, which estimated that consumers
would save five billion dollars in 1969 dollars annually by the removal of the oil import
quota imposed to increase the competitiveness of oil produced domestically, and these
savings would rise to eight billion dollars by 1980.*
Similarly in Japan, hundreds of billions of yen were used to support Japanese
private sector oil firms with revenues drawn from taxpayers, and limits on the
importation of oil products also imposed high costs on consumers. The abolition or
10 For a summary of the oil import quota program, and the Cabinet task Force report see Douglas R. Bohi and Milton
Russell, Limiting Oil Imports: An Economic History andAnalysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
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restructuring of policies designed to shape flows of oil and oil products therefore imply a
reduction in costs imposed on consumers within economies.
Policies designed to shape flows of oil and oil products are also likely to affect
the distribution of income between countries. If subsidies for national oil companies are
contingent on the geographic diversification of oil supplies as in the case of Japan, for
example, this implies the shift of economic rents obtained from one producing country to
another. Given the world consumes approximately 85 million barrels a day of oil, this
implies significant transfers of wealth even in the case that policy intervention only shifts
a small portion of these flows from one country to another."
My findings also have important implications for our understanding of liberal
convergence in the advanced industrial states, and the conditions under which we are
likely to see a reversal in this process. Common explanations for liberal convergence are
of two types. The first explains outcomes using the effects of global competition, or
pressure from international organizations and powerful actors in the international system.
Here the interests and policy preferences of domestic political actors are downplayed;
domestic actors are assumed to have little capacity to shape policy outcomes, and are
forced to liberalize in response to international pressures. International competition, for
example, has been used to explain changes in forms of corporate governance in Germany
and Japan in ways that made them more in line with liberal market economies."
Similarly, Kitschelt and others have noted that the pressures for liberal convergence stem
from international trade competition, in addition to technological changes and increases
I Different grades of oil are discounted from the indexes used to price them, making the analogy imperfect.
Nevertheless, if we assume a mean price of 100 dollars per barrel for oil traded on a given day, world trade in oil equals
8.5 billion dollars per day.
12 Gregory Jackson, "Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Liberalization Pressures and Responses During the
1990s," in The End ofDiversity?: Prospects for German and Japanese Capitalism, ed. Kozo Yamamura and wolfgang
Streeck (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
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in international financial flows." Others have pointed to international pressures in the
form of legal obligations rooted in international law as an important cause of liberal
convergence."
A second type of explanation emphasizes the importance of domestic actors
rather than discounting them. The most common version of this argument focuses on the
diffusion of liberal forms of economic governance through emulation, where
decisionmakers "look abroad, to see how other states have responded to similar pressures,
to share ideas, to draw lessons and to bring foreign evidence to bear within domestic
policy-making processes."15 Meseguer, for example, argues that privatization across the
OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s was driven by a process in which governments
emulated policies in other states in streamlining the public sector because they believed it
led to more efficient economic outcomes. Elkins and Simmons argue more generally that
interdependence increases information flows across borders, and that this has contributed
to the diffusion of policies of trade and capital liberalization. 6
Herbert Kitschelt et al., "Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies," in Continuity and
Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Herbert Kitschelt, et al. (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1999); Ian Bartle, "When Institutions No Longer Matter: Reform of Telecommunications and
Electricity in Germany, France and Britain," Journal ofPublic Policy 22, no. 1 (2002); Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang
Streeck, The End ofDiversity?: Prospectsfor German and Japanese Capitalism, Cornell Studies in Political Economy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
14 Christoph Knill and Katharina Holzinger, "Causes and Consequences of Cross-National Policy Convergence,"
Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005); Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, National Diversity and Global
Capitalism, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996). See also Colin J.
Bennett, "What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?," British Journal ofPolitical Science 21, no. 2 (1991);
Knill, Journal ofEuropean Public Policy, 2005; Stephan Heichel, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer, "Is There
Convergence in Convergence Research? An Overview of Empirical Studies on Policy Convergence," Journal of
European Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005); Beth Simmons, A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, "Introduction: The
International Diffusion of Liberalism," International Organization 60, no. Fall (2006). For an application of this
argument to the diffusion of neoliberal tax policies see Duane Swank, "Tax Policy in an Era of Internationalization:
Explaining the Spread of Neoliberalism," International Organization 60 (2006).
1 Bennett, "What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?", 220-22 1.
16 Meseguer, "What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatization in OECD and Latin American Countries"; Beth
A. Simmons and Zachary Elkins, "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political
Economy," American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004). For other learning-based arguments for liberal
convergence see also Kurt Weyland, "Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform,"
World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005); Sarah M. Brooks, "Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The
Diffusion of Pension Privatization around the World," International Studies Quarterly 49 (2005).
My findings suggest that each of these arguments has merit, but none are
sufficient to explain outcomes. I find in the oil sector that changes in the international
environment, competitive pressures, and processes of learning and adaptation in response
to policy failure each played a role in driving liberalization and privatization in the oil
sector.'" To take one example, fixed prices for oil and oil products, which was one
component of policies applied in the search for enhanced national control over oil, were
no longer tenable following the nationalizations of oil production in the 1970s and
consequent volatility in oil prices, and were discarded as a result.
I also find, however, that the response of domestic policymakers and firms to
these changes was not passive. Instead, they retained the capacity to adapt by
implementing new strategies that continued to meet their organizational and political
interests. Further, these interests did not necessarily lead to a convergence on liberal
outcomes. The failure of protectionism in Japan to produce a viable national oil company,
coupled with pressure from European and U.S. policymakers to reduce barriers to oil
product imports in response to the construction of refineries in the Middle Eastern
countries and pressure from Japanese consumer interests, for example, led policymakers
to discard import licenses and other forms of regulatory control designed to control
domestic prices, yet they maintained barriers to entering the Japanese refining market for
non-Japanese firms for a further ten years. When this succeeded in forcing mergers
between Japanese firms, policymakers continued to support subsidies for Japanese firms
operating in exploration and production upstream with the goal of creating an integrated
oil major.
17 Peter J. May, "Policy Learning and Failure," Journal ofPublic Policy 12, no. 4 (1992). See also Peter A. Hall,
"Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," Comparative
Politics 25, no. 3 (1993).
Second, although learning occurred in each of the cases examined in this study,
not all actors learned the same lessons, and some remained vigorously opposed to
attempts to change policy outcomes if the proposed changes were inimical to their
interests. This meant the process of adaptation to changes in the international oil market
was contested; outcomes were determined not by a single actor learning how to more
effectively pursue their interests, but instead by a process of bargaining between multiple
domestic actors' interests and their policy preferences. To take another example, Japan's
upstream policies were adapted by senior officials in charge of oil policy to the effects of
collapsing oil prices on policy effectiveness. Reform was opposed as too radical,
however, by firms that benefited from subsidies and loans provided by the state, and as
insufficient by political representatives who opposed the ongoing use of government
funds to support special government bodies. The partial reversal of liberal convergence in
the 2000s, in turn, represented a reassertion of control over the policy process by officials
responsible for oil policy, who restructured the policies of national control to make them
more effective, but also ensured that they endured. This contrasts with the case of France,
in which firms and political actors within the state agreed that the existing policies of
protection were unnecessary, and liberalization and privatization occurred smoothly and
with little disagreement as a result."
The differences in the argument offered here with common explanations for
liberal convergence can be represented in a table, shown below, categorized according to
the key actors, the level of autonomy in policymaking assigned to domestic actors, and
importance of political bargaining in producing outcomes. In contrast to international or
18 John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen, "The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis," in The Rise of
Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, ed. John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2001), 1.
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systemic arguments, my explanation for outcomes focuses on the importance of domestic
actors. Unlike arguments based on learning and emulation, on the other hand, I
emphasize that multiple actors exist, each of which may learn different lessons from the
results of policy failure, or may oppose policies of liberalization because they are judged
to be inimical to interests.
Process Description of Actor Importance of Bargaining Domestic Autonomy
Competition Systemic Low Low
Powerful State International Low Low
International Institutions International Low Low
Learning/emulation Domestic/Unitary Low High
Domestic Bargaining Domestic/Multiple High High
What does this imply for our understanding of the causes and consequences of
liberal convergence, and the possibility of its reversal?
My findings imply there is nothing necessary about international competition, or
processes of learning and adaptation, that lead us to more liberal governance outcomes.
Rather, the process of liberal convergence is more complex than arguments focusing on
the role of international institutions, competition, or policy learning, propose. This means
in turn that identifying whether changes in international markets or other processes are
likely to lead to a convergence on liberal outcomes, or indeed whether this process is
likely to be reversed, requires us to identify the effects of shifts in international markets
or other kinds of changes on the underlying interests and policy preferences of multiple
domestic political actors. Indeed, my findings suggests that there is nothing necessary
about the role of exogenous shocks or other types of economic or political processes in
changing the policy preferences of domestic actors. Further, domestic actors retain
considerable leeway in the design and implementation of new policies even when an
existing policy regime has been undermined by changes in market conditions, and they
may not have an interest in adjusting policies so they converge on liberal forms of
economic governance. In seeking to understand instances of convergence, or its reversal,
therefore, we must turn to theories about political economy of protectionism, regulation,
and subsidies, in order to understand how outcomes were produced. This is what I seek to
do in the chapters that follow.
3. Structure of Study
This study has seven chapters. In this chapter I have summarized the questions
motivating the study, the most significant findings, and their implications for our
understanding of state-market relations. Chapter two reviews the literature on liberal
convergence, and locates this study within this body of work. In chapter two I also
develop a strategy for measuring the dependent variable used in this study - strategic
intervention - and present the outcomes. The remainder of the chapter offers an
explanation for these outcomes, focusing on the policy preferences of actors within the
state, and firms, and how these have changed over time. Changes in long-run oil prices, I
argue, are central to explaining these changes in policy preferences.
Chapters three to six make up the empirical section of the study. Chapter three
outlines the major theoretical explanations for shifts in long-run petroleum prices, and
describe those changes across time. I do this because of the importance placed in the
study on the influence of shifts in long-run petroleum prices on policy preferences. Then,
in chapters four to six, I show how these price shifts affected the policy preferences of
political/bureaucratic interests, and firms, in each of the country cases: Japan (chapter
four) France (chapter five), and the United States (chapter six). Policy preferences of
state actors, and firms, are not solely a function of prices, however. In each of the
empirical chapters I also, therefore, detail other variables that have contributed to shifts in
policy preferences across time. This complicates the discussion, but also provides a more
complete explanation for policy change. Finally, in the seventh and concluding chapter, I
restate the findings of the study and discuss their implications for theory and policy.
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Chapter Two -Explaining Liberal Convergence and Divergence in Petroleum Markets
PART I: Liberal Convergence in Petroleum Markets
1. Introduction
This chapter is made up of two parts. In the first I review the literature on liberal
convergence. I then define and develop a strategy for measuring the degree of liberal
convergence in the petroleum sector and present the outcomes. In the second part of the
chapter I develop a framework for explaining the puzzling outcomes we observe. As
outlined in chapter one, I propose that policies designed to enhance national control over
the petroleum supply chain met the interests of both political actors in the state and
domestic oil firms. Changes in policies promoting strategic intervention were caused by
shifts in the structure of the international oil market, leading to a search for a new set of
policies that advanced the interests of domestic actors involved in the petroleum sector.
Outcomes were determined by these actors as they adapted their preferred policies to the
new conditions, while bargaining with other domestic actors who sought to reduce the
costs of oil policies on their own interests.
2. Liberal Convergence - What Does it Mean, and Why Does it Matter?
In its most general form, convergence is defined as "the tendencies of societies
to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and performances."1 9
19 Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies; Convergence or Continuing Diversity? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), 3. Within this general definition, a heterogeneity of phenomena associated with the
"convergence" concept. Bennett identifies five different outcomes folded under the concept of convergence (policy
goals, policy content, policy instruments, policy outcomes, and policy style). Knill and Holzinger, on the other hand,
distinguish between convergence across two dimensions: policy outcomes, and policy outputs. Colin J. Bennett, "What
Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?," British Journal ofPolitical Science 21, no. 2 (1991); Christoph Knill and
Katharina Holzinger, "Causes and Consequences of Cross-National Policy Convergence," Journal ofEuropean Public
Policy 12, no. 5 (2005), 776.
Although they take issue with the finding, Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, for
example, have described a trend towards a "secular expansion of market relations inside
and across the borders of national political-economic systems." In this view, the market
progressively replaced government as the mechanism through which resources are
allocated." This does not imply simply a reduction in the absolute size of the state.
Instead, as Vogel, Levy and others have noted, it suggests a reconfiguration of state
institutions and capacities so that they seek to promote the efficient operation of
economic markets and to expand the realm within which markets operate; a "market-
supporting state" in Levy's language.21
Scholars have adopted a variety of strategies for measuring if forms of
government converged on liberal outcomes across the advanced industrial states. A first
strategy uses aggregate measures of government intervention in order to understand
whether the size of the government is converging. Taken as a whole, their findings
confirm a trend towards liberal convergence. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, for
example, employ aggregate measures of privatization revenues as a percentage of GDP,
and an index for financial openness, and find that the political economies of the advanced
industrial states are converging on liberal economic outcomes." A United Nations
overview of the changing relationship between the state and the market similarly uses a
range of aggregate measures to assess the changing role of government in the political
20 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political
Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. For reviews see Suzanne Berger, "Globalization and Politics,"
Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000); Jonah D. Levy, The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of
Liberalization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006); Herbert Kitschelt et al., "Convergence and
Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies," in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. Herbert
Kitschelt, et al. (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21 Levy, The State after Statism: New State Activities in the Age of Liberalization, 3.
22 Beth Simmons, A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett, "Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism,"
International Organization 60, no. Fall (2006).
economies of the advanced industrial states, including public sector employment,
government consumption, and central government expenditures and tax revenues, in
order to assess the degree to which convergence has occurred on a smaller role for
government, an outcome consistent with a liberal market outcome."
As noted above, a convergence on liberal forms of government does not only
imply a reduction in the absolute size of the state but also a restructuring of state
activities to give a greater role to market forces in determining the allocation of goods
and services. Macroeconomic studies have therefore been augmented by a
microeconomic approach, in which scholars examine policy change within specific
economic sectors across time. Scholars have conducted studies across a myriad of policy
areas, including social and fiscal policy, environmental policy, trade policy, banking
regulations, telecommunications and electricity, health policy, monetary policy,
migration, competition policy, agricultural policy, and education. Given the wide range
of sectors, time periods, and countries and regions findings are necessarily more
disparate. Nevertheless, most confirm a trend towards policy convergence. Of the 74
studies reviewed by Heichel, Paper and Sommerer, for example, 59 found some evidence
of convergence.24
Within this tradition, scholars have focused on examining the role of the state as
a manager of risk, and in particular whether policies designed to function to insure
citizens, or the country, against a variety of risks have increasingly conformed with
liberal terms through greater privatization and liberalization. A focus of recent work, for
23 World Bank, 2001, 145-153.
24 For a review see Stephan Heichel, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer, "Is There Convergence in Convergence
Research? An Overview of Empirical Studies on Policy Convergence," Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 12, no. 5
(2005), 817-840.
example, has been on the privatization of national security functions of the state. A long-
standing concern of scholars of liberal convergence has similarly focused on the changing
role of the state in protecting individuals against volatility in labor markets, illness or
other problems through social welfare institutions."
In this study I extend this examination of liberal convergence using national
policies in the petroleum market. Petroleum has historically been treated as a strategic
resource, with policies introduced to enhance national control over the petroleum supply
chain. This was for two reasons: first, because of the characteristics of petroleum as a
commodity; and second, because of the policy response adopted historically in the major
petroleum consuming countries to manage perceived risks associated with these
characteristics.
2.1. Characteristics of Petroleum
The first important characteristic of petroleum lies in its utility in a wide range of
economic, and military activities. In the early part of the 20th century trading volumes in
crude oil were insignificant, as petroleum products were employed for illumination or
cooking purposes. This changed with the growth in the use of petroleum products in the
transport sector, and the shift became decisive with the inclusion of gasoline or diesel
driven vehicles in WWI war planning.26 In the years following WWII, superior price and
25 On the privatization of military functions see Deborah D. Avant, The Marketfor Force: The Consequences of
Privatizing Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). On social welfare see Jacob S. Hacker,
"Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the
United States," American Political Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004); Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare
State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Sarah M. Brooks, Social Protection and the Market in Latin America
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
26 The first widespread military application of petroleum products was the use of oil for naval propulsion systems,
however this figured less significantly than transport in the growth in demand in WWI. 2. Anglo-Persian (the
predecessor of BP) production for example, rose from 80,000 tons in 1912 to 897,000 tons in 1918. Fiona Venn, Oil
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 38.
fuel properties ensured that products refined from crude oil began to dominate coal as the
energy source of choice in the civilian economy, as well as the military. Despite
significant efforts to diversify fuel sources away from oil, products derived from crude oil
remain dominant across the advanced industrial states, driven in part by the lack of
substitutes within the transport sector.
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The second important characteristic of petroleum lies in the fact that it is found
in a limited number of regions in the world. Natural resources differ from traditional
goods in that the location of production is determined by where they are found in the
world, rather than some approximation of the law of comparative advantage. Coal (the
carbon residue of prehistoric plant life), for example, is widely distributed
geographically. Petroleum (the carbon residue of animal life), on the other hand, is
distributed less broadly. As no perfect substitutes for petroleum exist at reasonable cost,
this establishes an inescapable barrier to market entry: countries that have petroleum
located on their territory are able to act as producers, those that do not, can not.
World Oil Production (by region)
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Prior to WWII the United States was the dominant producer in the world oil
market, with the bulk of petroleum supply trade internationally made up of exports from
the U.S. Gulf Coast." Tremendous growth in petroleum discoveries in the Middle East
changed the dynamics of petroleum supply, however. The pace of this growth in low-cost
oil from the Middle East was astounding. From 1953-1957, for example, proven reserves
in the Middle East increased by 23 billion barrels annually, which was equivalent to total
2 Helmut Jack Frank, Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East; a Study in Oligopolistic Price Behavior (New York,:
Praeger, 1966), 10-11.
reserves in the U.S..2 While the share of oil from the Middle East has been balanced by
significant growth in oil discoveries in other regions of the world (and because of pricing
strategies adopted by Middle Eastern producing countries), oil production in the Middle
East continues to dominate the world oil market.
2.2 Policy Responses in the Major Petroleum Consuming States
This importance of products derived from petroleum to national economies and
modern militaries, coupled with the limited dispersal of crude oil internationally, induced
a range of policy responses in the major consuming countries, from shifting relative
prices in order to promote diversification of fuels away from oil products, to the
provision of incentives designed to encourage more efficient use of energy. Importantly
for this study, however, a common response across the major petroleum consuming
countries has been to intervene in the petroleum market in order to enhance national
control over international supplies of petroleum.29 In this study I term this set of policies
strategic intervention.
This contrasts with strategies that I define as more liberal responses to the
problem of the reliance on imperfect international markets for the supply of crude oil and
petroleum products, These focus on lessening the role of crude oil in the economy in
order to decrease the economic impact of price volatility or supply interruptions, or
implementing policies designed to make the market more competitive. It is important to
28 Francisco R. Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History ofPetroleum (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 35.
29 Richard J. Samuels, "Public Energy Corporations and Public Policy in Japan," (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1982), 15-16. In the study I make no argument about the efficacy of this policy strategy.
Indeed, there is much evidence that states have found that ownership does not confer the ability to control publicly-
owned firms operating in the petroleum sector. For sustained arguments along these lines see Harvey B. Feigenbaum,
The Politics of Public Enterprise: Oil and the French State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985);
Gregory Nowell, "Realpolitik Vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the World
Oil Cartel, 1860-1939" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988).
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note that the liberal convergence hypothesis does not predict a total withdrawal from
policy intervention designed to manage problems of ensuring security of supply. This is
because geopolitical risks, issues with market power, and other problems that exist in the
international petroleum market provide a rationale for ongoing policy intervention under
the liberal paradigm through strategies such as enhancing energy efficiency, or shifting
relative prices in ways that favor fuels that are partial substitutes from petroleum
products.3" For this reason I draw a distinction in this study between those policies
designed to enhance national control over petroleum, and those that are designed to
correct for market failure."
That petroleum has historically been treated as qualitatively different to other
goods is borne out by the fact that crude oil and products derived from it remain outside
the remit of international trade institutions. Indeed, the illegitimacy of erecting barriers to
trade in crude and crude products has not been addressed in negotiations at GATT/WTO
because of resistance by national governments, despite trade in petroleum products not
being explicitly excluded from the multilateral trade regime. Instead, trade rules
governing energy products have remained the preserve of national governments, both
those who produce oil, and those that consume it. This in turn is demonstrated by the two
major international organizations that exist in the petroleum market: The International
30 The illegitimacy of national discrimination under the liberal paradigm is institutionalized most notably through
Articles III and XIII of GATT Article III: 1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products
in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production. For a review of market failure as a justification for government intervention see Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector, (New York : w.W. Norton, 2000). For a review of OPEC's role in the
international oil market see Robert Mabro, Opec and the Price of Oil (Oxford, Oxford University Press: Oxford
Institute for Energy Studies, 1992), 3-27.
31 Although it appears counter-intuitive, I include the U.S. military posture in the Middle East, to the extent that it is
driven by oil interests, in the latter category. This is because the U.S. military commitment to the Middle East serves to
ensure the open flow of oil, rather than secure it for U.S. national interests alone. For a summary of U.S. state actor
preferences that emphasizes its role in ensuring competitive markets see Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National
Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978).
Energy Agency (IEA) and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The
former, created in 1974, was organized as a club of major petroleum importing countries
to increase their bargaining leverage relative to producer governments. The latter is a
cartel intended to shape petroleum prices through manipulating production amongst
member states. The result has been that in a world of falling national barriers to trade and
investment through successive negotiations at the multilateral level, oil has remained
isolated from this trend.
Nevertheless, a convergence on liberal forms of economic governance should
predict a decline in strategic intervention in the petroleum sector across the major
petroleum consuming countries. That is, we can hypothesize that, although we may not
observe a decline in policy intervention in general terms, we should observe a decline in
the application of policy instruments designed to discriminate in favor of economic actors
in the petroleum sector located in the home country.32
H]: The convergence on liberal policy outcomes is correlated with a decline
in strategic intervention in the petroleum sector across the major petroleum
consuming countries.
2.3 Prices, Petroleum, and Liberal Convergence
At their heart, concerns about security of petroleum supplies are motivated by
fears of scarcity. Given this, a reasonable first hypothesis is that we should expect shifts
in petroleum prices to influence the likelihood of the introduction of policies designed to
mitigate the economic costs of these increased long-run prices. Further, if petroleum
32 This formulation of the liberal convergence hypothesis follows others who have argued that deregulation and
privatization leads to a change in the nature of state intervention in economies, rather than an absence of state
intervention altogether.
prices are an important indicator of relative scarcity, then we should expect high long-run
prices to lead greater policy intervention designed to mitigate petroleum security of
supply concerns.
Certainly this is what we observed in short-term policy-responses in the period
leading up to and including the oil shocks. Policymakers in the advanced industrial
countries identified energy supply insecurities, alongside the Soviet Union, as a threat
capable of undermining the free world, and national governments intervened heavily in
petroleum and other markets to manage the consequences of price increases, and reduce
the likelihood of future shocks. Following this, however, petroleum prices stagnated,
oscillating between ten and twenty dollars per barrel from 1986-2001, before beginning
to increase once again from 2001. Indeed, in late 2007 spot prices breached one hundred
dollars per barrel, equaling the peak price of the 1970s in inflation-adjusted terms.
This increase in the price of petroleum offers, I argue, a second opportunity to
examine liberal convergence in the petroleum sector. If we observe an increase in policy
intervention designed to enhance national control over petroleum resources, even after
the broad shift towards liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s, this
suggests that the shift to liberal forms of governance in the petroleum sector are subject
to renegotiation. If, on the other hand, we do not observe policies designed to enhance
national control in the recent period of high prices (although we may see the introduction
of other types of policies), we can infer that the transformation in government-market
relations are likely to endure in the petroleum sector.
H2: An increase in petroleum prices, following the "treatment" of
liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s, may be correlated
with an increase in policy intervention, but is not correlated with an
increase in strategic policy intervention.
Graph 1: Heuristic of Prediction Drawn from Liberal Convergence
Liberal Prediction about Strategic Intervention in Petroleum Market
Time
3. Definitions
The dependent variable is defined in this study as strategic intervention in
petroleum markets. The term strategic is commonly used but ill-defined. In this study I
define strategic intervention as policy intervention designed to increase national control
over the production, transportation, and distribution of a given resource or good."
Although control through military conquest is one strategy for ensuring national control
over oil, in this study I used strategic intervention to refer primarily one of two other
3I use the term "policy intervention" rather than "government intervention" because in the model I am proposing
policy outcomes emerge from a bargaining process that involve the active participation of parts of government, but
which the government does not necessarily dominate. Throughout the study I also use the term "national control"
synonymously with strategic policy intervention throughout the study
outcomes: 1) the creation and/or support for national oil companies, with the goal of
increasing their share of the domestic market for oil and oil products, and share of
production upstream; 2) policies designed to increase the share of oil produced
domestically, as a ratio of total domestic consumption, on energy security grounds. Both,
I argue, serve to increase national control over the petroleum supply chain.
I define all outcomes other than strategic intervention as a convergence towards
liberal policy outcomes. This is justified, I argue, because of the difference in both the
goals of the policy, and the instruments used to achieve it. Firstly, and most
fundamentally, the rejection of strategic intervention represents a shift towards market
based transactions in order to secure the supply of oil and oil products; that is, accepting
arms-length contracting as the best method for securing the supply of oil and oil
products.34 Secondly, the instruments used to intervene strategically in the market,
described in detail below, have typically included ownership of national oil firms and/or
the use of trade, fiscal and regulatory policy instruments to discriminate in favor of
production by national firms or within national boundaries on strategic grounds. A shift
away from the application of these policies, therefore, represents a move away from
discrimination based on the nationality of firms and the use of trade barriers, and a
convergence on national non-discrimination and increasingly open trade. Each are
hallmarks of a convergence on liberal policy outcomes."
It is also worth noting that this study does not directly address other
justifications for intervention in petroleum markets, most importantly policies designed to
34 This distinction follows Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern
World (New York: Basic Books, 1986).
Susanne Soederberg, Georg Menz, and Philip G. Cemy, Internalizing Globalization : The Rise ofNeoliberalism and
the Decline ofNational Varieties of Capitalism (Basingstoke UK; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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mitigate the environmental externalities associated with the burning of fossil fuels, which
have emerged as an important driver of government intervention in energy markets. For
governments with domestically located energy resources, revenue or employment goals
may also provide a rationale for policy intervention.36 My definition also recognizes that
policies designed to manage the reliance on external sources for the supply of petroleum
need not lead to direct intervention in petroleum markets, but instead to intervention in
the markets for goods that act as partial substitutes, or to other policy responses. Common
responses to the oil shocks of the 1970s, for example, saw governments encourage a shift
of energy demand into markets for partial substitutes for petroleum products, such as
nuclear power, coal, or natural gas. Other modes of intervention sought to promote
technologies that increase the efficiency of energy use, but do not increase national
control over the production of petroleum.
Finally, in this study I also do not address policy interventions designed to
substitute for petroleum or reduce aggregate demand for energy. This is primarily
because I am interested in identifying if countries continue to implement policies
designed to enhance national control or not. I recognize, however, that this introduces the
possibility of omitted variable bias. It is plausible, for example, that outcomes in the
petroleum sector are determined in part by the success or failure of policy initiatives in
the markets for goods that act as partial substitutes for petroleum products. I have made
this choice for logistical and substantive reasons. Logistically, understanding the causes
of variation in patterns of government intervention across the full range of policy options
lies beyond the scope of a single study. Substantively, my findings show that the policy
36 On the interaction of policy interventions in the environment and energy security see International Energy Agency,
Energy Security and Climate Policy: Assessing Interactions (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2007).
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strategies and preferences of domestic political actors are the most important determinant
of liberal convergence. This means results are unlikely to be systematically biased in one
direction or another given that different political actors and firms operate in each of the
sectors. The empirical chapters also show that budget constraints do not force trade-offs
between policies in the petroleum sector and substitutes that are significant enough to
change the value of the dependent variable. To take two examples, the decision by the
Carter Administration to decontrol crude oil and petroleum product choices by 1981 was
not affected by the decision to implement a synthetic fuels program; both policies were
pursued simultaneously. Similarly, the implementation of a comparatively successful
program in Japan aimed at making the use of energy more efficient was unrelated to the
decision to deregulate the downstream petroleum sector in the ten years from 1986-1996.
3.1 Measuring Strategic Intervention
National firms operating in the oil sector have been central to policies designed
to enhance national control over the petroleum supply chain. A review of national
policies across time demonstrates, however, that a broader range of policy instruments
have been applied in the attempt to enhance strategic control over petroleum markets. In
order to understand variation in policies designed to enhance national control, therefore,
it is necessary not only to investigate patterns of direct ownership over firms, but also to
incorporate trade, regulatory, and fiscal policy instruments.
In this study I divide policy interventions into direct and indirect types. Direct
intervention is defined as market intervention through government ownership of a
corporate entity. Indirect intervention, on the other hand, is defined as policy intervention
designed to redistribute benefits in the marketplace in order to enhance strategic control.
A typology of the instruments used to measure outcomes in this study is
presented below."
Direct Indirect
Instrument Ownership Fiscal Trade Regulatory
1) Equity participation / 1. Tax/tax exemptions 1. Import/export tariff 1. Licensing (non-trade)
"golden share" 2. Credit instruments 2. Import/export license 2. Volumetric or price
Example 2) Total/partial ownership (subsidies, loan controls
3) Military guarantees) 3. Technical regulations
3. Diplomacy
a) Ownership
Governments can participate directly in energy markets through the ownership of,
or equity participation in, national energy firms. Indeed, a number of the major European
integrated oil firms were originally established, or operated, under varying degrees of
government control, with ownership aimed at promoting strategic energy goals. BP, for
example, was originally incorporated as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1909, with
the British Government taking a controlling stake during World War One. Total was
created as the Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles (CFP) in 1924 by the French
government for strategic reasons. After World War Two, ENI (1953), Deminex (1969),
and Repsol-predecessor INH (1981) were established by the governments of Italy,
Germany, and Spain to promote national control over energy resources.
This is not to assume that ownership or equity participation translates into
effective governmental control, as noted in chapter one. During the first oil crisis of
3 Adapted from International Energy Agency, The Role of IEA Governments in Energy: 1996 Update (Paris:
International Energy Agency, 1996), 24. Kitschelt etal draw a similar distinction in describing measures of the political
determination of resource allocation, differentiating between: i) the direct ownership of productive resources; ii)
indirect intervention via subsidies, taxes and regulations. See Kitschelt et al., "Convergence and Divergence in
Advanced Capitalist Democracies", 439.
1973-4 for example, the British government of Edward Heath was unable to persuade BP
to break existing contracts in order to guarantee physical supplies of petroleum to Great
Britain, despite holding majority shares in the company. Nevertheless, some form of
ownership of a firm operating directly in the petroleum market is a common strategy
utilized by governments in the pursuit of strategic energy goals.
Ownership also need not take the form of direct government participation in
upstream activities such as exploration and production, or downstream activities such as
refining or the marketing and sales of petroleum products. Government ownership in
South Korea and Japan, for example, has taken the form of a public company charged
with providing subsidies and other fiscal transfers to Korean and Japanese private sector
firms operating in the petroleum industry.
A related option for pursuing ownership is through the use of military
instruments. The use of military force can secure territory within which petroleum
resources lie, for example, allowing national firms to exploit these resources. The
military strategies of both Germany and Japan during World War Two were partially
designed towards this end. The economic exploitation of colonial possessions by France
and Japan during the colonial period was also backed by the use of military force.
It is also worth noting, however, that while military force can be used in the
pursuit of national control over petroleum resources, it need not be used towards this end.
U.S. military forces during the tanker wars between Iran and Iraq, for example, were used
not to secure oil for U.S. consumption alone, but rather to ensure the safe passage of oil
tankers through the Straits of Hormuz. President Carter's announcement that the U.S. was
willing to use military force in order to ensure that no power monopolizes access to
Middle Eastern oil resources is similarly designed not to ensure exclusive U.S. access,
but to guarantee an open market by denying third-party states the ability to monopolize
crude reserves from major producing countries and regions.
Finally, although it is not an outcome observed in the period under investigation
in this study, asserting national control over the petroleum supply chain through military
means is an alternative form of ownership, although this necessarily leads to the
exploitation of resources within the captured territory following annexation. The decision
by France and the United Kingdom to invade the area surrounding the Suez Canal is one
example of the use of military force to increase national control over oil supplies.
Another is the attempt by the Japanese Imperial Army to secure access to oil resources by
annexing the Dutch East Indies.
b) Market Shaping - Fiscal
Fiscal instruments can be applied in a variety of forms in the pursuit of strategic
energy goals. Examples include the provision of soft loans or direct subsidies to national
firms engaged in the petroleum sector in order to improve their ability to secure the rights
to upstream exploration and development projects, the application of preferential tax
rates, or the provision of aid or loans to governments in petroleum producing countries,
with the same goal.
c) Market Shaping - Trade
Trade instruments shift the relative prices of imports and exports in order to
encourage the consumption or production of domestic goods over imports. In the
petroleum sector this can be done to encourage the production of domestic petroleum
resources in countries with a domestic resource base. Alternatively, import taxes on
petroleum products, coupled with low taxes on crude oil imports, can increase strategic
control over the production chain by encouraging the construction of refineries
domestically. Tariffs or quotas applied to exports of petroleum products or crude oil can
also be used in an attempt to enhance energy security of supply.
d) Market Shaping - Regulatory
Non-trade regulatory instruments represent a further mode of intervention
employed to enhance strategic energy goals. Examples include restrictions on the amount
of equity in national petroleum firms able to be held by non-nationals, licensing or other
administrative controls over the establishment or transferal of petroleum assets within
national borders, and discriminatory pricing that encourages the development of domestic
resources.
3.2 Coding Strategic Intervention Versus Other Types of Policy Intervention
Each of the policy instruments detailed above need not be used in order to
enhance strategic control over petroleum resources. Rather, they can also be used in the
pursuit of other policy goals. An example of non-strategic application of ownership as a
policy instrument, for example, is the direct ownership of the British National Oil
Corporation (BNOC) and Statoil of Norway by the governments of each of these
countries, with the goal of capturing a greater share of revenues from the exploitation of
domestically located resources. A second example of the non-strategic use of a policy
instrument is the use of differential tax rates in order to change the domestic fuel mix in
ways that enhance environmental goals, for example, by increasing the price of coal. A
regulatory measure that forces energy firms to purchase a given percentage of renewable
or low carbon emitting energy sources are a functionally equivalent policy alternative. In
a country with a large coal resource base, on the other hand, policy might shift energy
consumption towards coal for strategic reasons.
Distinguishing between the purpose of policy choices requires us to understand
not only if a particular policy instrument is implemented, but also the purpose of
intervention. In the cases of France and Japan this is less complicated: both countries
have few domestic oil resources and there are few positive spillover effects associated
with supporting oil firms in terms of employment, technological innovation, or other
benefits. This means that policies discriminating in favor of domestic oil firms can be
categorized as being designed to enhance the control of national firms over oil with
greater confidence. In the case of the United States the existence of domestic oil
resources makes categorizing the purpose of policy intervention more difficult. Given
that policies have been designed to increase domestic production as a share of total
consumption and have not explicitly shaped the market to the benefit of U.S. firms, it can
more plausibly be argued they are aimed at increasing tax revenues or economic growth
through the promotion of domestic industry. I resolve this problem by coding as strategic
intervention all policies designed to increase domestic production of crude oil, and where
the goal of the policy, as stated by the president, is to increase national production in
order to make the United States more energy independent.
3.3 Selection of Cases
The universe of cases defined in this study is the major petroleum consuming
countries. Within this universe of cases, the focus of the study lies in the institutions
governing the petroleum sector in Japan, the United States, and France. Two strategies
have been used in the selection of these cases. First, they have been selected because they
are important, representing the geographic spread of the major petroleum consuming
countries. The United States and Japan have been, within the universe of cases,
consistently the largest two consumers of petroleum during the period under study.
France, on the other hand, is the second largest consumer (behind Germany) within
Europe, with Europe the third major petroleum importing region globally.38
The second rationale for selecting cases is to ensure they do not systematically
bias results in one direction. Each country relies on international market significantly for
the supply of petroleum during the period under study (see appendix), ensuring the key
question of the degree of 'strategicness' is held about constant for each of the cases.
Further, the cases selected do not bias outcomes because of a lack of variation in
domestic institutions or actor interests. Each has a very different institutional structures
and different actors operating within the petroleum sector. Japan, for example, is a
parliamentary system with relatively weak firms internationally operating in the
petroleum sector, but a powerful bureaucratic actor in the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry (METI). France, on the other hand, maintains a presidential system and a
strong bureaucratic actor in the energy sector. France's colonial legacy, unlike Japan, also
left it the legacy of a powerful integrated oil major operating in the petroleum sector:
38 France also represents a harder case for the neoliberal convergence hypothesis than Germany, given its long-standing
interventionist policies in the petroleum sector through policies designed to enhance national control.
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Total.39 Finally, the United States offers a contrast to both Japan and France. The United
States has a domestic petroleum resource base, although growth in consumption has
meant these reserves have been inadequate to meet domestic demand since the 1960s. Yet
as a result of this resource base the United States has developed strong producer firm
interests with a powerful, but not overwhelming voice in petroleum policy setting.
Further, the United States' DoE and Department of the Interior, which are the
departments competent in energy policy setting, are bureaucratically weak. Power is also
diffused within the presidential U.S. decisionmaking system, which maintains a strong
separation between the executive and legislature.
4. Presentation of Outcomes
4.1 Measuring Policy Outcomes
Outcomes for Japan, France, and the United States, are measured for the four
policy instruments identified above. The multiple instruments of policy intervention
cannot effectively be combined into a single index, confounding quantification of the
dependent variable without introducing the possibility of significant measurement error.
Further, although proxies for the magnitude of government intervention, such as
budgetary spending or levels of taxation or subsidies, appear plausible surrogates for
aggregate policy intervention, the validity of using single measures such as these is
undermined through the conflation of the ends of intervention itself; as noted earlier,
strategic intervention represents only one rationale for the application of policy in the
petroleum market, other being environmental, or budgetary. Using a single measure, such
39 Total is the fourth largest integrated oil major globally, and was created from the merger of Total (formerly CFP) and
Elf-Aquitaine (formerly Elf-ERAP) in 2000.
as taxation levels or budgetary outlays, therefore, is likely to lead to an overestimation of
the degree of strategic intervention.
Given these problems, I employ two alternative approaches to coding policy
outcomes. First, I apply a simple framework to measure policy outcomes across the three
states. Outcomes are summarized by a coding schema of +/- corresponding to whether
strategic intervention occurs or not. These outcomes are presented in more detail in table
three, where also I note the most significant change in each country case, sorted by
instrument. The second method for assessing outcomes is qualitative, in which I
summarize changes in policy change in each country across time.
Table 2: Summary of Outcomes by Policy Instrument
1970-1980 Japan United States France
Ownership + -
Fiscal + -
Trade + + +
Regulatory + + +
1981-2000 Japan United States France
Ownership (-) 
-
-
Fiscal (-) 
-
-
Trade - - -
Regulatory - +
2001-2006 Japan United States France
Ownership + - -
Fiscal +- -
Trade - -
Regulatory - -
Table 3: Outcomes in Detail
Country SubSector Outcome: 1980s-1990s Outcome: 2000s
Upstream - Liberalize prices - Prices remain liberalized
United - Reduced regulatory support - Intervention reinvigorated
States
Downstream 
- Status quo (non-intervention) 
- Status-quo (non-intervention)
France Upstream - Privatize firms - Firms remain privatized
Downstream 
- Remove trade barriers 
- Trade remains unrestricted
Upstream - Privatize firms
Japan - Commit to exit market - Intervention reinvigorated
Downstream 
- Remove trade and regulatory 
- Trade remains unrestrictedbarriers
4.2 Japan - Summary of Outcomes
Of the cases identified in this study, Japan has the smallest indigenous share of
petroleum resources; its economy is reliant on the international market for ninety-eight
percent of its petroleum requirements. Further, petroleum represents the most significant
share in of fuels within Japan's energy mix, despite the use of a range of policy
instruments designed to shift domestic energy demand away from crude oil and towards
substitutes such as natural gas and nuclear energy.
Japanese policy intervention in the petroleum market was conditioned by this
almost total lack of domestic reserves of petroleum, and the absence of colonial
possessions that afforded some control over energy resources.4 The first industry
40 The position of Japan stands in contrast to both France, which had concessions in the Middle East as well as
legislation, passed into law in 1934, gave the government the authority to control trade
flows and refining capacity through licensing, as well as control prices and distribute
market share between domestic refiners and marketers. The law also gave the
government the authority to provide subsidies to firms for domestic exploration and
production.
The entry of Japan into membership of the major international bodies regulating
international commerce following the Pacific War led to a new law that mirrored the
1934 petroleum industry law. Like the previous law, it conferred on government the
authority to use licensing and other regulatory instruments in the attempt to increase the
market share of Japanese refiners and distributors in the domestic market. The use of
policy instruments also extended to trade. The government was able to regulate imports
of crude oil and petroleum products through a licensing scheme, and also banned the
export of crude oil. A public corporation was established to provide fiscal support, in the
form of subsidies and low-interest loans, to Japanese private sector firms operating in
exploration and production internationally."
In contrast to the high level of policy intervention that existed prior to and
following the Pacific War, Japanese policy during the 1980 to 2000 period converged on
the neoliberal consensus. First, domestic controls over refining began to be loosened in
1986, and by 1996 the use of regulatory instruments designed to increase the domestic
market share of Japanese firms in refining and distribution was abolished. In its place,
petroleum producing colonial possessions in Algeria. It also contrasts with the United States, which has significant
domestic petroleum reserves of its own.
41 See Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical
Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
Japan retained a significant volume of strategic petroleum reserves, as mandated by the
IEA and are to be used under emergency conditions only.
Strategic policy intervention designed to increase the volume of oil produced by
Japanese firms was also reduced both quantitatively and qualitatively. The public sector
corporation designed to provide subsidies was abolished in 2001, and an independent
committee established to review policy setting in the petroleum sector committed the
government to exiting the market after ten years, and following the privatization of
government held assets. Quantitative import targets for crude imported by Japanese firms
were abandoned in 2001.
The 2001-2006 period saw a partial reversal of the liberalization and
privatization policies of the 1980-2000 period. In the domestic market there was no
reregulation. In exploration and production, however, quantitative targets for equity oil
held by Japanese firms were reestablished in 2003, and a new public corporation was
given a greater mandate to invest in upstream projects carried out by Japanese firms.
4.3 United States - Summary of Outcomes
The United States is unique among the cases examined in this study because of
the significant domestic petroleum reserves located within its national borders. Indeed,
until the discovery of oil reserves in the Middle East, production in the U.S. constituted
the largest share of the world crude market. Nevertheless, policies designed to enhance
strategic control were a component of U.S. petroleum policies. The impulse in the case of
the United States centered on increasing "energy independence," defined as increasing
the share of oil produced domestically as a ratio of total domestic oil consumption.4 2
Standard Oil dominated the crude oil industry within the United States prior to
its breakup by court order in 1911. Overproduction, rather than strategic intervention,
was the initial cause for government intervention in the domestic petroleum market,
however, and this occurred most significantly at the state level. In 1919 the Texas
Railroad Commission ordered that production wells should be placed forty feet apart, in a
bid to restrain production. The federal government, on the other hand, restrained
production on lands it owned the property rights to, and in 1932 imposed both an import
tariff and limits on inter-state trade in oil, with the goal of limiting domestic production.
Increased regulatory controls during World War Two were largely dismantled
under President Truman. The most significant increase in U.S. petroleum policy during
peacetime followed, however, in the imposition of first voluntary, and then compulsory,
quotas on the importation of crude oil under the Eisenhower Administration. This change
was introduced in response to the rapid increase in imports of crude oil in conjunction
with the increasing role of the Middle East in world crude production, and were
supported by the White House for reasons of national security, and firms for reasons of
42 Given the economic benefits to domestic producers this policy also entails, an alternative argument proposes that
such a policy is caused by regulatory capture, in which U.S. policy is driven by oil companies' lobbying of
congressional representatives in oil producing states, or through direct lobbying of the White House. Three salient
points about the dynamics of policy-setting in the United States in petroleum together undermine the explanatory power
of the regulatory capture argument, however. First, congressional representatives in oil producing states have rarely
initiated legislation, and have also often failed to secure their preferred policy outcome in the face of opposition from
the White House or other congressional members. Second, evidence shows both that the White House is the major
initiator of proposals for changing U.S. energy policy, and that proposals to increase U.S. supply as a ratio of total
consumption come from presidents from both Democratic and Republican sides and across many decades. This is an
unlikely outcome unless rather heroic assumptions are made about the ability of private U.S. oil firms to successfully
capture energy policy in each presidency regardless of its political leanings. Third, the argument of regulatory capture
ignores the face that the most powerful domestic oil firms, in the form of the progeny of Standard Oil, have not been
strong supporters of increasing domestic production. Rather it has been the smaller, and less influential, independents
that have been the strongest supporters of such policies. For details see chapter four, the empirical chapter on the
United States.
protection. Voluntary controls were first implemented in 1954, and then were renewed in
1957. Voluntary restraints were made mandatory in 1959, meaning that crude oil could
not be imported without a license issued by the Secretary of the Interior. These controls
were established under the national security provisions of the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1954.
Mandatory import quotas was maintained for the next fourteen years. An
attempt under the Nixon Administration to abolish the quota system in favor of tariffs
failed, however this was carried out under the Ford Administration. Price controls were
also maintained following their imposition for inflationary reasons in 1971, along with
other goods. Prices on petroleum products were maintained even after those of other
goods were freed in 1974, however. Further, a new regime was put in place in August
1973 under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) that set a two-tiered
pricing system in place, with the objective of providing incentives to firms to explore and
produce more oil domestically. Further, under the Ford Administration, licensing
procedures for exploration and production on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) were
loosened to encourage drilling. Imports of crude oil were also taxed more heavily than
domestic oil, at an initial rate of one dollar per barrel from February 1975, and then an
addition dollar in June of the same year.
The 1978 National Energy Act passed by Congress during the Carter
Administration promoted national production. This was done through a mix of both
demand and supply measures. On the supply side, an Energy Security Corporation was
created in order to create oil substitutes, while an Energy Mobilization Board was
designed to streamline regulatory processing for energy related projects. Tax and other
incentives were also put in place to encourage the development of oil shale within the
United States. Most importantly for domestic oil production, however, was the decontrol
of oil prices, which was put in place under the Energy Production and Conservation Act
(EPCA) of 1975. Gradual decontrol of prices began in June 1979, and was scheduled to
be completed by September 1981. The goal of price decontrol was to encourage domestic
production, which had been dampened by the ceilings placed on the prices of crude oil
and a rage of petroleum products.
Full decontrol of prices was decreed by the Carter Administration, as noted
above. Upon entering office the Reagan Administration brought forward this decontrol of
prices by eight months. This marked the end of the application of trade instruments and
price controls, with the goal of boosting the production of crude within the United States
and on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The Reagan Administration also loosened
regulations governing the licensing of federal lands for exploration and production.
The major rationale for easing licensing procedures given by the Reagan
Administration was primarily given as boosting economic growth and reducing
government intervention in the economy, in line with its broader program, rather than the
promotion domestic production because of security of petroleum supply concerns.
Nevertheless, the goal of promoting energy 'self-sufficiency' was not absent from
presidential justifications for relaxing regulations used by the Energy Task Force
established by President Reagan. The Reagan Administration also initiated a review of
the national security implications of the fall in U.S. production associated with the
collapse of oil prices in 1986. It concluded that U.S. security would be boosted by
reducing the amount of imports.
As with the Reagan Administration, strategic intervention was also encouraged
under the Bush Administration. President Bush's initial proposals, developed by a
controversial task force headed by Vice President Dick Cheney, recommended a range of
measures, including opening drilling in the Arctic Natural Wildlife Reserve (ANWR) in
order to "decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil imports." Congressional debate over
the appropriate form of government intervention in the energy sector was highly
conflicted, and was also interrupted by the attacks of September 11, 2001. When the
House and Senate reconciled legislative versions passed in each house in 2005, the clause
promoting drilling ANWR had been removed. A range of lesser measures designed to
promote domestic exploration and production were introduced, focusing on accelerating
drilling on federal lands and the OCS. The justification for doing so was given as
reducing the share of imported oil as a share of U.S. consumption. Although by more
limited means than in the 1970s, therefore, strategic intervention remained a component
of U.S. policy during the 2000-2006 period, as in Japan.
4.4 France - Policy Outcomes
Intervention in the petroleum sector in France began with the imposition of
tariffs in 1871. These were, as in the case of the United States, designed to protect
domestic industry, in this case the French oil shale industry. That this was not driven by
strategic concerns can be inferred from the insignificance of oil as a fuel for both the
military, and in the civilian economy.
The French strategy to enhance strategic intervention in both the pre-war and
post-war periods was centered on national firms. These firms were supported by
subsidies, as well regulatory instruments designed to increase their market share within
domestic refining and marketing, the latter through a law passed in 1928. The first firm
organized by the state was the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP), which was
established as a public-private partnership in 1924 with the government holding thirty-
five percent of outstanding shares. The firm took advantage of the 23.75 percent stake it
received in the Iraqi Petroleum Company, following the signing of the Treaty of San
Remo, and later expanded into different areas.
The second group firm was Elf-ERAP, established as an umbrella firm after the
Second World War. Unlike CFP it was wholly government owned, and focused on
exploiting oil reserves discovered in the France Zone in North Africa and elsewhere.
What was to become the Elf-ERAP group was also granted a twenty-five percent share of
the domestic refining market by law through the Union Generale des Petroles (UGP). By
the 1960s, the combined share of CFP and Elf-ERAP in the French market for petroleum
products was approximately half, therefore reaching one of the major public policy goals
of the government in the petroleum market.
In the 1980-2000 period the French government wholly liberalized the
petroleum sector. In 1992 a new law was passed to replace the 1928 petroleum law.
Imports and exports of crude oil and petroleum products were liberalized. The
government retained emergency stocks of petroleum, as mandated by the European
Commission and the International Energy Agency (IEA), but these were marked for use
in emergency periods only. As part of the liberalization of trade in crude and crude
products the licensing system maintained by the French government since 1928 was also
abolished.
In terms of privatization, both the Elf-Aquitaine group and the CFP group (now
known under the brand of Total) were wholly privatized over the 1980-2000 period.
Completing this process, the two firms merged in 2000 to create the fourth largest global
integrated oil major, when measured in terms of market capitalization. As part of the
privatization, and merger, process, the French government relinquished its golden share
in Elf, which had given it the right to stop non-French firms from acquiring a stake in the
firm.
The French government, echoing Japanese policy, released a National Energy
Strategy (Strategie energetique Nationale) in 2005. The law was designed to promote
energy security of supply, as well as achieve environmental goals. Policy initiatives
designed to revitalize France's long-standing strategy of promoting national control over
the petroleum supply chain, however, were wholly absent. Instead the law focused on
controlling energy demand and diversifying fuel types, as well as energy related research
and development, and the stability of energy transmission and storage networks. The
increase in petroleum prices, therefore, did not lead to a revitalization of strategic
intervention, as it did in the case of Japan.
PART II: Explaining Outcomes
5. Restatement of Puzzle
How are we to explain the outcomes outlined above? How can we best explain
variation in strategic intervention within countries across time? And how can we explain
variation across countries, most notably the transformation of policies of national control
in the case of France, in contrast to Japan and the United States, where we observe
apparent convergence on more liberal policy outcomes, followed by a reemergence of
strategic intervention in both cases?
5.1 Explaining Policy Change
Explaining the variation identified above requires us to identify the most
important actors, their interests, and how and why their preferences over outcomes
changed over time. In this study I argue that two sets of actors are particularly important
in determining whether strategic intervention continued to be pursued as a component of
policy: state actors in the executive (bureaucratic and political) with responsibility for oil
policy, and firms engaged in the oil sector.
Including firms and political actors from within the state means this study takes
a middle path between the two opposing views of the drivers of oil policy: realist-
mercantilism and regulatory capture. In the former the interests of the state are assumed
to lie in maximizing national security and the state, as a unitary actor, is assumed to
determine policy outcomes. In the latter, policies implemented in the national interest are
assumed to be a fagade behind which firms vie to increase economic rents by raising
barriers to market entry. The state, in this understanding of policy outcomes, is
understood as passive, implementing policy demands derived from firm interests.43
In contrast, the argument here is that the existence of strategic intervention is a
function of the policy strategies adopted by both actors state and firms.44 As such, I argue
that strategic intervention has never been solely about securing oil. For firms, for
example, it has also been about securing competitive advantage within the international
oil market. For bureaucratic and policymakers, on the other hand, the goal of enhancing
security over oil supplies was met through policies of national control, however, these
policies also served organizational and political interests, such as increasing budgets and
responding to political demands from the voting public, as described below.
I argue that the interests of both were met most of the twentieth century through
policies designed to achieve this goal. The oil shocks, and the shift in market structure
they represented, I argue, led to a period of renegotiation, under which both sets of actors
reexamined whether strategic intervention remained in their interests. Further, these
actors were forced to bargain with others both inside and outside the state when
attempting to determine which policy instruments could be applied. In the case of France,
for example, the national oil firms determined that strategic intervention was no longer in
their interests. State actors in the Ministry of Industry, whose organizational mission was
to support these firms, therefore also lost interest in promoting strategic intervention.
There was therefore little opposition to proposals from the European Commission, and
within the Ministry of Finance, to increase competition in the sector; the former with the
43 A summary of this position can be found in Richard A. Posner, "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of
Economics and Management Science 5, no. 2 (1974), 335-358.
44 In this sense my argument follows that of Milner. See Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information:
Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997).
goal of completing an internal market for energy, and the latter with the hope that greater
competition would contribute to lower inflation. In the cases of Japan and the United
States, on the other hand, firms and state actors continued to have an interest in
maintaining policies of strategic control. Although adjustments were made in the
particular instruments used to promote these policies in response to changes in the
structure of the oil market, and the position of other societal and state actors, policies of
national control were not wholly jettisoned as in the case of France.4 5
Including actors from within the state, as well as firms, makes it explicit that
while the two actors are dependent on the others in the pursuit of their interests, each
have their own sets of underlying preferences over outcomes that may or may not align in
the pursuit of national control. Governments depend, by necessity, on industry, for
example, yet have imperfect control over firm decisionmaking. Firms themselves also
have interests that may, or may not, coincide with those of state actors; while state
support can be useful to them, it can also constrain them. This is the case even when the
state has created oil firms, as occurred in Japan and France.
Where the interests of the industry and the state have not aligned, I find that
firms have often successfully opposed policies promoted by the state, although state
actors have also been able to introduce policies opposed by firms. In the case of the
United States, in particular, state actors and firms have had a more arms-length, and less
coalitional relationship. Nevertheless, state actors' pursuit of strategic control through
increasing the share of domestic crude production as a ratio of total consumption
45 For a review of theories of government regulation that distinguishes between supply and demand theories of
regulation, and also presents an explanation that incorporates both supply and demand see Nathaniel 0. Keohane,
Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins, "The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy," Harvard
Environmental Law Review 22 (1988).
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necessarily promoted domestic industry. Industry also successfully resisted proposals to
increase state intervention in the sector, and attempted to shape state policies in support
of their interests.
The relationship between state actors and firms is therefore complex. Neither
are wholly independent from one another: state actors must pursue strategic intervention
through promoting industry, while firms may find it useful to promote competitiveness
through the use of policies requiring action by the state. Yet at the same time both have a
set of underlying preferences that need not be pursued through strategic intervention. I
propose that when public matched private purpose, as it did for most of the twentieth
century as firms sought market share and profits, and state actors sought security of
supplies as their overriding goal, the policy regime in favor of strategic intervention
obtained. The effects of the change in the structure of the oil market, reflected by
increasing price volatility, led both sets of actors to review existing policies. When the
policy strategy adopted by one, or both, of these actors diverged from strategic
intervention, I find that the policy regime in support of strategic intervention was
transformed, and replaced by a more liberal response in the petroleum sector to the
problem of relying on the international market for the supply of oil. Where state actors
and domestic industry were able to find a new policy equilibrium that met their
preferences and retained a focus on national control, then policies were adjusted but not
jettisoned.
5.2 State Actor and Firm Interests, and Preferences, Over Policy Outcomes
In this study I view both state actors and firms as seeking to advance their
interests in a rational way in strategic interaction with others.46 I assume interests are
fixed, but preferences over policy outcomes can shift as these policies become more or
less able to satisfy these interests. I pay particular attention to the effects of shifts in the
international petroleum market on the viability of existing policies, and therefore the
preferences of state actors and firms over policy outcomes.
5.2.1 State Actor Interests and Preferences Over Policy Outcomes
Putting the interests of state actors and firms at the heart of the explanation of
policy change raises the question of the origins of their interests. In this study I propose
the interests of state actors, whether political or bureaucratic, lies in their organizational
and political incentives.47 For economic and financial ministries with the organizational
mission of managing the oil sector, lack of access to refined petroleum products, or
volatile prices for these products, represents a threat to their ability to successfully carry
out this mission. For political representatives, on the other hand, inflation driven by
higher prices for petroleum products, or at the extreme the inability of consumers to
obtain these products, leads them to suffer political costs such as the failure of their
legislative program, or a loss at the ballot box. Each, therefore, has an interest in ensuring
the stable supply of crude oil and the products refined from it.
46 Following Scharpf, as cited in Peter A. Hall and David W Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 6.
47 A summary of strategies for assigning state actor preferences see Peter A. Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning,
and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain," Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (1993). See also
Andrew B. whitford, "Competing Explanations for Bureaucratic Preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics 19, no. 3
(2007).
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This fact alone does not, however, lead state actors responsible for oil to choose
a particular policy strategy. Rather, multiple responses are possible, as noted above. In
this study I am interested in whether and why states pursue policies designed to enhance
national control. I therefore categorize policy outcomes according to whether strategic
intervention is a component of oil policies or not. The question is how state actors choose
the former policy in addition to others. The inability of any strategy to wholly mitigate
the problems of supply and price volatility inherent in the structure of the petroleum
market means the choice between the two is not obvious.
I argue that state actors choose according to whether the policy promotes
political or organizational interests. In the cases of Japan and France, where economic
ministries have been the major state actors involved in petroleum decisionmaking, a
major organizational interest in addition to ensuring stable supplies of petroleum lies in
promoting domestic industrial competitiveness. For Japan, for example, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is the bureaucratic organization responsible for the
energy sector, and had a long-standing organizational mission of promoting the
international competitiveness of Japanese industry in addition to coordinating long-term
responses to volatility in the oil sector.4 8 GATT-induced liberalization forced METI to
abandon the use of its formal tools of industrial policy over ongoing rounds of
multilateral negotiations. Promoting firms therefore remained an important organizational
mission of METI , however; it responded not by abandoning its organizational mission of
promoting industrial competitiveness, but by supporting the interests of firms operating in
industries under its regulatory jurisdiction through the aggressive application of
48 The classic statement in English is Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth ofindustrial
Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).
multilateral trade rules. Importantly, the energy sector differs from other industrial
sectors in that it remains largely outside multilateral rule-making. This means the
application of METI's traditional tools of industrial policy remain viable, enabling it to
support firms through the use of traditional tools of industrial policy.49
Oil policy setting in France, as in Japan, has been dominated by bureaucratic
organizations and interests. The chief regulatory agency has been the Ministry of
Industry, which retained authority for monitoring the national oil companies and issuing
licenses for the importation of oil and oil products. Their role was complemented by the
Ministry of Finance (Ministry of Economy after 1978 when the Ministry of Finance was
split), which gained the authority to set prices domestically from 1976. Historically the
interests of both organizations lay in supporting industry. For the Ministry of Finance and
its successors maintaining price controls over domestic oil and oil products, and setting
these higher than the international price, ensured that the national oil companies could
carry out investments without draining the public purse."0 As a line ministry with
responsibility for regulating the oil sector on the other hand, the Ministry of Industry (and
particularly the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons, which was directly responsible for
oil policy setting) had an interest in supporting its clients, in the form of national firms
operating in the sector."
In the United States the major bureaucratic organizations charged with managing
oil policy, the Department of Energy (DoE) and Department of the Interior (Dol), are
49 For an investigation of the changes in MITI's policy strategy in response to pressure from GATT see Amy E.
Searight, "MITI and Multilateralism: The Evolution of Japan's Trade Policy in the Gatt Regime," (Pao Alto: Stanford
University, 1999).
50 Harvey B. Feigenbaum, The Politics ofPublic Enterprise: Oil and the French State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1985). As described in chapter five, this interest shifted to controlling inflation later, which led them
to support price liberalization in a falling oil price environment.
51 See Ibid. This is confirmed by the former Director of the DGH. Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-
1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July 18, 2008.
weak relative to their bureaucratic counterparts in Japan and France. Instead, the
president is the most important actor within the state responsible for initiating energy
policy. This is because the political implications of oil market volatility are structured
differently to many other policy problems in ways that increase the incentive for the
president to lead. Volatility in the oil market is viewed as a foreign policy issue by the
public. Although scholars have questioned the attentiveness of voters on foreign policy
issues, and therefore the influence of these types of issues on presidential popularity and
her ability to pass her legislative agenda, energy policy, in contrast to other questions of
foreign policy, concerns pocketbook issues for the voting public, and policy responses are
also primarily domestic." This makes energy policymaking salient for both the public
and Congress, and increases the incentive for the president to take the lead in crafting a
policy response. That presidents have an incentive to lead in oil policymaking is
suggested by the fact that every president since Richard Nixon has announced a
comprehensive energy policy, including for oil, soon after entering office."
What determines how the president is likely to respond? Like the bureaucratic
organizations of MITI and the Ministry of Industry, the president also responds to her
political incentives in crafting her response. The president first has an interest in
increasing her chances of reelection, and secondly in passing her preferred policy agenda.
On both counts the president must take into account public opinion, given the salience of
energy policy as an issue of importance for voters. If she fails to do so, then voters are
able to harm the president two ways. Firstly and most directly, they can vote her out
52 But see John H. Aldrich, John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue voting: Do Presidential
Candidates "Waltz before a Blind Audience?"" American Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989).
5 On the salience of foreign policy and domestic issues see Brandice Canes-Wrone and Kenneth W. Shotts, "The
Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness of Public Opinion," American Journal ofPolitical Science 48, no. 4
(2004).
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through elections, although the effects of this are limited in second terms. Secondly, they
can stymie the president as she seeks to achieve her interests by influencing the voting
behavior of congressional representatives. Congressional representatives, in turn, have an
incentive because of elections to reflect public opinion in addition to representing more
concentrated interests from their constituency. Putting the foreign policy character of the
problem, as well as its salience for voters, mean the president has a strong incentive to
take the lead on policymaking in the energy sector."
If the president must take into account public opinion in shaping her response to
oil market volatility, what does public polling suggest about the preferred policies of the
voting public? On this question the answer has been stable over time. As is shown
chapter six, the public strongly favors promoting energy independence by increasing the
ratio of domestic oil production to total oil consumed (although this is tempered by
environmental concerns). The president therefore has an incentive to respond to public
opinion by promoting increased domestic production of crude, so long as it does not
transgress the environmental concerns of voters. Indeed, although it has varied from
54 Ibid. Most scholarship recognizes a reciprocal relationship between public opinion and the policy positions taken by
presidents. That is, public opinion affects presidential policies, and presidents in turn are able to influence public
opinion. Page and Shapiro present the strongest evidence that public opinion shapes policy outcomes, especially in
areas where there is stable opinion over salient issues. Canes-Wrone finds that presidents are more responsive to public
opinion on issues that are familiar to voters in their everyday lives, as well as when presidential approval levels are not
high or when an election is close. She also finds that presidents are able to marshal public opinion in seeking to pass
her agenda through Congress, but that she tends to do this only for policy positions that already match public opinion.
Supporting this, Edwards III, Mitchell and Welch find that policy issues of high salience have a demonstrable effect on
the public standing of the president, and by extension the likelihood of her reelection and ability to pass her legislative
agenda through Congress. This gives her an incentive to respond to public opinion. In the other direction, Cohen finds
that the president is able to influence public opinion but her ability to do so is ephemeral. Canes-Wrone and Shotts,
"The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness of Public Opinion.", Brandice Canes-Wrone, Who Leads
Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public, Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2006), George C. Edwards III, William Mitchell, and Reed Welch, "Explaining
Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience," American Journal ofPolitical Science 39, no. 1 (1995);
Jeffrey E. Cohen, "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda," American Journal ofPolitical Science 39, no. I
(1995); Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy," American Political Science
Review 77, no. 1 (1983).
presidency to presidency and with changes in oil prices, energy independence has
remained a component of presidential proposals, and policy outcomes, since the 1970s.
5.2.2 The Role of Ideas in Shaping Preferred Policy Outcomes
An alternative method for assigning policy preferences of political and
bureaucratic actors is through ideas. It is possible, for example, that heuristics that
continue to frame the oil market as one in which supply interruption are likely to occur,
and likely to be of significant magnitude (as was possible in the early decades of the
international oil market) continue to inform political and bureaucratic policy preferences
in the oil sector. In this understanding of state actor preferences over policy outcomes it
would therefore be ideas about the nature of risk in the oil market, rather than
organizational or political incentives, that shape the likelihood policies of national control
will be chosen in addition to other over strategies for managing the problems associated
with relying on a highly-imperfect market for the supply of oil.
While this is possible, I believe the framing of interests and policy preferences
used here more plausibly identifies the reasons bureaucratic and political actors continue
to support strategic intervention across time. First, the evidence presented in the empirical
chapters suggests that there exist organizational and political incentives for continuing
with strategic intervention for actors within the state. Second, while some actors may
have believed that national control was the most appropriate response to volatility in the
international oil market, explaining the continued application of these policies across a
longer span of time can more plausibly be achieved by pointing to organizational and
political incentives, unless it is assumed that policymakers within Japan and the United
States across the three decades that make up this study all equally misunderstand the
character of the oil market.
5.2.3 Firm Interests and Preferences Over Policy Outcomes
I assume that firms are interested above all in maximizing profits. Within this
broad goal, I argue they can have preferences in favor of market or non-market (i.e.
policy-based) strategies. Which strategy they choose depends on their production profile.
I argue that less competitive firms are more likely to seek protection and support. More
competitive firms, on the other hand, are less likely to appeal for government protection,
and more likely to seek growth and profits through pursuing strategies focused on the
market.
In the petroleum sector competitiveness is closely linked to the degree of
vertical integration and firm size, because of the substantial economies of scale that exist
in the industry because of high capital costs, and greater profits generated through the
production and sale of crude oil." More vertically integrated, and more international,
firms are less likely to pursue support from government. Less vertically integrated,
domestically focused, firms, are more likely to seek protection, and support, from the
government.
This characterization of firm interests follows Milner, who argues that high
levels of international exposure shapes firm policy preferences against protection. The
proposals advanced here can be understood as an extension of Milner's thesis in two
ways. First, it applies Milner's insight to an important commodity market in which the
5 A non-vertically integrated firm focused on refining and distribution, for example, may oppose trade constraints
because its refineries are structured to sell to the international market, rather than simply the domestic market.
ownership of upstream resources is important to firm profitability, and necessitates
greater international exposure. Second, whole recognizing the importance of
competitiveness in driving firm preferences for seeking non-market strategies in order to
seek greater profits, my argument recognizes that protection is not the only type of
assistance sought by firms; firms can also seek subsidies and other benefits, as described
above. 56
Summary of Interests and Preferences Over Policy Outcomes
Firms
Not Competitive Competitive
Organizational
or Political Strategic Intervention Minimal or no S.I.
State Interest?
Actors NoOrganizational Minimal or no S.I. Liberal Convergence
or Political
Interest?
5.3 Mechanism of Change in Actor Preferences Over Policy Outcomes
How then, can we explain reproduction and change in the policies of strategic
intervention using the framework developed above? In this study I argue that changes in
the international petroleum market, expressed through long-run prices, represents an
important cause of actors changing their preferences over policy outcomes.57
Strategic intervention, I argue, has endured because it has continued to meet the
interests of both firms and state actors responsible for oil policy. For firms, national
control continued to benefit them by helping them to secure market share domestically,
56 See Helen v. Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
5 See chapter three for a discussion of the relationship between market structure and price. I do not propose that shifts
in long-run oil prices are the only cause of policy preference change. Empirical chapters detail less systematic
mechanisms driving shifts in the policy strategies of actors.
and also increase control over production internationally. This does not mean, however,
that such policies were introduced solely as a function of firm interests. Rather, national
control continued to be in the interests of state actors because it provided a road map of
how to insure against the risks associated with a reliance on a highly imperfect
international market for the supply of petroleum, while also meeting organization and
political goals.
I propose that changes in the structure of the oil market caused a search for new
policies for two reasons. First, for state actors responsible for oil policy setting, shifts in
the structure of the oil market undermined the efficacy of existing policies, leading them
to reassess the status quo. Second, firm strategies for maximizing profits are significantly
affected by changes in market structure and long-run petroleum prices, also leading them
to reassess the utility of the existing policies. More competitive firms - commonly
vertically integrated - are less likely to seek non-market strategies in response to changes
in market structure. Firms that are not vertically integrated (and therefore more reliant on
the domestic market), on the other hand, are more likely to pursue non-market strategies.
Third, renegotiation of existing policies between state actors responsible for oil policy
and firms, allowed other actors inside and outside the state to influence outcomes in order
to minimize the costs of policies on their own interests. Although this did not effect the
likelihood of strategic intervention being implemented or not, it did shape the instruments
used in order to promote this goal. A schematic diagram showing this framework is
shown below:
Initial Policy
Shift in Oil Setting
Market Srcure
Policy Review
Strategic Intervention in Interest of
State Actors/Domestic Firms?
Yes No
Negotiate with Other Actors Negotiate with Other Actors
Inside and Outside State Inside and Outside State
Policy Instruments of Strategic
Intervention Determined
Other Policy
Instruments Determined
5.4 Using the Framework to Explain Outcomes in Japan, the United States, and France
I argue that the framework presented above offers a more coherent explanation
for outcomes than explanations that relegate the importance of domestic actors' interests
and policy preferences, or that focus on learning by a unitary domestic actor. In the case
of France, for example, the repudiation of policies of national control occurred because of
a shift in the policy preferences of both state actors and the national firms. The shift in
policy outcomes was driven by the effect of shifts in the international petroleum market.
This undermined the existing regulatory structure designed to enhance strategic control
over petroleum through the promotion of national firms. Firms responded by shifting
outside the French market, taking advantage of their increasingly diversified portfolio of
assets internationally both in refining and production. This meant there was little interest
in protection. It also meant there was no interest in continuing to support firms from
within the Directorate of Hydrocarbons, which had been the major supporter of strategic
intervention. The general move of policy preferences towards liberalization and
privatization, and away from the etatisme that characterized much of French economic
policymaking from the end of the Second World War, by other actors within the state,
and the push of the European Commission to integrate the energy markets of member
countries, met state actors responsible for oil, and firms, that were no longer interested in
maintaining the status quo.58 Further, this disinterest of both state actors, and firms, in
support for national control led to continued support for liberalization and privatization
under conditions higher oil prices in the 2000s.
In the case of the United States, the adjustment of the existing policies of
strategic intervention also occurred because of a shift in the policy preferences of state
actors and firms. Unlike in France, however, strategic intervention was not wholly
rejected. This is because the existence of domestic resources meant that it remained in the
interest of the president and domestically-focused firms, to continue to promote
increasing domestic production in the name of energy independence. The outcome has
therefore not been total rejection of the institutions of national control, but rather their
adjustment away from the use of trade quotas and tariffs to promote domestic production,
58 For a similar argument see Andrew Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 37. This
argument matches outcomes in terms of the relatively smooth process of petroleum liberalization in France, in contrast
to that of the electricity and gas sectors. In the latter firms have been far more resistant to initiating policies designed to
converge on the neoliberal market model, because they have more to lose from doing so given their reliance on the
French domestic market for revenues.
and towards more limited questions of federal leasing. This matches the interests of the
president, who is interested in implementing policies that respond to oil price volatility
but also are politically popular, and firms, which seek to obtain access to exploration and
development opportunities.
In the case of Japan, like in the United States and in contrast to France, policy
restructuring did not lead to a complete abandonment of strategic intervention. Rather,
the abandonment of controls over trade reflected a decision to discard trade instruments
as a means for enhancing strategic control because of the failure of those policies to
promote the competitiveness of Japanese firms. The privatization of JNOC assets also
reflected the poor performance of these firms thanks to changes on long-run petroleum
prices, and a subsequent attempt to recalibrate the policy setting, rather than the
abandonment of national control as a policy goal. Once again, this matched the interests
of firms, which continued to demand policy support from the government given their lack
of competitiveness in the international petroleum market, and left open the possibility of
a renewal of policy instruments in support of national control under conditions of high
long-run oil prices.
Summary of Outcomes - Empirical Cases Inserted
Firms
Less Competitive More Competitive
Organizational Japan Upstream (2000 -) France Downstream (1980 - )
or Political U.S. Independents Upstream U.S. Majors Upstream (1980-)
State Goal? (1980-)
Actors NoOrganizational Japan Downstream (1980 - 2000) Japan Downstream (2000 -)
or Political France Upstream (1980 -)
Goal?
6. Data and Methods
The dependent variable in this study is national policies designed to ensure
security of petroleum supplies in Japan, France, and the United States. It is a
dichotomous variable, taking the value of strategic intervention, or non-strategic (liberal)
intervention. It is measured through the four instruments identified above, with evidence
drawn from laws and regulations in each of these countries. Policy outcomes are, as
argued above, a function of the policy preferences of political/bureaucratic and firm
actors (independent variables).
6.1 Evidence Used to Identify State Actor Policy Strategies
The first set of actors identified in this study as important to outcomes are state
(political and bureaucratic) actors, here understood as the initiators of policy. Differences
in national political institutions mean that their makeup varies across cases of Japan, the
United States, and France. In the case of Japan, long-term policies are often initiated
within METI. Data used to identify policy preferences is obtained from internal and
public documents, interviews and statements recorded in media sources, trade journals,
and direct interviews with participants in the policy process. In the case of the United
States, policy is initiated by both the executive (White House) and the legislature
(Congress). In terms of major policy initiatives in the energy sector, however, the White
House is more dominant, with each incoming president typically announcing a
comprehensive set of energy goals designed to be achieved through the presidency. In
this study I focus, therefore, on the White House as the indicator of political/bureaucratic
policy preferences. Data on White House policy preferences are obtained from official
policy proposals, participant memoirs, and secondary sources including interviews and
statements recorded in media sources, and trade journals. Finally, in the case of France,
policy is initiated by the executive, and from within the Directorate for Oil and Gas in the
Ministry of Industry (now Ministry of Finance, Industry and Labor). Data on the general
shift in policy preferences detailed in the empirical chapter on France are obtained from
secondary sources. Data on the direct effect of market changes on policy preferences are
obtained from participant interviews, and media. Finally, data used to identify European
policy preferences are taken from primary sources obtained from the European
Commission and Council of Ministers, as well as secondary sources.
6.2 Evidence Used to Identify Firm Policy Strategies
The second important set of actors that help shape outcomes are firms. In order
to identify the preferred policy strategies of firms in Japan and the United States I use
statements and positions announced by the major industry associations as proxies for firm
policy preferences. I justify this on logistical and substantive grounds. Logistically, the
large number of firms operating in the petroleum sector in both the United States and
Japan makes it difficult to collect direct evidence from each of these. Further, firms
typically do not publicly detail lobbying efforts, complicating the data collection process.
Industry associations, on the other hand, are designed to act in the interests of member
companies. As such they have an explicit role in the policy formulation process. Data
collection is therefore simplified. Further, given their role as representative of firm
interests in the political process, using industry association policy preferences as data
does not significantly undermine the validity of their statements as indicative of
underlying firm preference. In the case of France, on the other hand, more direct evidence
of the policy preferences of firms is used given the dominance of the Total and Elf-
Aquitaine groups within the French petroleum sector. This data are taken directly from
annual reports, interviews with firm representatives, and industry reports.
Chapter Three - Changes in the International Petroleum Market
1. Outline
In chapter two I argued that petroleum policies in Japan, France, and the United
States, were adjusted in response to shifts in the structure of the international petroleum
market. For state actors responsible for oil policies, shifts in long-term oil prices
undermined existing policies. This caused a reassessment of existing policies to see if
they continued to match their interests. For domestic firms, on the other hand, shifts in
the structure of the oil market also led them to reassess their preferred policy outcomes.
More competitive firms, which in the petroleum sector largely equates with firms that are
big and vertically integrated, were less likely to seek support from the state, and more
likely to adopt market-based strategies to manage the effects of shifts in market structure.
Non-competitive firms, on the other hand, were more likely to seek governmental support
in the name of strategic intervention.
Given the important role I ascribe to shifts in market structure and long-run oil
prices, in this chapter I describe the major changes that occurred in the petroleum market
in the period under study, as well as the relationship between the structure of supply in
the petroleum market, and price changes. I begin by outlining the major theoretical
explanations of the relationship between prices and market structure.
2. Theoretical Explanations ofLong-term Oil Prices"
Two paradigms have dominated research into the question of how the dynamics
of supply influence price in the petroleum market. In the first view, the most important
long-run driver of price is taken to be the geological fact of petroleum's exhaustibility. In
the second view, exhaustibility is relegated to a "geological fact of no economic
interest,"60 and the most important variable affecting supply in the petroleum market is
understood to be producer market power.
The former position was first elaborated in Harry Hotelling's seminal study of
exhaustible resources in 1931 61 Hotelling proposed that resource prices, including in the
case of petroleum, are determined by the problem of exhaustibility. Given this, Hotelling
argued, a resource owner must decide the rate at which to extract and sell the resource. In
a competitive market, Hotelling proposed that the price of an exhaustible resource should
be determined by the efforts of producers to maximize the net present value of their asset
59 The problem of strategic control is linked to the supply of petroleum, rather than demand, hence this chapter's focus
on the structure of supply in the petroleum market. I also recognize that changes in the cyclical and structural
composition of demand also significantly influence petroleum prices. The pace of economic growth in the major
economies, for example, influences demand for oil because economic growth increases energy consumption. The
opposite is also true; that is, sharp increases in oil prices can affect economic growth, which in turn affects the demand
for oil. Demand also varies seasonally, increasing during winter in the northern hemisphere. More long-standing,
structural changes in demand, on the other hand, are caused by technological innovation and changing competitiveness
between fuels. For a review of the literature on this question see, inter alia, James D. Hamilton, "Oil and the
Macroeconomy since World War II," The Journal ofPolitical Economy 91, no. 2 (1983); Donald W. Jones, Paul N.
Leiby, and Inja K. Paik, "Oil Price Shocks and the Macroeconomy: What Has Been Learned since 1996," The Energy
Journal 25, no. 2 (2004); Robert B. Barsky and Lutz Kilian, "Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s," The Journal
ofEconomic Perspectives 18, no. 4 (2004).
60 Morris A. Adelman, "Mineral Depletion, with Special Reference to Petroleum," The Review ofEconomics and
Statistics 72, no. 1 (1990), 1.
61 Harold Hotelling, "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," The Journal ofPolitical Economy 39, no. 2 (1931).
For an early discussion of the economic characteristics of exhaustibility of resources see Lewis Cecil Gray, "Rent under
the Assumption of Exhaustibility," The Quarterly Journal ofEconomics 28, no. 3 (1914). Devarajan and Fisher
summarize the development of Hotelling's theory. See Shantayanan Devarajan and Anthony C. Fisher, "Hotelling's
"Economics of Exhaustible Resources": Fifty Years Later," Journal ofEconomic Literature 19, no. 1 (March 1981).
Solow offers an elegant summary of the theory of exhaustible resources in his 1973 Ely Lecture: Robert M. Solow,
"The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics," The American Economic Review 64, no. 2, Papers and
Proceedings of the Eighty-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association (1974). Also Dermot Gately,
"A Ten-Year Retrospective: Opec and the World Oil Market," Journal ofEconomic Literature 22, no. 3 (1984) for a
summary of the theory of exhaustible resources applied to petroleum.
over time.62 This implies that price increases at the rate of interest. If the price of the
resource increases more slowly than the rate of interest, then resource holders will extract
the resource more quickly in order to earn a superior return.63 If the resource price is
increasing faster than the rate of interest on the other hand, the optimal choice is to retain
the resource in the ground as an asset, allowing it to continue to gain value.
Hotelling's thesis was elegant. It was also useful because it generated an easily
testable proposition: if long-term prices are correlated with the rate of interest over time,
this represents evidence in support of the theory. If not, then the theory is cast into doubt.
The first real empirical tests of Hotelling's thesis came with the wave of research into
resource economics that coincided with the oil shocks of the 1970s.64 Most notably,
Morris A. Adelman demonstrated that the prediction derived from Hotelling's Rule, as it
came to be known, does not hold in the case of petroleum: petroleum prices did not rise
with the interest rate over the long-term. Rather, Adelman demonstrated that prior to
1970 there was no evidence of an upward price trend for crude oil.65
Given this, Adelman proposed an alternative model of petroleum prices, which
remains the dominant paradigm for understanding prices in the petroleum market.66 In
this model it is artificial, rather than geological, scarcity that explains variation in
petroleum price over time. Adelman argued that reserves of petroleum are best
understood as an inventory, with the inventory level a function of investment in
62 Net present value is defined as the present value of future cash flows obtained from an asset. Robert S. Pindyck and
Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 5th ed., Prentice-Hall Series in Economics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall, 2000), 542.
63 In a monopoly market the marginal revenue of the monopoly producer is predicted to rise at the rate of interest. See
Devarajan and Fisher, "Hotelling's "Economics of Exhaustible Resources": Fifty Years Later", 67-68.
64 Ibid., 65.
65 Adelman, "Mineral Depletion, with Special Reference to Petroleum", 2.
66 One indicator of the degree to which Adelman's insight has become the new paradigm in resource economics is to
examine the treatment of resource economics in microeconometric textbooks. See for example, inter alia Pindyck and
Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 28-30; N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles ofEconomics, 3rd ed. (Mason, Ohio:
Thomson/South-Western, 2004), 353.
exploration and production and technological innovation. Under this model, prices should
not rise at the rate of interest, but rather should be determined by investment levels,
which are themselves determined by the balance of supply and demand.
The inventory model offered an explanation of why we should not expect a
gradual increase in petroleum price over time. It did not, however, account for the
significant long-run increases as well as decreases in petroleum prices. In order to
account for this outcome, Adelman pointed to a second feature of the petroleum market:
market power.67 Natural resources differ from traditional goods in that the location of
production is determined by geography rather than comparative advantage. Coal (the
carbon residue of prehistoric plant life), for example, is widely distributed
geographically. Petroleum (the carbon residue of animal life), on the other hand, is
distributed less broadly. Given that petroleum has high barriers to entry, primarily
derived from its distribution across limited number of regions, economic (and political)
advantage can be secured by restraining supply. As a result, rather than price increasing
as a linear function of increasing natural scarcity, as assumed by Hotelling's Rule,
artificial scarcity through the exercise of market power became the dominant analytic
lens through which researchers sought to account for price movements."
67 See, inter alia, Morris A. Adelman, "The Clumsy Cartel," (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1979); Morris A. Adelman, "Scarcity and World Oil Prices," The Review ofEconomics and Statistics 68, no. 3 (1986).
68 This does not mean there was consensus amongst economists about the causes of the rapid increase in petroleum
prices in the 1970s. A number of scholars contended, for example, that price shocks followed a path explained best
explained by a rise in petroleum demand and short-term losses of supply, coupled with the short-term inelasticity of
demand, rather than any exercise of market power by the OPEC cartel. See Gately, "A Ten-Year Retrospective: OPEC
and the World Oil Market", 1101 for a summary of this view.
2.1 Summary of Empirical Tests of Price Determinants in Petroleum Sector"
The paradigmatic shift from Hotelling's Rule to the inventory model heralded a
change in the focus of research. The majority of empirical studies now test the effect of
OPEC market power on petroleum prices, or assume that OPEC is an important
determinant of petroleum prices, and attempt to identify a model for understanding OPEC
behavior. Most studies agree that OPEC maintains some price setting power, but is
constrained by a "competitive fringe" of non-OPEC producers,70 the existence of partial
substitutes for petroleum, intra-producer relations, and demand elasticity." Each of these
forces constrains the ability of the cartel to set prices."
The dominant strand of empirical research into the petroleum market assumes
OPEC is significant, and goes on to examine how OPEC behavior should best be
characterized. Dahl and Yucel, for example, reject the alternative hypothesis that OPEC
is a competitive producer, instead finding that OPEC producers collude with one another
when producing." Smith focuses on the internal dynamics of OPEC in characterizing the
cartel as "weighed down by the effect of forging and enforcing a consensus amongst its
members," 74 while Kaufman, Dees, Karadeloglou and Sanchez find that "OPEC has
69 See appendix for a summary of econometric tests.
70 Carol Dahl and Mine Yiicel, "Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer Behavior," The Energy Journal 12, no.
4 (1991).
71 Paul Stevens, "A Survey of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry 1945-1984," in The Changing
Structure of the World Oil Industry, ed. David Hawdon (London ; Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, 1985); Fadhil J. Al-
Chalabi, "The World Oil Price Collapse of 1986: Causes and Implications for the Future of OPEC," in After the Oil
Price Collapse: OPEC, the United States, and the World Oil Market, ed. Wilfrid L. Kohl (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1991); Solow, "The Economics of Resources or the Resources of Economics." for a
theoretical treatment of the effect of substitutes on OPEC's ability to set prices.
72 Hillard G. Huntington, "Oil Price Forecasting in the 1980s: What Went Wrong?," Energy Journal 15, no. 2 (1994);
Dermot Gately, "Strategies for OPEC's Pricing and Output Decisions," Energy Journal 16, no. 3 (1995).; Gately, "A
Ten-Year Retrospective: OPEC and the World Oil Market."
73 Dahl and Yicel, "Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer Behavior", 126.
74 James L. Smith, "Inscrutable OPEC? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis," The Energy Journal 26, no. 1
(2005).
considerable power over price via decisions over quotas, production, and operable
capacity."75
An alternative finding is presented by Alhajji and Huettner, who use data from
1973-1994 to reject the hypothesis that OPEC acts as a coherent cartel, and instead
propose that Saudi Arabia dominates, with other member states playing an insignificant
role in influencing price. They bolster their argument by noting that OPEC should not be
characterized as a cartel as it has no mechanism for punishing defection by OPEC
member governments, a central requirement of cartel formation in theoretical treatments,
represents less that fifty percent of total world production, and commonly fails to agree
on price targets.7 6
Part of the difficulty in assessing the effect of OPEC on prices lies in the
assumption of standard tests that OPEC maximizes profits, which ignores political
preferences across OPEC countries, as well as within countries across time.7 As Stevens
notes, for example, given that an assumption about behavior is at the core of the
modeling process, tests based on assumptions at odds with underlying OPEC behavior
are likely to lead to faulty conclusions. 78 A second problem limiting the ability of
empirical tests to identify the character of OPEC, or its precise effects on price, is data
quality. Stevens also notes, for example, that data aggregation is difficult because of the
differentiated nature of petroleum as a product, and the questionable reliability of data
issued by the governments of producer countries. Comprehensive data sets, such as those
R. K. Kaufmann et al., "Does Opec Matter? An Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices," The Energy Journal 25, no. 4
(2004).
76 A. F. Alhajji and David Huettner, "Opec and Other Commodity Cartels: A Comparison," Energy Policy 28, no. 15
(December 2000).
77 Paul Stevens, "Understanding the Oil Industry: Economics as a Help or Hindrance," The Energy Journal 16, no. 3
(1995).
78Ibid., 130.
produced by the International Energy Agency (IEA), are also compiled from government
figures and face similar issues with reliability.
Perhaps the most intuitive, although imprecise, evidence of the influence of
OPEC over petroleum price is given by Adelman and Parra. In a market with many
suppliers, reservoirs with the lowest cost of marginal production should be exploited first,
followed by reservoirs with the next highest marginal cost, and so on.79 Adelman and
Parra argue that the fact of OPEC influence over prices can be seen in the significant gap
that exists between the marginal cost of production in low-cost production centers in
OPEC, and world petroleum prices over the long-term. Using data garnered from the
Saudi Aramco buyout of international oil company interests in 1976, for example,
Adelman estimates Saudi development and operating costs to be approximately thirteen
cents per barrel in 1978.80 This stands in sharp contrast to oil prices over the same period,
as well as the 1980s when prices dropped significantly.
Empirical tests of the relationship between market structure and price, then,
make the market structure of supply a central explanatory variable. There remains
disagreement, however, about the how to characterize the cartel that exercises market
power. Questions center on whether OPEC is a functioning cartel, of Saudi Arabia
dominates production within the cartel, and whether OPEC members attempt to
maximize long-run returns on their petroleum assets, or target a revenue stream designed
to meet social and political need in the short to medium term. Regardless of these
79 Robert Mabro, Opec and the Price of Oil (Oxford, Oxford University Press: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
1992), 6.80 Adelman, "Scarcity and World Oil Prices."; Gately, "A Ten-Year Retrospective: Opec and the World Oil Market",
1108.
disagreements, however, empirical findings suggest that OPEC plays a role in influencing
prices in the international petroleum market.
Studies also note, however, the ability of the cartel to influence price is
constrained by a number of factors, including the existence of partial substitutes, cartel
dynamics, and long-run demand elasticity. In the following sections I identify how
changes in the structure of supply have influences prices over time. I begin by reviewing
market structure in the early period of the oil market, before discussing the relationship
between price and market changes in the three periods under investigation in this study.
3. Market Structure and Price across Time
In this section I describe changes in market structure, and long-run petroleum
prices. In begin by outlining the structure of the international petroleum market prior to
1970.
3.1 Early Market Structure
Trading volumes in crude oil were insignificant, however this changed with the
growth of the transport sector, and the shift became decisive with the inclusion of
gasoline or diesel driven vehicles in WWI war planning." Coupled with the discovery of
new reserves in regions outside the main consumer countries of the United States and
Europe,8 2 this ensured that physical or political control over oil producing territories
81 The first widespread military application of petroleum products was the use of oil for naval propulsion systems,
however this figured less significantly than transport in the growth in demand in WWI. 2. Anglo-Persian (the
predecessor of BP) production for example, rose from 80,000 tons in 1912 to 897,000 tons in 1918. Fiona Venn, Oil
Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), 38.
82 New discoveries centered on Latin America and the Middle East.
became an important component of international diplomacy.83 Nevertheless, the United
States remained the dominant producer state in the world oil market prior to WWII, with
the bulk of petroleum supply trade internationally made up of exports from the Gulf
Coast.84
The production of petroleum outside the United States was managed by a
system of "guided laissez-faire," dominated by a small number of multinational oil
companies (MNOCs)85 that operated in a quasi-cartel like structure, with occasional
diplomatic support from host governments.86 Colonial relationships buttressed the system,
with six of the thirteen countries that later formed OPEC remaining as colonies or
protectorates of the European powers until decolonization began in the late 1950s.87
These vertically integrated MNOCs utilized their overwhelming financial power and
technical expertise to establish long-term concessional contracts in non-US oil producing
states, which ceded production and pricing decisions in oil resource development to them.
MNOCs typically enjoyed concessions of at least fifty years, and contract terms did not
stipulate spending requirements on exploration, production, or reinvestment rates.88 They
also made pricing decisions unilaterally.
83 In 1901 oil was discovered in Mexico. Commercial quantities of oil were discovered in 1908 in Persia. Despite this,
US production remained dominant in world markets until the 1950s, and was dominated by US firms, which until then
had insignificant holdings internationally.84 Helmut Jack Frank, Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East; a Study in Oligopolistic Price Behavior, Praeger Special
Studies in International Economics and Development (New York,: Praeger, 1966), 10-11.
85 Here MNOC refers to the "majors," made up of: Exxon (or Esso, Standard of NJ), Shell, BP (British Petroleum,
originally Burma Oil and Anglo-Iranian), Gulf, Texaco, Mobil (Standard of NY), and Chevron.
86 The phrase "guided laissez-faire" is taken from Nye. See Joseph Nye, "Energy Security," in Energy Security, ed.
David Deese and Joseph Nye (1980), 8. For details see Venn, OilDiplomacy in the Twentieth Century, Francisco R.
Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History ofPetroleum (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).87 Nye, "Energy Security."
88 Louis Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 3rd ed. (Winchester, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1983).
Major Concessions in the Middle East 1950
Iran Iraq Kuwait Saudi
Concessionaire BP (AOIC) IPC Group KOC Aramco
Production (1950 kbd) 660 140 344 547
Year of Expiry 1993 2005 2025 1993
MNOC Equity Share
BP (AIOC) 100 23.75 50 -
CFP - 23.75 - -
Chevron -- - 30
Exxon - 11.875 - 30
Gulf - - 50 -
Mobil - 11.875- 10
Shell - 23.75 - -
Texaco -- - 30
Total 100 95 100 100
Source: Parra, 2004, p. 32
Tremendous growth in petroleum discoveries in the Middle East, and the
inability of the MNOCs to monopolize the development of these new fields, changed the
dynamics of petroleum supply. The pace of this growth in low-cost oil from the Middle
East was astounding. From 1953-1957, for example, proven reserves in the Middle East
increased by 23 billion barrels annually, which was equivalent to total reserves in the
U.S., the world's largest producer at the time.89
The majors were unable to maintain control over the development of these
reserves to market; by 1958, for example, there were some 190 US companies, as well as
non-US firms, carrying out exploration and production activities internationally,
compared to just twenty eight before 1945.90 The inevitable result was that price
moderated as the number of suppliers proliferated, and the market share of the majors
fell. The majors' share of production in regions other than the U.S. and Soviet bloc fell
89 Parra, Oil Politics : A Modern History ofPetroleum, 3 5.
90 Frank, Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East; a Study in Oligopolistic Price Behavior, 95.
from ninety two percent in 1955 to seventy six percent in 1965, and in refining from
eighty one percent to fifty eight percent over the same period.'
This moderation of prices in the 1960s masked a second change in market
structure. As noted above, MNOC market share was eroded by the rise of independent
concessionaries, which presented oil producing governments with a new set of actors
with whom to negotiate contract terms. Demand was also increasing quickly. World
energy demand grew 4.4 percent annually from 1970-1973, and production of coal,
natural gas and other energy sources were unable to meet this demand. As a result
international demand for oil grew at an average of 7.6 percent per annum during the same
period.9 2 Further, investment in non-Middle Eastern petroleum supplies was also
inadequate to meet demand, and alternative suppliers that had made up the shortfall in
previous moments when the world oil supply was constrained, such as the 1956 Suez
Crisis, were unable to do so. By 1971, for example, the United States was a net-importer
of oil, and two other countries that had used spare capacity to compensate for supply
disruptions, Venezuela and Iran, were now members of the OPEC cartel.93 These changes
caused an increase in the market power of the OPEC member states that "colored
everything that occurred during the next decade."94
3.2 Mechanism for Price Setting
The method of price setting evolved in the pre-war WWII period to reflect the
dominance of U.S. crude oil on the international market. Prices were determined using
91 Steven A. Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983)., 86. See also
Parra, Oil Politics : A Modern History of Petroleum, 67.
92 Parra, Oil Politics : A Modern History ofPetroleum, 161.
93 Nye, "Energy Security", 8; Hanns Maull, "Oil and Influence: The Oil weapon Examined," in Economic Issues and
National Security, ed. Klaus and Trager Knorr, Frank N. (Kansas: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 262-3.
94 Maull, "Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined", 114.
the price set fro Gulf of Mexico oil, with freight and insurance added to produce the Free-
On-Board (f.o.b.) price, representing the price at delivery to port. This was backed by a
system of agreements between the major international oil firms to ensure that prices were
not undercut in other markets.
Although a number of factors led to the breakdown of this model, the growth in
Middle Eastern oil production and peaking of U.S. production were the most significant.
These changes had two effects. First, they reduced the rationale for setting prices in the
major European markets based on U.S. prices, and second, they lowered the barriers to
entry into the market. The first change to pricing came with the establishment of a second
base for setting prices, established in the Middle East. The price setting mechanism in
this case still followed the Middle East, but allowed for price movement in a band to
better reflect differences in transportation costs. Finally, from the mid-1950s discounts
became increasingly common, until they were being offered on larger and larger volumes
of crude at increasingly long periods. Indeed, the increased discounting was a direct
cause for the formation of the OPEC cartel in 1960, which formed with the goal of
bringing stability to prices. The shift in price setting from the international oil majors to
the producer governments, detailed below, completed this process.
3.3 Increasing Prices (19 70-1980)
Crude Prices (nominal, inflation adjusted; 1970-1985)
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By the late 1960s the governments of OPEC member countries enjoyed greater
nascent market power as the primary source of internationally traded crude, as well as an
increased number of potential buyers. In June 1968 OPEC fired the first salvo in the
battle to assert control over pricing and production decisions through the "Declaratory
Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries," extending host governments'
regulatory controls over company exploration and other details. This increased the
pressure points producer governments had over firms, while stopping short of breaking
the concessionary arrangements that were the foundation of the industry. The ability of
the MNOCs to resist this pressure was limited; as Francisco Parra notes, "to the
companies it appeared that a huge expansion in the Middle East would be essential, and
fear of losing the privileged access they enjoyed.. .to Middle Eastern oil, drove them to
appease producer government demands.95
Following this success OPEC demanded in December 1970 an increase in
posted prices, threatening joint action if their demands were not met. This led to the 1971
Tripoli Agreement, when MNOCs were forced to negotiate posted prices for oil with
OPEC governments rather than set them unilaterally.96 Such successes led to further
demands for equity participation in concessions by OPEC governments. By 1975-6
OPEC governments had moved from having no control over price and production
decisions in relation to oil resources located in their territory to controlling approximately
sixty percent by 1974, to almost full control by 1976.97
This change was epochal The transfer of control over production and pricing
decisions to producer countries did not undermine the underlying structure of the
petroleum market, which tends to cartelization because of the limited dispersal of
petroleum resources. It did, however, increase the likelihood that disruptions would
occur. First, although the MNOCs under the former production regime were able to raise
prices above the marginal cost of production, the threat of sanction by home governments
established a powerful politically-determined ceiling on the magnitude of excess profits
they could extract.98 Producer states, on the other hand, were less easily sanctioned, and
were therefore capable of extracting greater profits from the manipulation of price.
95 Parra, Oil Politics : A Modern History of Petroleum, 114.
96 Turner, Oil Companies in the International System, 13 1.
97 Ibid., 131. Major nationalizations of concession-holder operations took place in Algeria and Libya (1971), Iraq
(1972-5), Libya once again (1973) and Kuwait, Qatar and Venezuela (1976).
98 Morris A. Adelman, "World Oil: Ten Years after The "Energy Crisis"," (Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1984), 9.
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Second, while the MNOCs were private firms that sought to maximize profits
and resisted politicization, the locus of the new cartel was found in state-led firms
controlled by producer state governments. This led to the politicization of the production
and distribution of oil, and, as the 1973 crisis proved, opened the possibility that the oil
market might be manipulated for political as well as economic gains.
Third, the advent of a cartel dominated by state firms increased the likelihood of
demand-supply mismatches as a source of market failure. The MNOCs effectively
matched the production and distribution of oil in response to demand signals from
consumer markets given their long experience operating within the international oil
market and their vertically integrated structure, which allowed information to flow from
downstream markets to upstream production. Years of concessionary arrangements left
producer governments with less experience in predicting changes in demand. Further,
producer government firms were often not vertically integrated, instead continuing to rely
on the MNOCs for refining and distribution. This increased the likelihood of unintended
volatility in price caused by a misreading of market conditions.
This vulnerability of the economies of the advanced industrial countries to
supply disruptions was proven with the first (1973-4) and second (1978-9) oil crises. The
first oil "shock" began ten days after the start of the Yom Kippur War between Israel and
Egypt-Syria on October 16, 1973. Representatives of the Organization of Arab Oil
Producing Countries (OAPEC)99 met in Kuwait and voted to unilaterally increase the
price of oil by seventy percent in order to pressure industrialized states to sanction
99 OAPEC was established in 1969 by Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia. Its membership increased to include Algeria,
Abu Dhabi (now part of UAE), Dubai, Bahrain and Qatar in 1970, and Syria, Egypt and Iraq in 1972. Tunisia joined in
1982 but suspended its membership in 1986. It is functionally separate from OPEC.
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Israel.'4 Later, in response to President Nixon's announcement of support for Israel,
OAPEC announced that it would cut oil production by five percent on a monthly rolling
basis, and would embargo exports to the United States and the Netherlands.' The
situation worsened for consumers in November when OAPEC met and decided to reduce
supply by twenty five percent from September 1973 levels, and a further five percent in
December. Spare capacity in other countries only replaced one million of the five million
barrels per day removed from the world market, and oil prices skyrocketed.
Political upheaval in the Middle East also led to price spikes in 1978-9. In this
case, however, political instability in Iran was compounded by economic opportunism.
The crisis was precipitated by an Iranian oil worker strike beginning in October 1978,
causing Iranian oil production to plummet. It fell below the level needed for Iranian
domestic consumption on December 26, 1978 and exports stopped between December 27
and March 5. This represented a fifteen percent drop in the volume of internationally
traded oil.1 2
The reduction in Iranian crude supply did not lead to an absolute shortfall in
crude supplied to the market. Instead, supply and demand remained largely in balance
throughout the last quarter of 1978 and first quarter of 1979 as surplus capacity in other
countries was available to make up the shortfall. 1*3 Nevertheless the price effects of the
Iranian cutback were significant due to a failure of the price mechanism to accurately
reflect the overall balance in supply and demand. The failure stemmed from the dual
100 Punitive measures primarily against the US were initiated by Algeria and Iraq before the announcement of the
embargo on October 16, but were relatively minor in scope and did not significantly affect oil flows. See Schneider,
The Oil Price Revolution, 222.
101 Although Rotterdam was a key center for oil trading and distribution within Europe, the embargo only applied to
domestic consumption.
102 Schneider, The Oil Price Revolution, 430-6.
103 Morris Albert Adelman, The Economics ofPetroleum Supply : Papers by M.A. Adelman, 1962-1993 (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 513.
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pricing structure in the international market. At the time official prices posted by
producing states remained the basis for the majority of oil traded. There also existed a
spot market however, which was used for the trading of smaller quantities of crude
between refiners and others to enable the balancing of inventories. As sales were cut back
to third-party firms by the MNOCs,144 they entered the spot market, where physical
supplies were limited, in an attempt to make up contract shortfalls.'0 This bid prices up,
causing spot prices to rise to over double the official rates posted by producers, leading
them to increase their prices to reflect prices in the spot market.0 6 Problems were
exacerbated by a later cut in production by Saudi Arabia's Aramco in January 1979 of
around one million barrels per day.
These oil crises appeared to herald a new era for governments in the advanced
industrial countries, in which control over production decisions was held by sovereign
governments in producer states making decisions based not only on concerns over profit.
Further, unlike in the 1956 Suez Crisis, when spare U.S. capacity had been able to
compensate for supply shortfalls in Europe, U.S. crude production had peaked, meaning
there was no supplier of last resort. Given the lack of ready substitutes for many
petroleum products, this shift suggested an ongoing vulnerability to economic and
political decisions made in producer governments. Projections of future prices made by
104 Although production in the Gulf states was largely taken out of the hands of the MNOC producers, they retained a
I onificant role in distribution.
Thomas L. Neff, "The Changing World Oil Market," in Energy Security, ed. David Deese and Joseph Nye (1980).;
Data on volumes traded on the spot market at the time remains anecdotal. An Exxon report calculated it at around 1.8
million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 1979. See Parra, Oil Politics: A Modem History ofPetroleum, 229-230.
106 Neff, "The Changing World Oil Market", 30; Al-Chalabi, "The World Oil Price Collapse of 1986: Causes and
Implications for the Future of OPEC", 5.
the IEA, national governments, industry bodies and firms continued to predict price
increases throughout the 1980s, underlining these fears.107
Changes in market structure in the following decade, however, confounded the
predictions of the governments and others in the advanced industrial states. Instead of
remaining high, prices began to fall from a peak of thirty-two dollars per barrel in 1981,
reaching thirteen dollars in 1986 in nominal terms. The reduction in prices was also
significant when adjusted for inflation, falling to $4.40 in 1986 in real terms.
This fall in prices was caused, on the supply side, by the stimulation of
investment in non-OPEC production, which weakened OPEC market power. During the
1970s OPEC members were responsible for some fifty percent of global oil production
and seventy five percent of global oil trade.108 The increase in crude prices of the 1970s
led to new discoveries that undermined this market share, however, as well as causing
fields to be developed within established producing regions that otherwise would not
have been.109 Exports of Mexican crude, for example, jumped from 533,000 bpd in 1979
to a peak of 1.525 million bpd in 1984." Production in the North Sea also grew
significantly. In the United Kingdom controlled region it jumped from an average of 1.67
million to 2.68 million barrels per day between 1980 and 1986, and Norwegian
production increased from an average of 528,000 to 806,000 barrels per day over the
same period.
Ironically, the initial response of the OPEC governments to the growth in non-
OPEC supply contributed to its loss of market share. Since the nationalization of
107 John R. Brodman and Richard E. Hamilton, A Comparison ofEnergy Projections to 1985 (Paris: OECD, 1979).
108 Edward L. Morse, "A New Political Economy of Oil?," Journal of International Studies 53, no. 1 (1999), 7.
109 Al-Chalabi, "The world Oil Price Collapse of 1986: Causes and Implications for the Future of OPEC", 131-137.
110 George w. Grayson, Oil and Mexican Foreign Policy, Pitt Latin American Series (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 41.
production OPEC established a price for long-term crude contracts, using the Saudi
Arabian produced Arabian Light as a reference, and then adjusted the price per barrel for
other crudes according to differences in quality. Until 1986 the OPEC governments
agreed to focus on defending this official price through production cutbacks.' In essence
this was equivalent to reducing Saudi Arabian production, as other governments within
the cartel did not reduce production; Saudi production fell as a result from an average of
10.2 million barrels per day in 1980 to 3.6 million in 1985.
The flaw in this strategy was that firms producing in the non-OPEC countries
were able to take market share from OPEC member countries by undercutting the official
price, which the British National Oil Corporation and Norwegian producers producing in
the North Sea, as well as producers in Egypt and the Soviet Union, dutifully did. As a
result, OPEC's share of global oil production fell to twenty nine percent in 1986 from a
peak of fifty two percent in 1973.112 The loss of market share is consistently identified in
OPEC statements as a key drivers behind the fall in prices, and the subsequent decision
by OPEC to abandon the official price. In the opening speech to the 7 0th meeting of
OPEC in July 1984, for example, the speaker noted his frustration at the flooding of the
market by non-OPEC supplies, along with their unwillingness to restrain supplies in
order to stop the falls in price: "it is not only that most of the major non-OPEC producers
did not exercise any restraint on their production in an endeavor to support OPEC's effort
to stabilize the market, but on the contrary, many of them have increased output."" 3 In the
meeting minutes from the same conference it was noted that "the increased production
I See appendix for history of price regimes.
112 Huntington, "Oil Price Forecasting in the 1980s: What Went Wrong?", 12.
113 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, "Opening Address to the Eighty-Seventh Meeting of the
Conference by the President of the Conference," (OPEC, 1990), 214.
from oil-exporting countries, non-members of OPEC, had greatly contributed to the
recent market situation." 1 4
OPEC governments adopted a second strategy in the face of falling prices:
negotiating with the major new non-OPEC suppliers in order to defend a price floor. This
strategy was also undone, however, by the fact that new supplies came from regions in
which governments were unlikely to cooperate with OPEC's pricing strategies; the most
significant contributors to the growth in production were Alaska (discovered in 1968), the
North Sea (1971) and Mexico (1972-3)."5 The United States government for example, as
a net importer of oil, did not cooperate in OPEC's attempts to raise the price floor; it's
response to the high prices of the 1970s were instead guided by its role as a major
consumers, with policy efforts to coordinate consumer government responses to the price
shock through the establishment of the lEA, as well as restrict the growth in domestic
demand.'16 Mexico also refused OPEC overtures to cooperate with its price setting
policies despite having control over production decisions through the national oil
company PEMEX; it had little to gain from overt cooperation with OPEC, had a different
profile to the OPEC producers that gained political independence in the 1970s, given it
had nationalized its industry in 1938. The Norwegian and British governments also had
little sympathy for the predicament of the OPEC producers.
114 Ibid., 217.
115 Parra, Oil Politics : A Modern History of Petroleum, 249.
116 See G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities ofAmerican Government, Cornell Studies
in Political Economy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988).
3.4 Falling Prices (1980-2000)
Crude Prices (nominal, inflation adjusted; 1986-2000)
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The balance between OPEC and non-OPEC supply remained comparatively
stable between 1986 and 2000, and nominal prices also remained below twenty five
dollars per barrel until 2000. Price was also low after adjusting for inflation, varying
between two and four dollars per barrel until 2000. This decrease in prices did not signal
the end of OPEC as a force in the international oil market. Indeed discipline within OPEC
increased as a result of the collapse in prices that followed, and the organization
continued to influence the price of petroleum, although at a far lower price level than
previously predicted.
The benign market conditions were driven by ongoing growth in non-OPEC
supply throughout the mid-1980s and 1990s, confounding predictions that it would be
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insufficient to meet growing demand while mitigating growth in OPEC. The number of
countries producing greater than 100,000 barrels per day, for example, grew from thirty
six in 1980 to forty eight in 2000. Further, new suppliers in the developing world
contributed a significant component of the aggregate growth in non-OPEC supply over
the 1990s. From 1990 to 2000 for example In Latin and South American producers such
as Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, and Argentina as well as Mexico, added at least 100,000
barrels per day to production levels. In Asia on the other hand, producers in Australia,
China, Malaysia, India, and Vietnam, contributed at least 100,000 barrels per day to the
growth in non-OPEC supply. African supply also increased markedly over the 1990-2000
period, with Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and the Sudan, adding at least 100,000
barrels per day to production. The exception to this steady growth in production in the
non-OPEC areas is the former Soviet Union, where it declined precipitously following its
collapse; production from the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan fell from
11.2 to 7.2 million barrels per day (a thirty five percent drop) between 1990 and 1999,117
before beginning to recover. In total non-OPEC supplies grew by 7.8 million barrels per
day between 1980 and 1990, with total non-OPEC oil increasing from twelve mbd in
1965 to thirty four mbd by 1995.
117 The most significant producers in the former Soviet Union are the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and
Uzbekistan. All figures calculated British Petroleum, BP Statistical Review ofEnergy (London: British Petroleum,
2007).
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The failure of OPEC's strategy to maintain prices through production cutbacks
led to the abandonment of the official selling price. The de facto abandonment of official
pricing was made de jure in December 1988 when OPEC agreed at the 8 4 th meeting of
the Conference held in Vienna in November 1988 to establish a target price, named the
reference price, and use production quotas to support this price level. The decision to
target market share rather than price enabled OPEC to regain some of ground it had lost
to new producers outside its organization. As a result OPEC market share, or more
properly Saudi Arabian market share, for they had borne the brunt of the attempt to
defend the official price through reducing production as noted, recovered.
OPEC meetings in the 1990s emphasized the important role the growth of non-
OPEC supplies played in limiting price increases, and OPEC continued to attempt to
develop cooperative relations with other oil producers in the name of market
"stability.""' This continued importance of non-OPEC producers in restraining OPEC's
price setting power throughout the 1990s attained equilibrium in a system through which
non-OPEC producers produce at full capacity, while OPEC producers, and most notably
Saudi Arabia, as the "swing producer" adjust production volumes in order to maintain a
target price.
The benign nature of the market in this period is demonstrated by the first Gulf
War. Iraqi and Kuwait production plummeted during the crisis, however the shortfall was
met by an increase in production of over three million barrels per day by Saudi Arabia, as
well as production increases in Iran and the United Arab Emirates, which served to
maintain OPEC market share but mitigated price rises. It therefore did little to alter the
underlying balance between OPEC and non-OPEC producers. In other periods non-
OPEC producers met the bulk of demand growth. During the 1993-4 period for example,
non-OPEC producers met about eighty percent of demand growth, while OPEC
production remained flat.
3.4.1 OPEC Dynamics
Aside from this reduced market share, the weakened position of OPEC was
compounded by problems related to cartel bargaining and enforcement. The benefits of
forming a producer cartel are obvious; by restricting production cartel members can
increase prices above the marginal cost of production, thereby obtaining greater profits.
This ability of cartel members to manipulate prices is constrained, however. First, if
substitutes exist for the good being produced, consumers can switch consumption if price
increases make it competitive. This is clearly relevant to the case of petroleum; fuel
118 Parra, Oil Politics: A Modern History of Petroleum, 265.
switching for electricity generation, for example, decreased demand for petroleum
markedly in the major petroleum consuming countries in the wake of the oil crises, as
outlined below. Nevertheless, the lack of substitutes derived from petroleum appropriate
for use in the transport sector, most notably, mean that substitutability no longer plays a
significant role in constraining the exercise of market power by OPEC.
Second, if it is relatively easy to enter the market for producing a good, then
price increases are likely to prompt new entrants into the market in the search for profits.
This dilutes the market share of the producer cartel, thereby reducing its ability to
influence prices. The growth in non-OPEC production, outlined above, serves as a key
example in the petroleum sector; increases in prices in the 1970s led to greater
investment, and production, from non-OPEC areas, as shown above. Nevertheless, in the
case of petroleum the geographic fact of the limited distribution of petroleum reservoirs
around the world makes it impossible for countries with no indigenous petroleum
resources to enter the market. Further, countries that do possess domestically located
resources are also constrained by the amount of the resource located domestically, and
the costs of extraction."19
A further set of constraints on a cartel's ability to manipulate prices relate to
organization dynamics. To be effective, members of a cartel must reach agreement on
production quotas designed to restrict supply, and members must have the capacity to
monitor and enforce the implementation of production agreements. The bargaining and
enforcement phase presents particular problems given the incentive to cheat on assigned
quotas increases along with price. Further, in the case of OPEC, the bargaining and
119 The barriers to entry in the production of products derived from crude, on the other hand, while high, are not
insurmountable. Both the Japanese and the Germans, for example, produced small amounts of transport fuel from coal
during the 1939-1945 war.
enforcement process is made more difficult because production agreements are entered
into by sovereign governments with policy concerns that are not purely profit driven, but
extend into the social and political realms. OPEC member governments are also largely
reliant on petroleum for revenues, making them less resilient to reductions in petroleum
prices or assigned production volumes. Finally, different resource endowments and
demographic constraints amongst OPEC member countries give their governments
different incentives to acquiesce to production agreements.""
These differences have caused difficulties in reaching agreement on quotas.
Indeed, OPEC set official quotas for the first time only in 1982, some twenty-two years
after the organization was first established. Problems in enforcement have also led to
endemic cheating within OPEC ranks. The United Arab Emirates, for example, has
continually overproduced relative to its assigned quota because the lack of unified
government."' Kuwait has also commonly ignored OPEC quotas when likely to result in
reductions in export revenues.2 2 This led to Iraq opting out of participation in OPEC
production agreements from 1986, and colored the Iraqi decision to go to war. In the
wake of the end of the Iran-Iraq war Iran also concentrated on increasing oil revenues as
quickly as possible in order to assist with reconstruction efforts, regardless of assigned
quotas.
The negative effects of overproduction on OPEC's ability to maintain price
levels were noted in press announcements by the organization during the 1986-2000
120 For a theoretical treatment of the bargaining and enforcement problems in OPEC Lisa Blaydes, "Rewarding
Impatience," International Organization 58 (2004). For an summary of the problems of bargaining and enforcement
with a specific focus on OPEC see Robert Mabro, OPEC's Production Policies : How Do They Work?, Why Don't They
Work? (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1989).
121 Mabro, OPEC's Production Policies: How Do They Work?, Why Don't They Work?
122 Eliyahu Kanovsky, The Economic Consequences of the Persian Gulf War: Accelerating OPEC's Demise
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992).
period." 3 Indeed, a systematic investigation of the degree to which OPEC members have
followed agreements reveals significant and ongoing overproduction by a number of
OPEC member countries. Calculating average production levels on a barrels per day
basis for each member country for a given quota period, and then comparing this average
to assigned quotas, demonstrates that OPEC members have produced in excess of
assigned quotas fifty eight percent of the time. Further, in twenty six percent of cases,
member countries have overproduced at least 100,000 barrels per day, representing
significant production in excess of agreed quotas." 4 The mean level of
over/underproduction in the period between the establishment of official quotas in 1982
and the end of 2000 was 104,000 barrels per day.
Further, these figures almost certainly understate the actual degree of cheating.
Official quotas have been adjusted at times to reflect the overproduction of certain
members, and OPEC's inability to enforce the agreement. Further, Iraq chose not to
participate in the quota system from 1986, rather than cheat, because it was deadlocked
with Kuwait over quota allocations. Finally, production data is released by the petroleum
producing governments, and while it is impossible to determine how accurately they
report production figures, the incentives to underreport production are clear.
Despite these drawbacks, the data demonstrates that cheating within OPEC
ranks has been prevalent, an unsurprising finding considering the implications of falling
petroleum prices for economic performance in the OPEC countries; the collapse in oil
123 See, for example, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, "Opening Address to the Eighty-Fourth Meeting
of the Conference by the President of the Conference," (OPEC, 1988).
124 Calculated by author. In methodology I Mabro, OPEC's Production Policies: How Do They Work?, Why Don't They
Work? Saudi Arabia is excluded from the calculation given its role as swing producer.
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prices in the 1980s caused widespread damage to the OPEC economies, increasing the
incentives to cheat.125
3.5 Increasing Prices (2001-2006)
Crude prices rose above the twenty dollars a barrel mark at the end of the 1990s,
a significant increase from a decade earlier when they had hovered around the ten to
fifteen dollar range. Prices then appeared stable until the latter half of 2003, when they
increased dramatically, breaking seventy dollars a barrel at the end of 2006. They have
remained above fifty dollars a barrel since this time, except a short drop at the end of
2006. Real prices also doubled, and approached the levels of 1973.
Kanovsky, The Economic Consequences of the Persian Gulf War: Accelerating OPEC's Demise, 95.
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In this case there is little evidence to support the contention that the increase in
prices observed in the 2001-2006 period is caused by an increase in market power by the
OPEC countries. The share of the market enjoyed by OPEC fluctuated between 39.7
percent and 42.9 percent of world production during these years."'6 Indeed, rather than the
expansion of OPEC market power, analysis suggested that the OPEC faced problems
meeting demand because of reduced capacity. The IEA, for example, estimated that spare
capacity within OPEC, which plays the role of swing producer as noted earlier, fell below
one million barrels per day in 2004, meaning there were fewer producers able to match
sudden increases in demand.
Further, although OPEC in March 2000 established a price band of twenty-two
to twenty-eight dollars per barrel, above or below which member countries were
126 Calculated from data taken from Petroleum, BP Statistical Review ofEnergy.
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supposed to implement production cuts (increases), the band has only been used once,
when production was increased by 500,000 barrels per day on October 31, 2000, and the
use of the band was suspended on January 30, 2005. Further, following increases in
production during the initial phases of the second gulf war, OPEC members have
instigated a number of production cuts, as well as increases. On April 23, 2003, for
example, OPEC decided to cut production by two million barrels per day; on September
24, of the same year it announced a further reduction of 900,000 barrels, and on February
10, 2004, at the 129th meeting the production quota was lowered once again by one
million barrels to 23.5 million barrels per day. On June 3 of the same year, however, at
the 131st meeting held in Beirut quotas were increased to twenty six million barrel, and
then twenty seven million at the following meeting. Ongoing increases in price, coupled
with calls by the IEA for OPEC to increase production further, suggest that restrained
OPEC production has been a factor in the rise in prices.
Importantly, production in non-OPEC countries has been unable to meet
increased demand while restraining price. This stands in contrast to the 1990s, when, as
noted above, non-OPEC suppliers were at times responsible for meeting almost the total
increase in world demand. This change in the ability of non-OPEC suppliers to meet
incremental demand was driven not only by a lack of investment in production
infrastructure, but also signs that a number of fields that had played a role in tempering
OPEC market power in the 1980s and 1990s were beginning to mature. Total U.S.
production, for example, is forecast by the UEA to fall by 170,000 barrels per day
between 2007 and 2012. Production in the United Kingdom and Norway, which manage
North Sea oil, on the other hand, fell by 1.6 million barrels per day between 2000 and
102
2007, with U.K. production falling eight percent. and Norwegian production falling three
percent, over this time.'2 Mexican supply was also projected to fall by 400,000 barrels
over the 2007-2012 period as its major fields mature. As a result the IEA noted that
although substitutes to oil such as oil sands and bio fuels, were likely to increase as a
component of overall supply, within the non-OPEC areas the "conventional crude
component of global production appears.. .to have reached an effective plateau."128
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Projections of future prices are problematic; in the 1980s, as noted above,
projections proved uniformly pessimistic about the likely level of prices, compared with
actual outcomes.'29 In the 2000s, however, there once again appears uniformity in
127 The Energy Information Agency notes that production in the Norwegian side of the North Sea appears to have
peaked in 2001, and in 1999 in Great Britain. Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 2007
(washington, D.C.: Energy Information Agency, 2007), 32.
28 International Energy Agency, Medium-Term Oil Market Report (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2007), 30.
129 For a criticism of projections see Michael C. Lynch, "The Analysis and Forecasting of Petroleum Supply: Sources
of Errors and Bias," in Energy Watchers VII: Energy Outlook after 2000: Issues of Fuel Choice and Priorities, ed.
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projections that non-OPEC production is likely to increase less rapidly than OPEC in
future years, implying an increase in OPEC's share of production, and therefore a greater
opportunity to exercise market power in order to support high prices. The medium term
oil report of the IEA, for example, predicted that between 2007 and 2012 global oil
demand would increase at 2.2 percent per year, while non-OPEC supply would grow at
one percent per year over the same period, compared to 1.4 percent over the period 2000-
2007."0 The Energy Information Agency (EIA), the information gathering service of the
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), also predicted a fall in non-OPEC supply, arguing
that OPEC would supply more than half of the projected increase in petroleum demand to
2015, and two-thirds of the increase to 2030, assuming existing policy settings did not
change. 3 1 This translates into a price of ninety five dollars a barrel on a nominal basis,
with a projected lowest price of fifty eight dollars and a projected high of 157 dollars a
barrel.132
3.5.1 Other Causes of Price Increases
If market power does not explain the increase in prices, then what does? One
significant component of the cause of the increase in oil prices over the 2001-2006 period
is the strength in demand growth. The most notable component of the increase in demand
growth during the period is the increase in growth from non-OECD regions. Of the
important petroleum consuming countries, defined as those that use more than one
million barrels per day on average over the 2001-2007 period, the biggest growth came
Dorothea H. El Mallakh (Boulder, CO: ICEED, 1995). 153-181.
130 International Energy Agency, Medium- Term Oil Market Report.
131 Known as the reference case, this projection assumes no change in existing policies from those of today. Energy
Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 2007, 29.
132 Ibid., 30.
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from China, which increased petroleum consumption by 7.8 percent per year, followed
by Saudi Arabia and Iran, with 4.6 percent and four percent growth respectively. The
growth in consumption in the OECD over the same period, by contrast, was virtually
static at 0.5 percent."3
Overall, growth in petroleum consumption continued at an average rate of
increase of 1.5 percent per year over the 2001-2006 period, after growing at 1.4 percent
for the 1990s, and 0.2 percent in the 1980s, with most of this growth, as noted above,
generated from the developing countries rather than the advanced industrial economies.
Projections of future demand assumed continued growth in the developing countries. The
reference case for the IEA, for example, assumes an average rate of growth of 2.2 percent
(1.9 million barrels a day) worldwide between 2007 and 2012, with growth in the non-
OECD countries outpacing that of the OECD countries by three times.1"4 Similarly, the
EIA projects a doubling of petroleum consumption in the non-OECD countries of Asia
between 2004 and 2030, compared to a thirteen percent growth over the same period in
OECD countries in the North America, Europe and Asia.13 5
An additional factor noted by analysts as contributing to the increase in prices is
the increased role of financial players in the energy markets. A 2006 report of the U.S.
Senate on the role of market speculation on oil and gas prices, for example, noted that
"the traditional forces of supply and demand cannot fully account for [the] increases" in
price.136 Evidence supporting this proposition comes from the rapid rise in investment in
the petroleum market coming from financial investors, the simultaneous rise in both
133 Calculated from Petroleum, BP Statistical Review ofEnergy.
134 International Energy Agency, Medium-Term Oil Market Report, 7-8.
135 Energy Information Agency, International Energy Outlook 2007, 30.
136 Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need
to Put the Cop Back on the Beat, 109th Congress, 2nd Session, June 27 2006, 1.
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crude oil inventories, which are used by refineries to balance supply and demand, and
prices,'37 and the seeming adequate levels of supply of physical crude despite the large
demand increases noted above.
The rise in financial investors, in turn, emerged from the emergence of forward
markets for petroleum which occurred following the establishment of spot markets as
mechanisms for determining contract prices for crude oil following OPEC's
abandonment of an official selling price in 1986. The forward market enables buyers and
sellers of crude oil to guarantee prices for the delivery of the product at some future date,
enabling them to make costs or revenues more stable. They also enable actors to enter
into the market to buy and sell contracts for future deliveries of crude oil without any
intention of buying or selling physical crude oil, with the intention of making profits from
price movements.
The unregulated nature of the market for futures contracts means that
comprehensive data is not collected measuring the ratio of speculative investment to total
crude oil contracts.'38 Data nevertheless suggests that there has been a substantial increase
in the amount of investments in crude oil contracts held by speculators. It has been
estimated, for example, that in May 2007 twenty four percent of the two million open
contracts on the main trading exchange in North America (NYMEX) were held by
financial investors.'39 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also estimated that
$100-$120 billion dollars of investments were made in energy markets between 2002 and
137 Under normal conditions high levels of inventories are associated with lower prices, given the role that inventories
ay as an additional element of aggregate supply.The problem of lack of data was noted, for example, by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs investigating the role of speculation in oil prices. See
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, The Role of Market Speculation in Rising Oil and Gas Prices: A Need to
Put the Cop Back on the Beat, 6.
139 Philip K. Verleger Jr., "Impacts of Passive Commodity Investors on Energy Markets and Energy Prices," Comments
on Energy Markets 1, no. 1 (2007), 2.
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2005, the majority of which were in crude oil.14 This compares with a total world value
of oil inventories of approximately one hundred and five billion dollars. 4 '
4. Summary
The structure of supply is an important influence on the direction of long-term
prices in the international petroleum market. For the major petroleum consuming states, it
not only influences process, but also acts as a signal of future price trends. The
importance of market power over the 1970-2000 is confirmed by empirical tests,
although they also demonstrate that the exercise of market power is constrained by long-
run demand elasticity and other factors.
Influenced by this changing structure of petroleum supply, the market
experienced two major convulsions between 1970 and 1980. The immediate cause of
both was political. However both followed a shift in the structure of the international
petroleum market that saw decisions over production and pricing move from MNOCs to
firms controlled by the governments of the producer state members of the OPEC cartel,
and the loss of domination of international trade by oil produced in the United States.
Prices moderated in the early 1980s, driven by an increase in supply from areas
other than OPEC, and also a reduction in demand in the major petroleum consuming
states. Official estimates during the period nevertheless continued to predict that oil
prices would remain high into the 1980s and 1990s. Continued growth in petroleum
supplies from areas outside OPEC, and lagging demand, combined to confound these
140 Pelin Berkma, Sam Ouliaris, and Hossein Samiei, "The Structure of the Oil Market and Causes of High Prices,"
(New York: International Monetary Fund, 2005).
141 John E. Parsons, Does Wall Street Move the Oil Price? (Cambridge, MA.: Center for Energy and Environmental
Policy Research, MIT, 2007).
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predictions, however. As a result prices remained stable and low in comparison with the
1970s.
Finally, in the 2000s, prices began to increase once again. The cause of price
increases this time appears less influenced by a rise in OPEC market power in the short-
term, although the organization has cut production a number of times in the attempt to
maintain higher prices. Rather, an unexpected increase in demand from developing
countries has contributed to this, coupled with the influence of a rise in the volume of oil
traded by speculators. Assessments of future price trends, on the other hand, point to a
fall in non-OPEC supplies over the long-term, increasing fears in the major petroleum
consuming economies that the rise in prices will remain over the long-term.
Despite a range of policies introduced in the advanced industrial states in order
to reduce the share of oil in their domestic economies, products derived from crude
continued to dominate consumption in the transport sector, meaning that oil remained
crucial to their economies. Further, this volatility had important consequences for the
policies introduced in the advanced industrial states to manage their reliance on the
international market for the supply of petroleum. In the next three chapters I move on to
examine how policies in the major petroleum consuming countries of Japan (chapter
four), France (chapter five) and the United States (chapter six) responded to these
changes in price, and structure of supply, across time.
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Table 1: OPEC Membership
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Country Year of Membership
Iran Sep-60
Iraq Sep-60
Kuwait Sep-60
Saudi Arabia Sep-60
Venezuela Sep-60
Qatar Dec-61
Indonesia Dec-62
Libya Dec-62
UAE Nov-67
Algeria Jul-69
Nigeria Jul-71
Angola Jan-07
Gabon 1975to 1995
Ecuador 1963 to 1993
Pricing System in World Oil Market
Years Main Actors Pricing System Details
Around 1921-1948 MNOCs Gulf plus US major exporter to world market. Oil bought at well head by refiners and prices
posted by them. Volume of US production controlled by state commissions. "Gulf
coast plus" price and freight to buyers terminal used for oil produced outside US.
1948-? MNOCs London equalization Venezuela and Middle Eastern production begins to crowd out Gulf exports. London
becomes point from which to charge freight charges, as "competitive interface" b/w
ME and Europe. US government pushed for the change because it paid free world's
oil bills, and using the gulf plus formula meant it was paying more because of fright
1950s- MNOCs NY Equalization US becomes net importer in '49, undermining London as equalization point. New
York used for calculation of prices, with some regional variants also emerging.
1973 - 1982 OPEC Fixed Pricing Long-term contract prices determined by reference price (OPEC) and bilaterally
negotiated price (non-OPEC). Saudis act as swing producer to meet price
objectives; no production quotas for other OPEC members. OPEC uses Arabian
Light as marker crude, with other prices adjusted according to quality.
1982-1986/7 OPEC Fixed Pricing + Quotas Long-term contract prices determined by reference price (OPEC) and bilaterally
negotiated price (non-OPEC). Saudis act as swing producer to meet price
objectives; others have a production quota. OPEC uses Arabian Light as marker
crude, with other prices adjusted according to quality.
1988- OPEC, market Spot Market Long-term contract prices adjusted according to spot price. Price-band established
by OPEC, backed by quotas. Saudis no longer act as formal swing producer, and
explicit price target dropped.
Sources: Parra (1994), Melamid (1962), Mabro (1986)
Summary of Econometric Tests of Petroleum Price Determinants
Author Publication Test Time Period Result
Kaufmann, Dees, Karadeloglou, EJ 25:4, p.67-90  Develops model of world oil 1986-2000 1. OPEC has considerable power over prices.
Sanchez market to test determinants of 2 "OECD stocks of crude oil have a negative effect on real oil
price prices."
Gulen EJ 17:2, p.43-54  Tests whether OPEC operates 1965-1993 1. "There is evidence of output coordination among [OPEC]
as a cartel, and whether members, especialy in the output rationing era (1982-1993)."
OPEC production affects the 2. "There Is no statistically significant causal relationship
price of oil between non-OPEC production and the price of oil in either
Alhajji and Huettner EJ 21:3, p.3 1-60  Tests whether: i) OPEC; ii) 1973-1994 1. "This study suggests that the world oil market is not
OPEC core; iii) Saudi Arabia competitive since the competitive model is rejected and it is
are competitive producers, or dominated by Saudi Arabia and OPEC or the core."
Cournot. 2. "The market power of Saudi Arabia, associated with oil price
controls in the US, enabled OPEC in general and Saudi Arabia
in particular to generate extra profits."
Smith EJ 26:1, p.51-82 Tests alternative hypotheses 1973-2001 1. "OPEC is much more than a non-cooperative oligopoly, but
of OPEC behavior: cartel, less than a frictionless cartel. All traditional explanatiopns of
perfectly competitive, OPEC behavior are strongly rejected, except the hypothesis
Stakelberg, Cournot that OPEC acts as a.. cartel wighed down by the cost of
forging and enforcing consensus."
Dahl and Yucel EJ 12:4, p. 117-129 Tests competing hypotheses 1971-1987 1. "We find no evidence that any of the OPEC countries
of OPEC production decisions behave in a competitive manner."
(dynamic optimization, target 2. "Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that loose
revenue, competitive, cartel, coordination or duopoly is most consistent with OPEC
swing producer) behavior."
Win2 and Kujundzic EJ 25:1, p.45-62  OPEC influence on oil price by 1984-2001 1. "The announcement of price increases seems to have a
measuring price effects of significant impact on future oil prices only in the medium term."
OPEC conference decisions
Jones EJ 11:3, p. 117-129 Tests whether OPEC 1983-1988 "Despite recent appearances of disarray ... OPEC's production
members are cartel or behavior can still best be explained by a partial market sharing
competitive cartel."
cGriffin AER 75:5, p. 954-963 O i g a
EJ: The Energy Journal
AER: American Economic Review
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Chapter Four -Japan Case
"A tail wind blows only for those who know its direction."
[Kaze no fuku h6k6 wo shiru mono ni nomi, ikaze wa fuku]
Liberal Democratic Party report on energy
security, November 1978
1. Outline
In this chapter I examine changes in Japanese national petroleum policies from
1980-2006. I find that the policies of national control were restructured over the 1980-
2000 period, leading to a reduction in strategic intervention. I also find, however, that the
rise of oil prices in the 2001-2006 period saw a partial reversal of policy intervention
designed to secure national control over oil: the domestic market remained open
following liberalization across the 1986-1996 period, however from 2001-2006 policies
designed to enhance strategic control over the exploration and production of petroleum
were reenergized.
How can we explain this partial reinsertion of policy in the form of the provision
of subsidies designed to enhance strategic control over petroleum? And, given this
reinvigoration of policy intervention, how can we explain the period of liberalization and
privatization that occurred in the 1980-2000 period? This chapter argues that the most
significant cause of policy change in the Japanese case lay in the adaptation of the
policies of strategic intervention employed by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) to the effects of changes in the international oil market. For METI, the
shift in policy preferences over the 1980-2000 period did not amount to a rejection of
strategic control in the form of supporting national firms as the in the oil sector. Instead,
these changes represented a restructuring of the policies used to promote domestic firms.
In refining and distribution, support for firms failed to produce a significant international
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oil major, and Japanese firms operating in the sector remained fragmented and small.
When the collapse in demand following the price rises of the 1970s undermined the
viability of the firms, decisionmakers responsible for oil within METI chose to expose
domestic firms to prices in the international market, rather than continuing to protect
them from competition. This, it was hoped, would force mergers between these firms,
thereby making them more competitive internationally, meeting not only METI's
preference for protecting against oil supply volatility, but also promoting domestic firm
competitiveness. The success of this strategy, and the changes it wrought on the firms
themselves, meant there was no voice for increased intervention in the downstream sector
under conditions of high prices in the 2001-2006 period. Instead, both firms and METI
bureaucrats shifted their preferred policies towards the provision of subsidies in order to
help these firms succeed in the upstream.
Similarly, in exploration and production, the process of privatization was not
caused by a rejection of the goal of strategic control, nor by firms rejecting policy support
because of their competitiveness. Rather, it was caused by a restructuring of the
instruments through which security through national control was sought in response to
the effects of falling oil prices on the existing policies of support. This left the door open
to the reversal of policy under the environment of high prices during the 2001-2006
period.
In line with the framework developed in chapter two, I argue that changes in the
preferences of METI within responsibility for oil policy, and firms, as they adapted to
shifts in the oil market, were the most important causes of policy change. I also proposed,
however, that they were forced to negotiate with others when determining the particular
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form this support took. In particular, groups affected by policies that increased oil
product prices worked to ensure the costs they incurred from strategic intervention were
minimized. These details are also outlined in this chapter.
As with the other empirical chapters that make up this study, I begin by
establishing the initial policy setting through a review of Japanese petroleum policy to
1980. I then examine the liberalization and privatization process during the 1980-2000
period, and the partial reversal of that process under conditions of high petroleum prices.
2. Initial Conditions
The history of Japanese policy intervention in the petroleum market is
conditioned by Japan's almost total lack of domestic reserves of petroleum, and the
absence of colonial possessions with energy resources.' State support for national oil
firms has, as a result, been a longstanding public policy goal. As in other countries,
consumption in the late 19th and early 20th century was concentrated in kerosene, which
was used primarily for illumination purposes. An increase in the consumption of light
oils, used in the fishing industry, and gasoline and heavy oil, used by the military, meant
the share of kerosene fell in relative terms following WWI however, from 65 percent of
total energy demand in 1914 to 35 percent in 1924.
Domestically produced petroleum proved inadequate to meet growing demand.
Production peaked following the introduction of rotary drilling at 83 percent of domestic
consumption in 1918, a level it has never since reached.2 The increasing use of heavy oil
1The position of Japan stands in contrast to both France, which had concessions in the Middle East as well as
petroleum producing colonial possessions in the Franc Zone. It also contrasts with the United States, which had
significant domestic petroleum reserves of its own.
2 Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History of Petroleum] (Tokyo: Nihon Sekiyu
Kabushikigaisha, 1988), 208. For an English language history see Richard J. Samuels, The Business ofthe Japanese
State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).
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in military operations, and supply problems of the first world war, led the Japanese navy
in 1918 to develop its first detailed policy position on securing petroleum. It emphasized
strategic control of petroleum resources through the nationalization and creation of a
domestic monopoly in refining, as well as maximizing imports during peacetime in order
to retain domestic reserves of crude for use in the event of war.3 Although not adopted by
cabinet, this marked the first attempt by an arm of government to address the problem of
petroleum security of supply.
The first attempt by government to design a national petroleum policy came in
1921 by an investigative committee (sekiyu seisaku ni kansuru chosakai). It was followed
by a Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) effort in 1926 to develop a national fuels
policy through the Fuel Investigation Committee (nenryd chasakai). Its findings were
passed to an industrial commission under the Minister for Commerce and Industry,
leading to the establishment of the ministry's first detailed policy in 1929. One
component of this study was the goal of increasing national control of downstream
refining industry as an element of national policy, although it did not receive budgetary
support.4
The Manchurian crisis of 1931 and subsequent expansion of Japanese military
operations on the continent played an important role in moving oil policy forward. Most
obviously, it increased demand for petroleum products. Gasoline demand, for example,
increased from 555,060 kilolitres in 1930 to 1,006,507 in 1938. Over the same period
3 "Gunjijo no Hitsuy5 ni Motodsuku Sekiyu Seisaku." Cited in Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One
Hundred Year History of Petroleum], 205-6.
4 "Sekitan Sekiyu Oyobi Sono Daiy6 Nenryd ni Kansuru Gutaiteki Kokusaku." Nihon Sekiyu puts this lack of support
down to the fiscal crunch caused by the depression. See Ibid., 303.
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heavy oil consumption also increased from 1.1 to 2.6 billion litres.'
As in France, the push for policy intervention was driven by the policy
preferences of domestic refining firms, which were placed in a difficult position because
of rising crude prices. Prices for crude increased from 9.53 yen in December 1931 to
20.78 yen/100 gallons in August 1932 due to restrictions on U.S. exports, yet rapidly
growing refining capacity and a fragmented industry limited the ability of firms to raise
prices. In response, the MCI brokered negotiations between the six major firms in the
downstream industry, leading to an agreement on October 25, 1932 to coordinate prices
and output. In short, to cartelize.'
Public purpose and private profits underpinned the development of a national
energy strategy, with cooperation between the MCI, the army and navy, finance and
foreign ministries, and the resources bureau (established within cabinet in May 1927).
Sub-committees were charged with designing policies to promote the domestic petroleum
industry, increase participation in upstream exploration and production by Japanese
firms, and develop alternative fuels. They reported to cabinet on September 15 of the
same year that strategic control over energy resources was the best method for enhancing
energy security of supply. The report concluded, for example, that importers and refiners
of crude oil should be made responsible for maintaining stockpiles equivalent to fifty
percent of previous years' imports. The report also recommended the government
establish a licensing system to regulate imports of crude and petroleum products and
restrict entry into the domestic refining market, provide subsidies for exploration and
production in order to increase control over upstream resources, and subsidize the
5 Tosuke Iguchi, Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi: Sekiyu [The History of Industrial Development in Japan: Petroleum]
(Tokyo: Gendai Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi Kenkyukai, 1963), 245.
6 Ibid., 245-6.
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production of domestically available alternatives to petroleum products, such as ethanol
and oil shale.
2.1 Petroleum Industry Law (1934)
The formation of the formal institutions of strategic control came with the
passing of the first industry legislation in March 1934. At the time the domestic refining
market was fragmented, with only eight refiners owning more than one refinery, and only
four of seventeen importers of crude oil also owning refining assets.' The law, which
came into effect from July 1 of the same year, gave the government the authority to
control trade flows and refining capacity through licensing. It also established a legal
basis for providing subsidies for domestic exploration and production and stockpiling, as
well as giving the government the power to fix prices and distribute supply amongst
domestic refiners. In short, the law gave government a comprehensive set of indirect
policy instruments (trade, fiscal, and regulatory) through which to shape the domestic
petroleum market in order to increase the share of domestic firms.
Strategic control also meant shifting market share away from international firms
marketing petroleum products in Japan. In the first set of gasoline production quotas,
allocated in 1935, domestic firms were given favorable conditions, reallocating some ten
percent of market share towards them. The process was repeated across the major
petroleum products.
The government effort to promote cartelization and increase the market share of
Japanese firms was taken over by industry once the government sponsored agreement
lapsed in 1934. The seven major firms in the industry formed a price cartel across
Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [One Hundred Year History ofPetroleum], 312.
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petroleum products that excluded Rising Sun and Standard Vacuum, which were the
major foreign marketing firms operating in the Japanese market. The effects in terms of
prices, and market share, can be seen below:
Domestic vs. Foreign Firm Market Share in Major
1934 1935
Refiner (Dom.) 47% 49
W
to Importer (Dom.) 4 4
0 Importer (For.) 49 47
Refiner (Dom.) 54 57
CD
3 Importer (Dom.) 0 0U)
Importer (For.) 46 43
Refiner (Dom.) 89 87
e
U Importer (Dom.) 1 2
Importer (For.) 10 11
Refiner (Dom.) 15 18
o s Importer (Dom.) 44 40
~ < Importer (For.) 41 42
Petroleum Products] 934-37
1936 1937 (planned)
52 57
5 5
43 38
62 67
0 0
38 33
88 90
2 2
10 8
24 25
40 45
36 30
The second feature of the institutions of national control focused on the upstream
production of crude. On March 28, 1938 the Petroleum Resources Development Law
(sekiyu shigen kaihatsuh6) established a system of fiscal support for Japanese firms, who
were only required to repay if they moved to the production phase. It also established a
registration system for exploration and production projects, improving information flows
to the MCI on upstream planning by private sector firms.
2.2 War and Occupation
Unsurprisingly, the Pacific War led to the increasing use of policy instruments
8 From "Petroleum Industry Law-related Materials," in Ibid., 307.
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designed to increase national control over the petroleum supply chain. In the downstream
sector, the outbreak of war achieved in the short term what the first PIL was only
partially successful in doing: increasing the control of national firms over the domestic
market for petroleum products. The domestic refining industry was converted into a
monopoly in September 1939 (sekiyu kydhan). This structure continued for nine years
before being disbanded by the occupation authorities GHQ in March 1949. Increased
control over refining and marketing was useless, however, without adequate supplies of
crude, and it is here that military and bureaucratic decisionmakers faced the problem
identified some twenty years earlier by military planners as Japan's Achilles heel. Until
the first world war non-belligerents typically provided the physical and financial
resources required to wage war. That this was no longer the case was brought home
starkly to the Japanese government by the September 1941 decision by the United States
to embargo the export of oil to Japan. At the time Japan relied on the United States and
Britain for some ninety percent of aggregate crude oil and petroleum products.'
The lack of access for Japanese firms to upstream development rights represents
a fundamental difference with France, where CFP's stake in the IPC, and Elf-ERAP's
access to upstream reserves through the discovery of substantial crude resources in
Algeria and elsewhere in the Franc Zone, gave French firms direct access to the
production of crude. Japanese firms, on the other hand, remained largely reliant on
purchases of crude produced by others.
Imperial Oil, a public-private partnership established in October 1941, a month
after the start of the oil embargo, attempted to manage this problem. It was charged with
carrying out upstream exploration and production operations, however its efforts proved
9 318
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inadequate. By the end of the war it controlled ninety-one percent of Japan's meager
domestic production, but efforts to gain control of resources internationally floundered.
Defeat in war had an important long-term effect on firms and others involved in
the Japanese petroleum sector. Whereas non-Japanese firms in the pre-war period largely
marketed petroleum products, or sold crude, to Japanese refiners and distributors
operating within the domestic market, the years during and after the occupation saw
foreign firms enter into direct agreements with Japanese firms, enabling them to enter the
downstream sector. As a result Japanese refining firms lost its monopoly in petroleum
refining and marketing.
Japanese firms were also left with two-thirds of their refinery capacity destroyed
following the war,'0 and demand was anemic, falling from over five million kilolitres at
the start of war between China and Japan in 1937, to some 256,000 kilolitres at the
conclusion of the war. The occupation authorities also closed refineries still operational
on the pacific coast in October 1945, and banned crude oil imports until January 1950.
This left the surviving industry to rely on meager production from domestic fields and
smaller east coast refineries.
The most significant effect of the occupation on firm alliances was the tie-up of
Japanese with U.S. firms in refining and marketing. The new joint ventures made sense to
both policymakers and firms for both political and economic reasons. Foreign firms had
ready access to the crude imports that Japanese firms required in order to meet rising
demand, while Japanese firms retained domestic sales and marketing expertise. Further,
domestic firms were too weak to finance the expansion of refinery capacity, and joint
10 Oil and Gas Journal, December 26, 1955,173-4. Cited in Chih Chen Ching, "Crude Oil Prices and the Postwar
Japanese Refining Industry" (Doctor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967), 165.
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ventures with foreign firms lowered the cost of capital when borrowing from third-parties
or directly from international petroleum firms.
Tie-ups also weakened political opposition within the occupation authorities to
rehabilitation of the domestic petroleum industry. Between 1949 and 1952 the major
Japanese firms partnered with foreign firms: Caltex with Koa Petroleum (July 1949),
Nihon Sekiyu with Caltex (1951), Mitsubishi Petroleum with Tidewater, Toa Fuels with
Standard Vacuum (February 1949), Showa Petroleum with Shell (December 1952), and
Maruzen Petroleum with Union (August 1949). These cooperative relationships took the
form of joint ventures, as required by the Law Concerning Foreign Investment." Further,
foreign firms were unable to own more than 50 percent of these ventures, meaning
Japanese managers maintained control over the firm while gaining access to the capital
needed for investment. Refining and marketing firms, such as Idemitsu K6san, that did
not enter into tie-ups with foreign affiliates, gained access to capital through loans from
the majors, or from banks with the majors acting as co-signatories, in return for
guarantees of the purchase of crude. 2 The result was that by 1962 foreign petroleum
firms controlled about ninety percent of Japanese imports of crude oil through long-term
contracts, and held stakes in some seventy five percent of refining capacity." Strategic
control remained out of reach.
11 The Law Concerning Foreign Investment was passed in May 1950 with the goal of encouraging investment in
capital-poor Japan while maintaining control over foreign currency reserves. The law stated that investment was
allowed only if it contributed to the self-support and sound development of the Japanese economy as well as to the
improvement of the international balance of payments." See Laura Elizabeth Hein, Fueling Growth : The Energy
Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), 209.
12 Ching, "Crude Oil Prices and the Postwar Japanese Refining Industry", 182-4.
13 Hein, Fueling Growth: The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in Postwar Japan, 305.
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2.3 Petroleum Industry Law (1962)
The rehabilitation of Japan's economy led to an adjustment in the instruments
used to protect and nurture domestic industry. Since the occupation international flows of
trade and capital were managed through The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law (December 1949), and the Law Concerning Foreign Investment (May
1950). The laws were designed to manage the twin problems of capital and foreign
currency scarcity. In the petroleum sector they enabled the government to allocate foreign
exchange towards the purchase of crude and away from the importation of crude
products. This served to enhance the goal of supporting national firms in the oil sector by
increasing the amount of petroleum products refined in Japan, as well as allocating
Japan's dollar reserves efficiently.
The reentry of Japan into the world economy, symbolized by negotiations to
enter the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and become an article eight
member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), made the existing policy structure
designed to enhance national control untenable." These negotiations led cabinet to
announce, on September 26, 1951, that it would liberalize the importation of crude oil by
October 1962. The second PIL was the response to this change, and enhanced national
control over domestic industry while conforming with the requirements set for entry into
the international trade regime. In other words, this was a reformulation of the policy
framework used in the effort to enhance strategic control, rather than an increase or
decrease in this efforts.
As with the first PIL, the new law gave the government authority to influence
14Article eight in the IMF prohibits restrictions on foreign currency flows to balance international payments. For
details see Bai Gao, Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origin of Prosperity and Stagnation (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 101-103.
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supply and pricing decisions. It also mimicked the pre-war powers conferred to MITI's
predecessor, establishing governmental authority over the flows of crude and crude
products in and out of Japan, as well as the distribution of these goods within the
Japanese market." That the goal of the law to enhance strategic control over the
petroleum industry is made clear in the final report of the roundtable established to debate
how to frame national policy:
"Petroleum is an international product, but is also a product for which our country is
extremely reliant on imports. It is therefore necessary for us to promote a comprehensive
petroleum policy based on placing a part of the domestic petroleum industry under the
influence of the state, in order to secure reasonably priced and stable supplies."16
Ultimately, after some nine revisions, the bill was passed by cabinet on March 6,
1962. Compromise with opponents led a clause initially to be attached stating that the law
could be changed or abolished depending on changes in external market conditions.
Industry lost control of the debate in parliament, however, and the clause was dropped
during the committee phase. This meant that the law as it came into force on July 10 with
no implicit sunset clause. 7
The main industry association for the downstream sector, the Petroleum
Association of Japan (PAJ), failed to produce a unified position on the bill. As in the
United States, where independent producers were the strongest supporters of trade
restraints under the banner of national security, smaller domestic refining firms supported
the bill because of the protection it afforded them. Larger firms, on the other hand, either
agreed with its temporary implementation to allow time for domestic firms to adjust, or
1 Although the law conferred considerable powers to the state it represented a significantly weaker outcome than that
initially hoped for by state planners in energy policy. For a summary of the politics of the enactment of PIL, as well as
a general summary of the extent and structure of Japanese state intervention in the oil sector to the mid-1980s see,
Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective, 168-227.
16 Cited in Iguchi, Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi: Sekiyu, 528.
17 Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History ofPetroleum], 591-5.
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came out against it. Firms in the upstream sector, on the other hand, supported the law as
it promised greater support for domestic exploration and production."
The central feature of the PIL was a five-year rolling plan prepared on behalf of
the MITI minister that calculated supply and demand of crude and crude products, as well
as refining capacity levels. The plan was enforced through a system that required firms to
lodge plans with the ministry, and conferred the authority to the regulator to order
changes to these plans, as well as to alter production levels in refineries. Government also
regulated the construction of new refining capacity and retained the power to halt
mergers and acquisitions of refining companies. In order to manage supply, refineries
were required to notify the state of annual refining plans, and MITI, as the competent
ministry, nominally had the authority to order changes to these plans in response to
market conditions. Although imports of petroleum products were allowed, they were
intended solely to meet gaps between planned domestic production and demand. This
occurred most commonly in the cases of naptha and residual fuel oils."9
This amounted to the archetype of plan rational etatism. In law the minister was
conferred with the authority to order firms to adjust import plans in order to solve
mismatches between planned consumption and production. In practice, however, this
power was not exercised between 1962 and 1988, when Lions Petroleum attempted to
import petroleum products without the cooperation of the regulator. Instead, the industry
arranged adjustments through the Petroleum Industry Association, with MITI
coordinating in the case the firms were unable to reach agreement among themselves.
18 Major consumer industries such as electricity and steel that used petroleum products as feedstock lobbied against the
law, arguing it would raise prices for petroleum products.
19 Tsutomu Toichi, "OPEC Export Refineries and the Implications for Japan's Petroleum Policy," (Cambridge, MA:
MIT, 1985).
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This did not mean the law was irrelevant to corporate strategy. Instead, it shifted
the basis of competition between firms from price (refined products have uniform
standards, making price the focus of competition) to refining capacity. Production
schedules were determined using a formula that included installed refining capacity,
meaning that constructing refining capacity guaranteed an increase in market share. This
made competition for licenses strong: in the first year following the passing of the law
applications were made to increase refining capacity by 1,037,150 barrels per day, of
which 421,150 barrels were approved. Between 1963 and 1973 the applications to
approvals ratio fluctuated between fifteen and forty percent, offering further evidence of
the significance of licenses.20
The PIL established a formal basis for employing policy instruments aimed at
enhancing strategic control over petroleum. In this it marked a shift from the previous
regulatory framework employed after WWII, in which laws originally designed to
manage the problem of capital scarcity were employed to achieve this policy goal.
The law also created a new institutional structure within which stakeholders
could negotiate over energy policy. First established under the Industrial Structure
Council, this energy policy committee was made an independent advisory committee to
the minister in June 1965, and became the key venue for negotiations between
organizations and actors with an interest in petroleum, and the energy sector more
generally."
The first report, produced by the committee in November 1963, was pivotal in
20 Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History of Petroleum], 641-2.
21 On the committee system see Chalmers A. Johnson, Miti and the Japanese Miracle : The Growth ofIndustrial
Policy, 1925-1973 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); Frank J. Schwartz, Advice and Consent: The
Politics of Consultation in Japan (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
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establishing the policy instruments and organizational resources available to marshal in
response to price turbulence in the 1970s. It set the scene by predicting that the domestic
demand for energy was likely to double every five years, far outpacing the capacity of
domestic production. In recognizing this, it confirmed the need to develop policies to
manage the emerging reliance on external supplies for a product of increasing importance
to the civilian economy. It also implied a shift away from policy discrimination in favor
of coal, which had been based on the assumption that coal, coupled with domestically
produced oil, would be sufficient to meet the energy needs of the Japanese economy.
The report argued that national policy should enhance strategic control over
energy supplies through subsidizing the development of oil fields both domestically and
internationally by Japanese firms, increasing the number of tankers controlled by
Japanese firms, as well as continuing to enhance the independence of the Japanese
refining industry. It also proposed the first hard target for strategic control of upstream
resources: by 1987 thirty percent of oil consumed in Japan should be developed by
Japanese firms."
Two new organizations were created in order to promote these goals. In the
downstream, smaller national firms were encouraged to merge through the provision of
subsidies, with the goal of promoting domestic refining and reducing the market power of
international majors in the Japanese market. A step towards this goal was achieved in
1965, when Ky6d5 Petroleum was established from national firms Asia Petroleum, Japan
Mining, and Tha Petroleum. Low-cost financing from the Japan Development Bank
(JDB) and preferential treatment in the assigning of refining capacity, enabled the newly
22 See Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective, 205-
6. As such, the law was an almost perfect mirror of the French law.
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established firm to grow from 11 percent of the domestic market in 1967 to 18.5 percent
in 1970, the largest share of any refiner."
As with the formation of the CFP in France, the organization of the Japan
Petroleum Development Corporation (JPDC), created in 1967 in order to promote
upstream goals internationally, reflected public and private purpose. Until 1964 only four
Japanese firms operated in the upstream. Domestically, Imperial Oil and JAPEX
continued to develop Japan's meager resources, while Arabia Petroleum and the North
Sumatran Petroleum Development Firm operated internationally. The creation of the
JPDC encouraged firms to move into the upstream. It did so through the provision of
cheap financing for exploratory activities, rather than operating upstream projects
directly. As a result, by the end of 1973 there were some forty firms engaged in the
upstream, although not all were operators but rather participated as equity holders.
By 1967, then, the full panoply of policy instruments identified in chapter two
were applied in the search for security through control by national firms. The government
directly participated in the market through the JPDC and JAPEX, which used fiscal
instruments in the form of subsidies and low interest loans to support Japanese firms in
both the upstream and downstream. Trade instruments also restricted imports and exports
in ways that strengthened the domestic refining industry, and regulatory instruments gave
the government the authority to regulate sectoral investments and prices.
2.4 Response to Oil Shocks
At first the high prices of the 1970s reinforced the rationale behind strategic
intervention in the upstream and downstream sectors of the petroleum industry. Major
2 See Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History of Petroleum], 650-651
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consumer groups acquiesced to the increased use of fiscal and regulatory instruments on
energy security of supply grounds. The regulator, political actors and firms operating in
the upstream and downstream sectors largely agreed that increased support was desirable,
although there was disagreement over where the line should be drawn between the
private and public sector spheres of action.
In refining and marketing, the implicit authority conferred to government
through the PIL was made explicit through the passing of two laws conferring formal
powers to regulate prices and distribution during emergencies. In the upstream a new
body was created with increased authority to support upstream activities on security of
supply grounds, as well as establish a national petroleum stockpile. The biggest area of
disagreement occurred not over whether to enhance strategic intervention, but rather to
how to fund it. Here, consumers and the downstream firms fought, and lost, a battle with
the regulator over whether to broaden the tax base in order to fund these new initiatives.
In general economic terms, the first oil shock magnified inflationary pressures
already present in the Japanese economy, and heralded the end of Japan's long period of
remarkable growth.24
2.5 Petroleum Sector Performance
The economic shock of petroleum price rises forced the domestic industry into
crisis. This did not occur because of a loss of actual physical supplies of crude oil; the
24 In the United States the Nixon Administration suspended convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold on August 16,
1971, and two days later the Bank of Japan revalued the Japanese yen upwards by almost seventeen percent to 308 yen
to the dollar, the first adjustment in the yen-dollar rate since the Dodge Line established a rate of 360 yen in 1949.
Following this, the Bank of Japan bought U.S. dollars to manage the rise of the yen. Coupled with loose fiscal policy
settings associated with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's program of Rebuilding the Japanese Archipelago,
this fed inflationary pressures into the Japanese economy. See Suzuki Yoshio, Nihon No Kinya Seisaku [Japanese
Fiscal Policy] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1993), 3643.
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amount of contracted crude lost by Japanese firms through the OAPEC embargo was not
as large as predicted in industry estimates. Initial estimates made in mid-November 1973
were that almost one-third of contracted import volumes would be lost, however actually
only one-fifth of contracted crude was lost, and for a one month period in November
1973 and February 1974. Otherwise the reduction of import volumes stood at around ten
percent of contracted supply.
First Oil Shock: Crude Oil Import Plans vs. Actual
Oct-73 Nov-73 Dec-73 Jan-74 Feb-74 Mar-74
Initial Import Plan 26,488 28,031 27,635 26,378 25,717 25,810
PAJ Assessment (11/16f73) 25,658 24,942 19,125 17,701 17,211 17,144
(ratio to initial plan) 96.9% 89.0% 69.2% 67.1% 66.9% 66.4%
PAJ Assessment (12105/73) 25,032 22,995 22,734
(ratio to initial plan) 94.5% 82.0% 82.3%
Actual 24,975 23,343 25,126 23,718 21,110 25,113
(ratio to initial plan) 943% 83.3% 90.90/ 89.9% 82.1% 97.3%
Source: Nihon Sekyu, Nihon Sekyu Hyakunenshi[A 100 Year History of Japan Petroleum, p. 759.
Rather, the effect of the crisis had a short-term, political component, and a long-
term structural component. In the short-term, downstream sector firms faced difficulties
because of their inability to pass prices on to consumers, even when the costs related to
purchasing crude oil increased. Under the PIL the ministry had the power to issue
guidance over prices to firms operating in the downstream, necessitating negotiations
over the extent to which costs could be passed on. Although industry was able to pass on
price increases in November 1973 following the announcement of the embargo by
OAPEC on October 17, the perception of impending shortages, and claims that firms in
the sector were price gouging, mitigated against further increases. Product prices were
frozen until March 18, 1974.
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Long-term structural problems associated with changes in demand proved more
challenging. Unlike French and many U.S. firms, Japanese firm sales were focused
almost wholly in refining and marketing, and this lack of vertical integration
compounded the short-term problem of being unable to pass prices as they could not
balance the losses in the refining sector by gains from the rising value of crude
production to consumers. Further, Japanese firms, like those of France and the United
States, faced the long-term structural problem of stagnating demand for petroleum
products and a shift in the composition of product consumption. Both led to underutilized
refining capacity. Although the rise in the yen against the U.S. dollar meant the cost of
crude to refiners in relative terms fell even as the dollar value of a barrel of crude
increased, this was not enough to insulate refiners and wholesalers from the twin blows
of increased purchasing costs of crude oil and falling demand for products.
The lull between the first and oil shocks did not ameliorate the difficult position
of downstream sector firms. Although demand for petroleum products recovered in 1976
and passed 1973 demand in 1978, the second oil shock hit late in that year. Further, this
time a rising yen meant that demand was less supported by export industries, as it had
been during the first price shock of 1973-4. This led to the thirteen major refining firms
recording combined losses of 17.5 billion yen for the first quarter of 1974." The industry
as a whole was on the edge of solvency, reaching a mean capital-to-assets ratio of 3.94
percent in 1975, and falling to 4.49 percent in 1981 following the second price shock.
2 5 Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History ofPetroleum], 762.
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Firm Performance in Petroleum Industry
Year Return on Assets Profits to Sales Capital-to-Assets Ratio
Petroleum Manufacturing Petroleum Manufacturing Petroleum Manufacturing
1960 8.86 7.72 6.44 7.29 12.40 31.99
1965 3.07 3.56 2.24 4.28 14.73 26.67
1970 3.08 5.28 2.18 5.43 12.07 21.80
1971 1.98 3.27 1.47 3.38 11.25 20.43
1972 1.89 4.04 1.32 4.52 10.73 20.47
1973 2.49 5.93 1.90 6.01 9.55 19.80
1974 -1.09 3.50 -0.51 3.33 5.19 37.05
1975 1.21 1.34 -0.64 1.37 3.94 18.37
1976 2.98 3.12 1.51 3.05 5.12 18.47
1977 3.43 3.17 1.80 3.08 6.81 19.82
1978 0.90 3.98 0.51 3.81 7.56 21.48
1979 2.81 5.55 1.36 4.75 5.44 21.93
1980 3.75 5.52 1.80 4.52 6.40 23.71
1981 -2.25 4.66 -1.09 3.86 4.49 25.00
1982 1.65 4.32 0.80 3.71 6.49 26.86
Note: RoA: (operating profits/capital)*100
Profit-to-Sale: (Operating profit/income before tax)*1 00
Capital-to-Asset Ratio: (capital/total assets)*1 00
Source: ldemitsu Sekiyu Shiryo, 1984, p. 125.
The most immediate response to the oil shocks was political. The political costs of
higher prices promised to be painful, with parts of the country in uproar as consumers
rushed to shops to panic buy basic products such as toilet paper, soy sauce and soy beans.
As a result the initial policy response was dominated by short term political exigencies.
The six-day war began on October 6, 1973, with OAPEC announcing its embargo on
October 17. By December 7 the cabinet had passed two laws designed to increase control
over pricing and distribution. In doing so it established a firm legal basis for price setting
and distributive policies already implementable under the PIL through administrative
guidance.2 6
Diplomatic means were also attempted. Prior to the first oil shock Japanese
26 See Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975, 298. Laws are Law for
the Adjustment of Oil Supply and Demand (Sekiyu Juky Tekiseikaho) and Emergency Measures Law for the
Stabilization of the National Lifestyle (Kokumin Seikatsu Antei Kinkyu Sochiho).
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refiners purchased petroleum through the international oil majors, either independently or
as part of a joint venture, and the Middle East was of little diplomatic interest to
policymakers.27 The loss of control over production by the majors changed this
calculation. At first the government, in contrast to the government of the United States,
adopted a diplomatic strategy that emphasized cooperation with Arab producer
governments. It acquiesced to the demands of Arab governments against Israel and
dispatched senior politicians to the region to sign agreements, including offers of
development assistance. As a result Japan was placed on the list of "friendly countries"
and excluded from the producer embargo.
Ironically, Japanese firms and consumers gained little from this strategy. The
Arab producer states, lacking well developed refining and marketing facilities, were
forced to rely on the international oil majors to sell their crude, as before. These
companies in turn complied with demands not to sell to the United States and the
Netherlands, which were the main targets of the embargo, but also rendered them
ineffective by selling Middle Eastern oil to other states, and routing oil produced in other
regions to the targets of the embargo. As a result the three major oil consuming regions of
Europe, North America, and Japan, lost equivalent amounts of contracted oil, regardless
of their diplomatic stance. The strategy of the majors also meant that any benefits of
improved relations between Middle Eastern producers and Japan could not be captured
by Japanese firms, but would be shared by all in the form of increased supplies to the
market.
Diplomatic efforts also did little to enhance national control of upstream
27 Ronald A. Morse, "Energy and Japan's National Security Strategy," in The Politics of Japan's Energy Strategy:
Resources-Diplomacy-Security, ed. Ronald A. Morse (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies University of
California, 1981).
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exploration and production. Nor were they likely to, given that Middle Eastern
governments would not relinquish control over upstream production. Aside from these
diplomatic and regulatory responses, therefore, the oil shocks initiated a process of
analysis and renegotiation of how to respond to the new market conditions.
2.6 State Actor Policy Preferences
In one sense the problem engendered by the nationalization of production was
less severe for Japanese firms, and therefore MITI, than firms in France and the United
States. Both firms and the MITI bureaucrats responsible for oil policy had long been in
favor of strategic intervention, with the goal of the latter focused on building an
integrated Japanese oil major. The lack of upstream reserves held by Japanese firms,
however, meant they did not face the problems of CFP or Elf-Aquitaine in seeing their
producing assets in the Middle East and elsewhere nationalized. It was unnecessary,
therefore, to focus on the loss of producing assets held nationally in designing a policy
response.
The replacement of the international oil majors with producer governments
nevertheless provided ammunition to advocates of the increased use of strategic policy
instruments. Iran's attempt to raise prices in November 1970, for example, was noted in
an internal MITI memorandum prepared in August 24, 1971.
"The attack on oil prices by OPEC, which began with the price rise by Iran in November
[1970], will have a decisive effect on Japan's petroleum situation given that our country
imports 90% of its crude from the Middle East, and 95.6% from OPEC countries. A
fundamental reconsideration of not only petroleum policy, but resource policy that
responds to these circumstances is therefore asked for."28
28 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, "S6go Enerugii Ch6sakai Sekiyubukai No Kongo No Unei Ni Tsuite
[on the Coming Operation of the Petroleum Committee under the Comprehensive Energy Council]," (Tokyo: Ministry
of International Trade and Industry, 1971), 1.
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The focus of discussion was on support for national firms operating in the
production of oil. Policy intervention in refining and distribution was already significant,
as regulations under the PIL protected domestic industry with the explicit goal of
building up a strong domestic player, and new laws giving the government emergency
powers to set prices and volumes.
Debate prior to the oil price shocks already focused on asserting greater control
over upstream resources. The Petroleum Committee within MITI, for example, convened
in September 1971 to discuss the new market developments, reconfirming that strategic
control should be the overriding goal of policy in the petroleum sector:
"In order to achieve a stable and affordable [petroleum] supply it is necessary to maintain
freedom of action from all types of foreign influence across all activities in the petroleum
industry, from the development and importation of crude oil, through to refining and the
sale of products. This is necessary because of our country's external dependence for
almost all its oil supply, changes in the supply-demand balance, and the presence of the
three major powers [in the market]: the international petroleum majors, OPEC, and the
socialist bloc."29
In accordance with this finding, the committee recommended increasing the
scope of activities of the JPDC, authorizing it to promote the participation of Japanese
firms in projects with non-Japanese firms in which Japanese firms held an equity stake,
purchase development rights, and repeating the long-standing goal of using policy to
encourage the development of an integrated Japanese major.
As the process of the nationalization of oil within the OAPEC region was
underway, a MITI briefing paper distributed to members of the small committee for
policy under the Petroleum Council on April 8, 1974, argued that the loss of control over
upstream oil by the majors required an increase in policy intervention, and that the
decision of the majors to distribute cutbacks across major consumers also demonstrated
29- ""Sg6 Enerugii Ch~sakai Sekiyu Bukai Chnkan H6koku [Interim Report of the Petroleum Committee within
the Comprehensive Energy Council]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1971), 22.
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they could not be relied upon to ensure security of supply. The final report of the
petroleum committee noted that increased government intervention is a necessary
corollary of the politicization of the oil market, and argued for increasing "policy oil,"
supporting upstream activities by national flag firms, and increasing stockpiling
requirements.
There was little opposition to the proposed changes. Major energy consumers,
supported greater intervention. Keidanren, the peak industry association, for example,
agreed that financing for upstream development should be increased, upstream and
downstream mergers promoted, and subsidies increased in order to strengthen the
performance of the sector." A parallel process within the LDP agreed that increased
intervention in the petroleum market was a necessary outcome of the oil shocks. A 125
page report released in November 1978 identified oil as a strategic resource, pointing out
that it is necessary for both military operations as well as the economy, and has no perfect
substitutes, particularly in the transport sector. It also created a new definition of
"resource defense," presaging the comprehensive security concept announced by Prime
Minister Ohira in 1981, and arguing the solution to Japan's weak resource base was to
increase "policy oil," provide greater subsidies for stockpiling, and increase risk coverage
provided by government for upstream exploration and development.
In the wake of the shocks, the JPDC was given increasing powers to finance
private sector operations, including the authority to directly purchase upstream
development rights under the condition these were sold to private sector firms. In 1978
3 0 Nihon Sekiyu, Nihon Sekiyu Hyakunenshi [a One Hundred Year History of Petroleum], 835.
3 Keidanren, "Sekiyu Wo Chnshin to Suru Enerugii Ni Kansuru Y6b6 [Request in Relation to Petroleum and Other
Energy Resources]," (Tokyo: Keidanren, 1973).
32 Liberal Democratic Party, "Enerugii No Anzen Hosh6 Ni Tsuite [on Energy Security]," (Tokyo: Liberal Democratic
Party General Affairs Council, 1978). "Resource defense" is a translation of "Shigen Boei."
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the JPDC was renamed the Japan National Oil Company (JNOC) for "assuring maximum
control of oil resources" by continuing to subsidize private sector activities, as well as
establish a national petroleum stockpile in addition to the ninety days of petroleum
holdings required to be held by private sector importers under the PIL."
Revision of JPDC/JNOC (1967-1978)
Jul-67 May-72 Jun-75 Jun-76 Jun-78
m 1. Equity capital1. Domestic E&P
5 2. Low interest loans 2. Oil shale added
3geophysical surveying 3. Purchase upstream
m assitancSassistance dded rights if soon sold to
domestic firms
0 1. Loan for purchase 1. Increase lending 1. National 90 day
Of oil for used in window for oil used in stockpile established
stockpile stockpile
0 1. Finance and loans
for improving refining
industry
Source: Adapted from JNOC 20 Year History, p. 5.
A victory for the upstream firms was achieved in that no conclusion was reached
on which firms should absorbed and which should remain, nor whether policy should
promote a shift of downstream firms into the upstream, or vice versa." Increased
intervention, in other words, did not mean that policy was adjusted to pick winners. This
Richard J. Samuels, "Public Energy Corporations and Public Policy in Japan," (Cambridge, MA: Energy
Laboratory, 1982).
34 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, " "S5g5 Enerugii Ch~sakai Sekiyu Bukai Chflkan H6koku [Interim
Report of the Petroleum Committee within the Comprehensive Energy Council]." An internal memorandum prepared
within MITI at the time is instructive, proposing in effect that all combinations should be tried: 1) finance refining
firms' shift into the upstream; 2) finance refiner efforts to move upstream through a joint development company; 3)
promote joint investments by upstream firms and refiners in refining projects; 4) promote upstream firms' investments
in refiners; 5) promote upstream firms' independent investments in refining. Under these conditions, increased fiscal
support for Japanese firms was likely to lead to greater exploration internationally, but not at the expense of any firms
through mergers or acquisitions. Ministry of International Trade and Industry, "Kaihatsu, Seisei, Hanbai No Ikkanka Ni
Tsuite [on the Integration of Petroleum Development, Refining and Sales]," (Tokyo: Mining and Coal Bureau, 1971).
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suited firms, which enjoyed subsidy support for upstream operations but did not want to
see competitors gain an advantage in seeking access to exploration or production rights.
This problem was to remain the biggest failure in Japanese upstream policy until it was
partially addressed in 2002 by the attempt to limit policy support to firms capable of
integrating vertically. Without this, financing was provided irrespective of the likelihood
that the receiving firm would develop into an integrated major. As a result, Japanese
firms' participation in exploration and production remained even more fragmented than
in refining and marketing.
As part of the enhanced set of policy instruments, equity capital was provided to
underwrite exploration, with up to seventy percent of total equity requirements provided
for offshore projects, and up to eighty percent for projects on the Japanese continental
shelf. If projects reached the development phase JNOC then guaranteed debt, usually in
coordination with private sector banking syndicates that had political risk underwritten by
the Export-Import Bank of Japan (ExIm Bank)" or the Development Bank of Japan
(DBJ). In 1980, its purview was extended to allow the purchasing of crude oil and
investment in international projects.36
What were the effect of these policies? If measured in terms of total investments
in upstream exploration or development projects, increased subsidies in the upstream
were an unbridled success. The level of overall investment and number of projects
jumped after stagnating from 1973 to 1978, during when company performance mitigated
against large investments in risky upstream projects. Further, the increase represented not
3 Part of the Japanese Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) since 1999.
36 This was first proposed in the Petroleum Committee interim report of October 23, 1978. See Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, "Kongo No Sekiyu Seisaku No H6k6 [the Current and Future Direction of Petroleum
Policy]," (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 1978), 14-15.
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only marginal increases in JNOC financing, but also investments by private sector firms
that had more confidence investing under generous JNOC conditions.
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Measuring outcomes in terms of the total share of Japanese firms' crude imports,
the other hand, produces a different outcome; it fell short of the thirty percent target,
instead fluctuating between ten and fifteen percent of aggregate imports.
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3. Explaining the Restructuring of Strategic Intervention 1980-2000
3.1 Outcomes
In contrast to the period leading up to and including the 1970s, the 1980-2000
period saw policy support for Japanese firms reversed. This was a remarkable break from
the past. Since at least 1934, other than the interlude of foreign occupation, the
institutions of strategic control remained an integral part of the response to the perceived
vulnerability associated with relying on external markets for the supply of petroleum.
Support for Japanese firms in exploration and production also reversed.
The application of policy instruments designed to increase strategic control over
petroleum changed in two ways. First, the quantitative extent of policy support decreased
in both the upstream and downstream. Second, policy shifted towards minimal
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intervention under normal market conditions, while continuing to grant emergency
powers to the government, in the form of price setting and product distribution.
In refining and marketing the PIL was eviscerated over a ten year period. By
1996 informal instruments giving the government authority to regulate trade, and entry
and exit into the domestic refining sector were all but gone. Significant mergers took
place as a result, and final abolition of the law in 2002 marked an epochal change in the
relationship between government and the market.
Government support for exploration and production by Japanese firms was also
limited. The major public firm utilized by the government to support private sector firms'
efforts was abolished, and numerous firms created and supported through its financing
privatized. A new organization was established in its place with decreased authority to
underwrite risk in upstream projects. Quantitative targets for crude imported by Japanese
firms were also abandoned, as was the stipulation that government-financed oil be
brought back to Japanese shores. Each of these changes reduced policy intervention that
aimed at enhancing strategic control of petroleum.
Taken together, these changes represent an apparent convergence towards liberal
outcomes. Rather than the abandonment of support for national control, however, I argue
it represented an adaptation of the policy instruments applied by METI to changes in the
structure of the international oil market, expressed through long-run oil prices. The most
important agent of policy change was the bureaucrats in the executive responsible for oil
policy. They determined that the existing policies had failed to achieve the desired public
policy outcome, and so decided to use, rather than distort, prices in order to achieve the
same goal. Subsidization of Japanese firms' operating in exploration and production was
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similarly reversed through a process of adaptation, but not a rejection of the goal of
strategic control of petroleum.
The evidence presented below shows firms also largely opposed the proposed
changes. This is unsurprising: no Japanese firm enjoyed a significant share of
international exploration and production, in contrast to both French and U.S. firms, and
remained weak as a result. It is unsurprising, therefore, that they continued to lobby for
ongoing support from government. Their position was overturned, however, by state
actors.
3.2 State Actor Policy Preferences
The most important cause of the shift in the policy preferences of actors within
MITI responsible for oil was the effects of the changes in the structure of the
international oil market on the viability of domestic refining firms. This occurred in two
ways. First, these firms were severely weakened by the price gyrations of the first and
second oil shocks, and remained fragmented. Lower oil prices in the mid-1980s -
equivalent to a decrease in the cost of inputs for refiners - did not enable them to recover.
Given this, the existing set of policy instruments, which relied on protectionism in order
to create lead firms in the petroleum sector, were reviewed and ultimately rejected. The
viability of a number of important national projects in exploration and production
undertaken under conditions of high oil prices were also undermined by the collapse in
oil prices, leading to a readjustment of the policy instruments.
These changes to the institutions designed to promote national control over oil
were foreshadowed in debate within MITI.in the early 1980s. The salience of energy as a
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public policy issue was high in the wake of the cutoff of Iranian supplies and increase in
crude prices. Within this, security of petroleum supplies was unsurprisingly most
prominent, with 'policy oil' - the term used to refer to national-flag oil and long-term
supply contracts negotiated on a government-to-government basis - proposed as the most
effective way of enhancing national control.
In the long term, the problem for state actors lay in determining whether the goal
of enhancing national control should be jettisoned, and if not, how existing policies
should be adjusted given the negative effects of the oil shocks on the agents at the center
of this strategy - Japanese firms. The thirty-six refiners and distributors suffered
significant losses from the first oil shock, as noted above, with total combined losses of
some 240 billion yen to the end of FYl975. The paid-in capital of firms in the sector as
of 1979 stood at 5.2%, which compared unfavorably with the average across Japanese
manufacturers (21.96%), and the US majors 45.57%, according to industry statistics
collected by MITI. 7
Opinion within MITI was divided on how to respond, according to the record of
the internal committee established in October 1980 to "assist in building consensus
within the ministry." The committee met eighteen times through to May 1, 1981 and was
chaired by the head of the Petroleum Committee Shiga Manabu. It had senior
representatives from all MITI sections involved in oil policy setting, as well as trade
officials and representatives from the Cabinet Secretariat. It therefore represents a useful
proxy for the status of preferences over policy outcomes from within the bureaucracy
3 Sekiyu Bukai, "Sekiyu Sangyo No Keiri Jokyo to Seihin Kakaku Mondai [on Problems Related to the Financial
Position of the Petroleum Industry and Petroleum Product Prices]," Sogo Enerugii Chosakai (Tokyo: Ministry of
International Trade and Industry, 1981).
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following the crises.38
Discussion within the committee focused on changes in the international market,
its effects on domestic industry, and how this should be reflected in national policy. It
began by noting that nationalization in producer countries was a significant event that
changed the structure of the international oil market from one in which international
majors dominated supply, to one where producer governments became the major
suppliers.
Opinion was not unified on the question of how to reflect the change in market
structure in the petroleum sector in national policy. Some on the committee proposed that
the failure of the existing strategy meant it should be jettisoned in favor of a liberal
response, in which the abolition of restrictions on trade in petroleum products would
enhance Japan's security of supply by increasing the number of firms qualified to import
petroleum products regardless of nationality. This view equated with abandoning the
policy of strategic intervention, and instead relying on the diversification of supply
sources obtained through many buyers and sellers to provide the best method to ensure
security of supply.
Others argued that strategic control over the domestic refining industry remained
the best policy response to Japan's reliance on imports, noting that the law was the most
significant factor ensuring Japanese firms maintained significant market share within the
domestic market. Other arguments marshaled for maintaining this "refine-at-home"
policy focused on the possibility that the open market for petroleum products (as opposed
to the more liquid crude market) was inadequate to meet demand. Finally, proponents of
38 , "Sekiyu Kihon Mondai Kenkyukai Chukan Hokokusho [Interim Report of the Research Committee on
Fundamental Problems in Petroleum]," ed. Sekiyu Kihon Mondai Kenkyukai (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, 1981).
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the status-quo argued that keeping the PIL served as a useful way of obtaining
information about industry plans, even if price setting and other clauses were not
invoked.39
The effects of the shift in the structure of the international petroleum market on
domestic demand was also noted. Two facts stand out in the analysis: the problems for
firms associated with the reduction in absolute demand, and the shift in demand away
from heavy oils used for electricity generation and manufacturing processes. These
problems, and their negative effects on the industry, meant that although consensus did
not exist on how to mange this problem, and whether changes to the PIL should be made,
agreement was reached that the ongoing problems faced by Japanese firms should be the
focus of subsequent discussions about how to adjust domestic institutions to the changed
international market.4 Discussions laid clear the problems the industry faced. In a survey
conducted by MITI, refiners recorded that eight firms had refinery overcapacity of ten
percent, with four firms holding up to fifteen percent overcapacity, and five firms with
overcapacity of fifteen percent or above." In FY1981 the industry lost 345.6 billion yen,
and 123.7 billion in FYl982.4
In the ensuing discussions with industry MITI's commitment to a public policy
role in the petroleum sector remained fixed. MITI identified the role for public policy as
39 Sekiyu Shingikai Sekiyu Bukai, "Naibu Shiryo: Kongo No Sekiyu Sangyo No Arikata Ni Tsuite [Internal Report: On
the Future of the Petroleum Industry]," ed. Sogo Enerugii Chosakai (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and
Industry, 1981).
40 Ibid., 20.
41 , "Kongo No Sekiyu Sangyo No Arikata Ni Tsuite (Sanko Shiryo) [Internal Report: On the Future of the
Petroleum Industry: Additional Material]," ed. Sogo Enerugii Chosakai (Tokyo MITI, : Ministry of International Trade
and Industry,, 1981), 1-1.
42 -, "Sekiyu Sangyo Ni Okeru Kozo Kaizen No Genjo to Kongo No Hoko [the Current State and Future
Direction of Structural Reform in the Petroleum Industry]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
1983), 3.
43 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, "Sekiyu Sangyo No Kozo Kaizen No Hoko to Sekiyu Sangyo No
Arikata Ni Tsuite [on the Direction of Structural Reform in the Petroleum Industry and the State of the Petroleum
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maintaining a viable domestic industry that remained independent, and ensuring security
of supply by monitoring the character of firms entering the sector, and promoting the
diversification of supply. The policies preferred for carrying out public purpose began to
change, however. For the first time it was asserted that intervention should be decreased
under normal market conditions, and that while the "refine-on-the-doorstep" policy
should be maintained, the market should play a more central role in allocating products
within the Japanese economy. It was also asserted that firms should be allowed to be left
to determine what to produce at home, and what to import."
The shift in focus towards greater openness to imports meant officials leading
debate on petroleum policies had to determine how to reflect these changing policy
preferences institutionally. Here there was no support for wholly jettisoning the PIL,
which was identified as continuing to play an important role in enabling the ministry to
retain the powers to shape flows of imports and exports in order to ensure security of
supply, as well as monitor the situation regarding mergers, a key goal of the ministry
given its strong preference to see leading companies emerge from the weak and
fragmented sector." The ongoing importance to MITI's policy preferences of ensuring
national control through support of Japanese firms is in the introduction to the interim
report produced following debate over how to manage the industry:
"The central axis of the petroleum supply system in Japan's domestic
petroleum industry is the wholesalers, who obtain supply of crude oil,
produce [refined products] and then distribute. Increasing the
concentration of wholesalers is extremely important in order to establish
a supply platform that is stable and efficient.. .Under the current
extremely difficult conditions, it is more of an urgent task than ever to
increase industry concentration among wholesalers in order to respond
quickly and appropriately to the needs of the national economy through
Industry]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1985), 11.
44 Ibid., 17.
45 Ibid., 21.
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the stable supply of petroleum." 46
It is also worth noting that the fall in oil prices of the 1980s did not reverse this
conclusion. This is perhaps counterintuitive: the change should have been a boon for the
industry, reducing the cost of feedstock for refiners and increasing demand for their
products. This windfall from the twin effects of the lower per barrel oil price and rising
yen did not materialize, however, for two reasons. First, the industry was unable to take
full advantage of falling in crude prices. Although protected from prices in the
international market through restrictions on trade, prices for petroleum products within
Japan were set in a market. Rather than respond gradually as cheaper oil was refined and
sold, these prices responded almost instantaneously to oil prices, meaning that product
prices fell while the refining and distribution system was still processing inventory from
higher priced crude. Further, falling prices and refinery utilization rates led to a price war
as firms tried to make up for losses.47 As a consequence, higher sales volumes only
increased losses accumulated by the downstream sector.
Second, consumption of heavy oil, which was a significant component of overall
refined product demand, did not recover in a U-shaped pattern; the high prices of the
1970s had induced a shift in demand to alternative fuels, as well as an improvement in
energy efficiency. This meant that the problem of overcapacity was not resolved by lower
prices. According to a survey of the twenty one refining firms completed by MITI, the
falling price of oil and ongoing weak demand gave them combined operating losses of
46 ,"Motouri Kigyo No Shuyakuka Ni Tsuite Chukan Hokoku [Interim Report on the Concentration of
Wholesale Firms]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1984), 3.
T~ichi Tsutomu, Managing Director, Institute for Energy Economics Japan and Petroleum Council member,
interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July 4, 2006; Interview with head of PAJ/President of Japan Oil, Keidanren Geppo,
April 1986, 52-60.
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136.6 billion yen in the first half of 1985.48
The centerpiece of this change was the shift of policy preferences towards
allowing greater imports, while maintaining the law regulating the industry of the whole.
This, it was deemed, would ensure that the flows of crude oil and petroleum products
were increasingly determined through market mechanisms, but that entry and exit into the
market remained constrained, to the advantage of Japanese domestic firms. In other
words, the idea of using, rather than distorting, prices in order to improve Japanese firm
performance was mooted. Allowing prices to operate freely would, the argument went,
force mergers within industry and therefore move industry closer to producing a national
flag firm capable of competing in the international petroleum market. Until this point the
relationship between the market and energy security of supply had been conceived of in
zero-sum terms. A new position was emerging, however, that argued that the market
could be used as policy instrument itself in order to strengthen the downstream industry.
Some twenty years later the head of the petroleum section within MITI at the time, Nait6
Masahisa, noted the intentions within the ministry at the time:
"While I was in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry I pushed deregulation of
the petroleum industry, but deregulation is nothing more than an instrument. In other
words, through deregulation [I wanted to] increase industry concentration. Why increase
concentration? In order to make an oil firm that is able to compete internationally." 49
National control therefore remained the leitmotif of intervention in the petroleum
sector, but the configuration of policies changed because of the ongoing weakness in the
48 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 6, 1985.
49 Interview with Naito Masahisa, Enerugii Fdramu, September 2005, 62; This finding is corroborated by T6ichi
Tsutomu, Managing Director, Institute for Energy Economics Japan and Petroleum Council member, interview by
author. Tokyo, July 4, 2006. and Kodaira Nobuyori, former Director General, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy
(2004-06) and former Director, MITI Petroleum Planning Division (1995-96). Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July
19, 2007.
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downstream industry.5 4 This was done through the introduction of a special law that
operated alongside the PIL, and allowed imports of gasoline, kerosene, and light oils, but
limited trade to firms with refining and storage capacity within Japan, and able to meet
Japanese quality standards." In practice this meant that only Japanese refiners and
wholesalers were able to meet the requirements, and therefore import petroleum products.
Indeed, critics of the bill argued that it increased, rather than decreased, the extent of
regulatory control over trade in petroleum products." It also it served to establish in law a
practice that had until then been carried out through informal guidance."
The law included a ten year sunset clause. The purpose of the clause was to
leave open the possibility that trade could be restricted once again if the balance of
supply and demand in crude oil became less favorable in the 1990s. Placing a ten year
restriction ensured that stakeholders could revisit the question of the structure of the
international market, along with the question of whether imports should be continued, at
the end of the period."
The law ensured that both foreign and Japanese competition were banned from
importing petroleum products. Indeed, resolve within MITI to restrict market access is
so The continuation of policy support for firms in exploration and production, despite the proposed shift in downstream
policy, offers further evidence that the change in policy preferences did not represent a rejection of the idea of national
control. The reform of these policies did not begin until 1997, some ten years after the initial changes made to
regulations governing refining and marketing. Further, as detailed below, the privatization and the recalibration of
instruments designed to enhance national control were also made in order to render more effective the strategy of
national control, rather than reject that goal.
Under the PIL imports were not banned, but rather importers were required by law to register import plans with
MITI. Under this system MITI had only recognized the importation of naptha, LPG and heavy oil in order to enable
firms to balance supply and demand, but imports of gasoline, kerosene and light oils were banned. See Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, October 23, 1985.
5 Fukuoka Yasuo, House of Representatives Trade and Commerce Committee, 10 3nd Session of the Diet, November
20, 1985, Takahashi Hiroshi, "Gasorin Yunyu Kaikin: Matta Nashi no Ikinokori Ky6s6 Jidai he[Allowing Gasoline
Imports: No Escape from the Era of Competition for Survival]," Shaikan T5yd Keizai, February 8, 1986, 90-93.
5 Kodaira Nobuyori, former Director General, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (2004-06) and former
Director, MITI Petroleum Planning Division (1995-96). Interview by author. Tokyo, Japan, July 19, 2007.
54 The bill originally proposed to place a five-year limit on the right to import, based on IEA predictions of a tight
market in the 1990s, but this was extended to ten years during Diet interpellations, under the rationale that a review of
market conditions after five years was premature.
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demonstrated by the celebrated case of Lions Petroleum, in which MITI threatened to ban
development assistance to the Philippines if their state firm contracted with Lions
Petroleum. Although the PAJ officially opposed the change, in private its members
recognized it as a reasonable outcome for the industry; certainly it ensured that refiners
and wholesalers could manage inventory more effectively while retaining control over
physical supplies."
A second effect of the reduction in intervention under the PIL was to increase
the importance of the review of the law prior to its expiry after ten years, in 1996. The
review concluded once again that the increasing competitiveness of the international oil
market had lessened supply risks, making intervention unnecessary. In the report
produced in 1995 the committee charged with reassessing state policy towards the
petroleum industry, for example, noted that:
"The development of the international oil market has positively affected Japan's ability to
ensure stability of oil supply through the dispersal through the market of the influence of
decreases in supply, and other effects.. .An emphasis on reliance on the functioning of
the international oil market should be at the basis of policy going forward...Regarding the
refining industry, supply and demand adjustment mechanisms in the PIL should be
abolished, as should regulations allowing for price intervention in peacetime."56
The law was allowed to expire, therefore, marking the abandonment of attempts
by the state to increase strategic control of petroleum through the protection of firms
engaged in domestic refining, and leading to widespread reorganization of the industry,
including mergers between the major Japanese refining interests and foreign majors."
55 Nihon Keizai Sangy6 Shimbun, September 13, 1985, 3. On the Lions Petroleum case Frank K. Upham, "The Man
Who Would Import: A Cautionary Tale About Bucking the System in Japan," Journal ofJapanese Studies 17, no. 2
(1991).
56 Quoted in: Ibid., 358-9 (author's translation).
5 Further, unlike in 1986 when political opposition eviscerated proposed reforms, changes in the structure of domestic
politics by 1996 had weakened the veto power of those arguing to maintain the ban on imported products. Kosuke
Oyama, "The Policymaking Process Behind Petroleum Industry Regulatory Reform," in Is Japan Really Changing Its
Ways?: Regulatory Reform and the Japanese Economy, ed. Lonny E. Carlile and Mark Tilton (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
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3.3 Firm Policy Preferences
Discussions among MITI officials responsible for oil policy about how to adjust
the policies of strategic intervention to the shift in long-run prices drew firms into the
debate. This is unsurprising given their poor financial condition. It also afforded them an
opportunity to seek state support for managing the problems associated with falling
demand and overcapacity.58
In contrast to MITI officials, the policy preferences of firms remained stable
around maintaining barriers to entry in the domestic petroleum market through trade and
regulatory restrictions on imports of petroleum products, while seeking independence of
action in reducing industry fragmentation.59 An internal memorandum of industry
produced by MITI in 1981 records that firms wanted to retain independence in dealing
with the problem of reducing overcapacity, as well as maintain the PIL in order to keep
barriers to competition from imports of petroleum products.60 This opinion was repeated
in subsequent hearings in 1985. Daikyo Oil, for example, noted in its response to a
ministerial request for comments that uncontrolled imports would cause significant harm
to the national economy and should be avoided, while the refine-at-home policy should
be maintained. It also argued that if imports should be allowed, only firms able to ensure
the stable supply of products should be allowed to do so. Further, holding up the
example, of the spin-off of its refining interests in order to combine them in a common
58 Data on the policy preferences of firms is obtained from industry association positions, as well as internal
memoranda on firm hearings within committee where available.
59 The exception to these policy preferences is Idemitsu Kosan, which argued in strong language that the attempt to
build lead firms in the industry was bound to fail if policy continued to protect industry, and trade in petroleum
roducts remained constrained.
lo Small Committee within the Petroleum Committee, ""Naibu Shiryo: Hiaringu Ni Okeru Kakushabetsu Iken [Internal
Memorandum: Firm Positions in Hearing]"," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1981).
151
firm with Maruzen, it argued that firms should be allowed to move forward with efforts
to create lead firms independently, rather than be forced to merge through the use of the
PIL.' Kyodo Oil similarly argued that firms should be allowed to proceed with the
rationalization of overcapacity at their own pace, and further proposed that firms receive
public support in order to short-up their financial positions. Like Daikyo, they also
argued in prepared remarks that petroleum imports should only be carried out by firms
with refining capacity in Japan.62 The industry association representing the refining
industry also lobbied the government to maintain the refine-at-home policy; in other
words, to limit imports of petroleum products, in order to maintain stable supply.63
This does not mean firms hoped to maintain the status-quo. Poor performance
and ongoing fragmentation meant most recognized that the existing industry structure
was untenable, and that the solution lay in increasing firm size through mergers and
increasing tie-ups in refining and marketing. Firms also preferred, however, that the
government not force mergers between them, but rather that they be allowed to proceed
independently.
In short, the negative effects long-run prices had on Japanese domestic firms,
undermined national regulatory and trade instruments designed to enhance strategic
control over the petroleum sector. This led both groups of actors to accept the need for
adjustments to the existing set of institutions. For state actors, the determination of a new
set of policy preferences took some five years. It was driven by ongoing poor firm
performance, which undermined the existing strategy in which firms were central to the
61 Sekiyu Shingikai Sekiyu Bukai Shoiinkai, Hiaringu Kaitosho [Hearing Response Form], June 3 1985.
62 Sekiyu Shingikai Sekiyu Bukai Shoiinkai, Hiaringu Kaitosho [Hearing Response Form], May 30 1985.
63 Sekiyu Renmei, "Sekiyu/Enerugii Seisaku Ni Kan Suru Teigen [Proposal Regarding Petroleum and Energy Policy],"
(Tokyo: Sekiyu Renmei, 1982), 8.
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strategic of enhancing security of petroleum supplies through building lead companies.
For firms, on the other hand, there was recognition that changes were required in order to
reduce industry fragmentation and overcapacity.
Crucially, however, the interests of both MITI bureaucrats and firms remained in
line with using policy to promote domestic industry. This is unsurprising in the case of
Japanese firms, which remained heavily reliant on the domestic market and retained little
presence in exploration and production of oil internationally. The poor prospects for the
industry also meant they were willing to accept the need to adjust through mergers,
although they hoped to maintain control over this process. Rebuilding the industry also
required support for dealing with the problem of overcapacity.
For MITI bureaucrats there was no attempt shift policy away from an
equilibrium that remained focused on national control. Beginning in 1981, a minority
opinion within MITI, which dominated the long-run response to the crisis, began to
propose opening the domestic market to imports, and loosening regulatory constraints. As
firms continued to flounder, a consensus was reached that the existing policies needed to
be adjusted to make domestic firms more competitive, but that improving the
performance of national firms remained a viable response to the problems inherent in the
international petroleum market.
The consensus was reached, therefore, to reduce regulations over refining and
production plans over a five year period. The agreement of firms to acquiesce to this
change was based on an understanding they would continue to control imports and
exports. In this way open trade would be allowed to equalize prices, but ongoing
regulations would ensure that Japanese firms controlled this trade. Gradual market
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opening was implemented through a five year action plan that removed guidance until the
PIL. The licensing of refining capacity, which was the strongest formal power conferred
to the government under the PIL, was loosened immediately. Other important changes
were the abolition of firms' production plans by the end of 1988, and firm refining
schedules within five years. A member of the committee established to design these
institutional changes, Morozumi Yoshihiro, noted that the changes were "epochal for
petroleum policy."64 Although an exaggeration, Morozumi's statement was accurate in
that the decision that "under normal conditions, petroleum supply should be left to the
independent action of a powerful petroleum industry,"65 represented a significant shift
towards liberalization.
3.4 Downstream Results
The reduction of regulatory and trade restrictions from 1986-1996 had the effect
desired by MITI. After 1996 the price spread between the international and domestic
markets for petroleum products equalized, most notably in gasoline, for which domestic
prices had long been in excess of the international price. Downstream firms shifted to a
new pricing regime for gasoline, kerosene and light oil to one that adjusted monthly to
reflect international market prices.66
The controlled introduction of imports of gasoline and other fuels also led to
firm mergers. In expectation of the change Showa Oil and Shell merged with one another
64 Meeting minutes for "Sekiyu Sangyo Kihon Mondai Kentokai, "Sekiyu Sangy6 Kihon Mondai Kentokai
H6kokusho [Report of the Deliberative Committee into the Petroleum Industry]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, 1988).
65 Sekiyu Sangyo Kihon Mondai Kentokai, "Sekiyu Sangy6 Kihon Mondai Kentdkai H6kokusho [Report of the
Deliberative Committee into the Petroleum Industry]," (Tokyo: Ministry of International Trade and Industry, 1988).
66 Petroleum Association of Japan, "Sekiyu Gyokai No Suii [Trends in the Petroleum Industry]," (Tokyo: Petroleum
Association of Japan,, 1996), 3.
154
in 1995. Then, following the entry into force of the law in 1996, Cosmo, Daikyo and
Maruzen joined together under the Cosmo banner, followed by Nihon Kogyo and Kyodo
Oil in 1992 which formed Japan Energy.
The second wave of mergers began after the abolition of the special law. The
largest downstream refiner, Nihon Sekiyu, cut its long standing ties with Caltex, and
merged with Mitsubishi Oil in April 1999, and then entered into partnership in refining
and distribution with Cosmo Oil in October of the same year. Japan Energy and
Showa/Shell also joined refining and distribution networks, although they did not
formally merge. Then, in 2000, Toa and General Oil merged to form Tonen-General, and
finally in 2002 Idemitsu and Shin-Nihon Sekiyu joined refining operations. By the end of
the process firm mergers and partnerships reduced the sixteen firms operating in the
downstream sector to four groups.
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3.5 Negotiations with Other Actors
In chapter two of the study a framework of policy change was introduced that
proposed changes in the policy preferences of state actors and domestic petroleum firms,
occurring in response to changes in the international oil market, were the most important
factors in explaining changes in policy across time. I also noted, however, that state
actors responsible for oil policy, and firms, were also forced to negotiate with other actors
in determining which policies were viable.
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In the case of Japan, the position of major consumer industries within Japan
shifted in response to change in the oil market. In the 1970s fears about disruptions to
physical supply meant major consumers supported increased strategic intervention on
energy security grounds. Under the retreat of OPEC and the low price regime, consumers
called for balancing the benefits of policy intervention in the oil market with the costs
this implied for industries using petroleum products as an input. Peak industry body
Keidanren, for example, argued that although the long-term security of petroleum
supplies was not guaranteed, the best solution to the problem was to let the market set
prices during normal market operation, but retain emergency powers.67 By doing so, it
was argued that consumers could take advantage of lower energy costs, while also
providing insurance against supply problems in the case of market disruptions. In a May
1988 statement Keidanren also included petroleum, along with other energy sources, as
an area to be included for ongoing liberalization and deregulation.68 Further, a succession
of committees operating outside the traditional ministerial committee system promoted
the benefits of deregulation and liberalization, beginning with the Maekawa Report,
which operated as an advisory body to the prime minister and reported in 1986 that Japan
should lower barriers to trade and in order to increase imports and domestic consumption.
The Maekawa Report did not mention energy or petroleum, but noted that imports of
manufactured products should be imported in order to improve the international division
67 Keidanren Geppe, June 1988, 42. The positions of Keidanren and the PAJ matched on the question of tax increases,
on the other hand. Keidanren argued, in common with the PAJ, that an increase in the petroleum tax was unjustified,
and repeating its position that energy security of supply policies should be funded out of general revenues given its
status as national policy. Petroleum Association of Japan, "Sekiyu Gy6kai No Suii [Trends in the Petroleum Industry],"
Tokyo: Petroleum Association of Japan, 1986), 144-5.
8 Keidanren, "Kisei Kanwa Ni Kansuru Y6b6 [Request Regarding Deregulation]," in Keidanren 50-Nenshi [Fifty Year
History ofKeidanren] (Tokyo: Keidanren, 1999), 557.
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of labor and make the domestic distribution system more efficient.69 It continued with the
Hiraiwa Commission, which specified in November 1993 that the domestic market
should be opened further, although its conclusions left room for adjustment within MITI
in petroleum policy by noting that regulations should be kept to a minimum during
normal market operation only if possible to do so. Specifically, the Hiraiwa Report
named gasoline, kerosene and light oil as three products for which regulation under
normal market conditions should be changed, stating that in petroleum "regulations in
petroleum should be kept to the minimum necessary, and, where possible, the formula
"free under normal conditions, restricted under emergencies" should be introduced." 70
3.6. Policy Adjustment - Upstream
The bifurcation of the Japanese firms into those operating in the domestic sector
and those operating internationally meant the debate over how to adjust policies designed
to support Japanese firms in the upstream was conducted on a parallel track to the
69 On the use of informal committees see Richard J. Samuels, "Leadership and Political Change in Japan: The Case of
the Second Rincho," Journal ofJapanese Studies 29, no. 1 (2003). For the assessment by the PAJ see Petroleum
Association of Japan, "Sekiyu Gynkai No Suii [Trends in the Petroleum Industry]," (Tokyo: Petroleum Association of
Japan, 1993), 167.
70 T6ichi Tsutomu, Managing Director, Institute for Energy Economics Japan and Petroleum Council member.
Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July 4, 2006. On the history of the deregulation process in the 1980s see Keidanren,
Keidanren 50-Nenshi [Fifty Year History ofKeidanren] (Tokyo: Keidanren, 1999). See Nakatani Iwao and Hiroko Ota,
Keizai Kaikaku No Bijon: Hiraiwa Ripoto Wo Koete [a Vision of Economic Reform: Beyond the Hiraiwa Report]
(Tokyo: ToyO Keizai Shinp6sha, 1994), 6.
The nationalization of oil production of the 1970s was also followed by efforts by governments in the Middle
East to capture a greater share of revenues from crude production. This was done by investing in refining capacity for
the export of petroleum products, and Middle Eastern producers added some 1.2 million barrels of capacity between
1984 and 1987. Governments in the European Community feared their own markets would be flooded, and pressured
the Japanese government to open its market to imports of petroleum products. According to Diet testimony, the
Japanese proposal was that the joint communiqu6 prepared within the International Energy Agency should note that the
market should have a greater role in the supply of petroleum products, but not that they should be traded under a free-
trade regime. The United States did not attempt to significantly influence the shape of Japanese policy, and concurred
with the Japanese proposal. Further, this is identified as a secondary cause of liberalization, as the decision to prepare a
law for the partial opening of the Japanese market to trade in petroleum products was made before the meeting with
European countries and the United States - the other major consuming regions. Committee on Commerce and Industry,
Testimony ofNonouchi Takashi, Director General ofAgency of Natural Resources and Energy, September 3 1985.;
Committee on Commerce and Industry, Testimony of Murata Keiiro, Minister of International Trade and Industry,
November 20 1985.
159
liberalization debate. The direction of policy change mimicked that of the downstream: a
reduction in the role of government in enhancing strategic control over petroleum
resources through privatization. Further, like liberalization of the domestic petroleum
sector, the most significant factor leading to the shift in strategy adopted in the
exploration and production of oil was the shift in long-run crude oil prices and its effects
on Japanese firms. Following the oil shocks a number of public-private partnerships were
established and invested in by JNOC, however the falling oil price, and rising yen, meant
these failed." This saddled JNOC with substantial debts, and the political costs associated
with the scale of these losses led to the reform of JNOC.
Once again, the adjustment of policies did not amount to a rejection of support
for national firms in the name of strategic intervention. Rather, they amounted to an
adjustment of the instruments applied in order to achieve this goal. Japanese firms also
continued to support the provision of subsidies and low-interest loans for exploration and
production efforts internationally. The result was a reduction, and restructuring of the
policy instruments designed to achieve strategic control, but not a rejection of this goal.
This left open the possibility of a reenergizing of strategic intervention under conditions
of high prices once again, which is what occurred.
3.7 MITI Policy Preferences - Upstream
The mechanism through which the shift in long-run oil prices undermined the
status quo was associated with the government financed JNOC. The scale of the debts
associated with upstream policy support provided through JNOC to firms reached some
71 The rising yen meant that the income from the sale of oil, which was calculated in dollar terms, fell, relative to the
cost of financing.
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342.2 billion yen from the 264 firms invested in by JNOC to the end of 1997. National
companies established in the wake of the oil shocks comprised almost three-quarters of
the losses at 251.9 billion." Japan Oil Development Company (JODCO), for example,
was established on February 22, 1973 and purchased rights in Abu Dhabi from British
Petroleum, but retained some 465 billion yen of unpaid loans and capital. The North Sea
and Sino-Japanese projects, both commenced in 1980 in the wake of the second oil
shock, also held over 100 billion yen in unpaid capital or loans.
Top Ten JNOC Investments by Value
(unit: yen millions)
Project Year Main Investor Capital Loan Total Outstanding
Canada Oil Sands 1978 Mitsui Bussan 26,333 0 26,333 26,333
Angola Oil 1985 Cosmo Oil 5,250 27,924 33,174 5,250
Mubarras Oil 1979 NipponOil 12,190 28,221 40,411 37,818
Indonesia Nippon Oil Coop. 1979 Nippon Oil 29,351 13,306 42,657 29,351
INPEX North Caspian 1998 Nippon Oil 21,590 23,969 45,559 45,559
United Oil Development 1970 (sold 2001) 16,033 35,795 51,828 49,171
Sakhalin Oil Development 1976 (failed) 13,531 38,522 52,053 45,009
Sino-Japan Oil Development 1980 (failed) 64,483 53,192 117,675 117,675
North Sea Oil 1980 (failed) 29,209 98,031 127,240 123,011
JODCO 1973 AOC Energy 447,511 372,200 819,711 465,234
Source:.DGMEC
The problem, once again, was the major vehicle determined by the government
to implement national policy - the Japan National Oil Corporation - was significantly
undermined by the shift in long-run oil prices. National projects were undertaken under
the assumption that prices would remain at 40-50 dollars a barrel over the life of the
project. This stood in contrast to the assumptions of the international majors at the time,
which maintained a twenty five dollar a barrel assumption, and meant that the projects
were saddled by massive debts when the long-run oil price dropped. Indeed, if prices had
7 Yomiuri Shimbun, "Sekiyu Kedan, 3400-oku en Kaishi Fun6: Shusshi/yuushi Saki Kaihatsu Gaisha no Yuda
Saikutsu, Shippai Tsudsuki [JNOC, 340 billion yen Unrecoverable: Ongoing Failures in Oil Field Exploration by
Development Companies Receiving Investments or Loans]," November 16, 1997, 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, "Kyogaku
Akaji no Sekiyu Kaihatsu Gaisha Osugiru Shusshi Gaisha, Sekiyu Shokku ni Endaka ga Oiuchi [Enormous Losses at
Petroleum Development Firms: Investment Target Firms too Numerous, the Oil Shocks and Rising Yen are the
Cause]," November 16, 1997, 38; Yomiuri Shimbun, "Sekiyu Kaihatsu Gaisha: "Kokusaku" no Moto, Kyogaku Fusai,
Hiy6, Rieki Mokusan Kurai [Petroleum Development Firms: Under National Policy, Huge Losses, Costs and Profit
Forecasts Off]," November 16, 1997, 39.
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not dropped so precipitously, one observer suggested it is not clear that JNOC reforms
would have occurred Later calculations carried out by the ministry determined that the
investments held by JNOC were profitable if calculated after the rise in petroleum
prices.74
A Board of Audit of Japan (Kaikei Kensain) confirmed the poor state of the
projects overseen by JNOC when examining the state of its balance sheet from 1995 as
part of its regular review of the state of government finances. It was the first review since
1976, and the auditors assigned four staff members, who spent some 30-80 work days per
year for a three year period reviewing each project, including interviews with JNOC and
firms receiving JNOC assistance. The results were presented in the administrative
oversight committee of the House of Representatives on December 3, 1997. They were
extraordinary. By the end of FY1997 JNOC had invested or loaned over 1.7 trillion yen
to 266 firms. Of these just 44 were producing oil, while 68 remained in the exploration
phase and ten were in the process of being dissolved. This left 144 firms already wound
up, responsible for losses totaling 372 billion yen.75
When asked to explain the losses, Komatsu Kunio, the president of JNOC at the
time, noted without apparent irony that the drop in the price of oil, which should have
been applauded by those concerned about Japanese energy security, had harmed Japan's
upstream development plans:
"In the mid-1980s the price of oil collapsed and remained low, and the yen continued to
increase in value. These factors had a serious influence on the condition of the
Ishii Akira, Chief Economist, Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC). Interview by author,
audio recording, Tokyo, Japan, July 5, 2006. A second effect was the rising yen, as revenues from the projects were in
U.S. dollars, whereas loans from JNOC were in yen.
74 Kodaira Nobuyori, former Director General, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy (2004-06) and former
Director, Petroleum Planning Division (1995-96), Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Interview by author,
Tokyo, Japan, July 19, 2007; senior official at JOGMEC. Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July 20, 2007.
75 Administrative Oversight Committee, Debates, December 3, 1997.
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companies. I think this was an extremely unfortunate event for our country's upstream
petroleum development."76
These failures linked to the shift in long-run oil prices, as with those of the
domestic refining and distribution firms, initiated a process of review of the existing
institutions designed to enhance national control over petroleum. The MITI minister,
Horiuchi Mitsuo, ordered the Director General of the Agency of Natural Resources and
Energy (ANRE), the body within MITI with responsibility for petroleum policy, to
review the findings.7 7
An internal ANRE group gathered for the first of ten meetings on June 17, 1998.
It reported to the minister on September 29. Using a cash flow analysis under which the
committee assessed each projects' expected production to 2020, and then subtracted
operational costs to reach a final figure for likely repayments, they found that just eleven
of 123 firms on the books of JNOC at the time were in the black, and this number was
likely to rise to 19 firms by 2020. Of the 1.392 trillion yen JNOC had spent by the end of
1997 they determined losses were expected to amount to between 504 and 687 billion
yen, with total unrecoverable investments 438 billion yen after the sale of assets and
repayment of investments from profitable firms. 78 The committee also found that twenty
seven of the existing firms should be dissolved immediately as there was no prospect of
improving their financial position.
The new MITI minister, Yosano Kaoru, continued with the review of existing
policy upon entering office.79 In response to criticism that the internal auditors had an
76 Komatsu Kunio statement to Administrative Oversight Committee, Debates, December 3, 1997.
77 Economy and Industry Committee, Debates, October 15, 1998.
78 Economy and Industry Committee, Debates, October 15 1998. The revenue flows were calculated under two
scenarios. The first used a $16.1/barrel Dubai assumption (the lowest value from the average spot price of the last 3-5
years), with an exchange rate of 110 yen/dollar (five year average). The second used a $20.7 /barrel (highest six month
average from the last six years) and 145 yen/dollar (monthly average for August 1998) assumption.
79 In the House of Councilors election held on July 12, 1998, the government of Hashimoto Ryiitar6 performed poorly,
163
interest in downplaying JNOC's problems, Yosano created a committee that would be
free from charges of bias.8" He appointed Shiono Hiroshi, an expert in administrative law,
to head the body, along with members expert in accounting and law. The specialists
agreed with the internal audit, as well as reiterating the role oil prices played in
undermining JNOC's financial position, first by encouraging support for large projects
following the oil shocks, and then damaging the financial position of these projects
through the collapse in prices of 1986.
"Because of the collapse of oil prices in 1986, and the rapid rise of the yen, the financial
position of firms invested in [by JNOC] worsened. In response, JNOC postponed loan
repayments, halted interest payments lowered the rate of interest charged, and carried
out other special policies for 13 firms. If these actions had not been taken and
repayments demanded, the firms would be bankrupted, and as a result JNOC would
have been unable to reclaim repayment."8'
Crucially, the report did not recommend the dissolution of JNOC, supporting the
proposition that the shift in policy towards JNOC was driven by a process of learning in
which the existing structure of policy support were adjusted, but the idea of national
control itself not abandoned. Rather, it suggested that the causes of previous failures
should be reviewed, and auditing and information disclosure processes improved. The
report noted that thirteen firms continuing to receive support from JNOC, including the
national project firms Sino-Japan Oil Development, North Sea Oil, and Sakhalin Oil
Development, should be wound up, and other firms sold off as appropriate in order to
improve the overall performance of the company.
and the cabinet, including the prime minister, resigned. On July 30tb the new Prime Minister, Obuchi Keizb, took over
the leadership, and appointed the new minister for MITI.
80 Yosano made clear this intention in a February 25, 1999 press conference: "When the previous report was released
people in the Diet and elsewhere pointed out that an assessment should be carried out from a neutral, expert position.
For this reason, last November I ordered that the Committee on JNOC Upstream Projects should be convened with the
preeminent experts in law, corporate accounting, economics, and petroleum development technologies, within the
Petroleum Council," in "Yoshino Tsisangyo Daijin Danwa [Release by MITI Minister Yosano]," February 24, 1999.
81 Ministry of International Trade and Industry, "Sekiyu Kodan Kaihatsu Jigyo linkai Hokoksho [Report of the
Committee on Jnoc Upstream Projects]," ed. Sekiyu Kodan Kaihatsu Jigyo Iinkai (Tokyo: Ministry of International
Trade and Industry, 1999), 16.
164
The implications of the proposed changes were profound in two ways. First, for
the first time in the postwar period a government policy document had explicitly
proposed supporting some firms above others in order to promote the development of an
integrated energy firm. This stood in contrast to earlier changes, which increased or
decreased the level of policy support for firms without taking this key step.
Second, the report presaged the idea that policy support for Japanese firms
operating in the upstream should be stopped once the process of selective support through
the disposal of profitable JNOC assets, and other means of support, was complete. If
followed through, this implied, as in France, a complete withdrawal of policy support
under normal market conditions for firms operating in the upstream and the downstream
sectors once state goals had been achieved. 2
In order to achieve this goals, the first five years was noted as a key period
within which existing subsidies should be expanded to allow JNOC to subsidize the
purchase of existing fields in order to develop the portfolio of the proposed major; the
first time that that JNOC would be allowed into the development side of the business.
During this period it also recommended that JNOC assets should be sold off to firms
capable of forming an integrated energy firm. In the following five years it proposed the
chosen firms should then receive support designed assist them in becoming more
competitive internationally. Following this, the committee hinted at the possibility that
the state would withdraw from the provision of policy support.
82 Interviews confirm the committee's intention to withdraw state support after a ten year window, citing the example
of the German firm Deminex, which was dissolved by the government in 1997. Arai Mitsuo, former member,
Committee on Basic Problems in Petroleum Committee (2000). Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July 12, 2007;
Kikkawa Takeo, former member, Committee on Basic Problems in Petroleum Committee (2000). Interview by author,
Tokyo, Japan, July 18, 2007.
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3.8 Firm Policy Preferences
The upstream industry, represented by industry association the Japan Petroleum
Development Association (JPDA), was not alarmed with the initial decision to review
upstream oil policies. Rather, its chairman saw a review of JNOC's activities as a useful
opportunity to rethink how the government should extend support to Japanese firms
operating in the upstream sector.83
The industry did not support a more thorough review of the structure of policy
instruments, however. The JPDC were given an opportunity to present to the committee,
but not sit as a member.84 This meant its approval was not required for the report to be
established as policy. It is unlikely they would have signed if given the opportunity. The
first problem was that the report did not refer to petroleum as a strategic good, rather
stopping by noting that it has "considerable differences" with other goods because of
price volatility and OPEC market power.85 While this did not amount to a repudiation of
the use of policy instruments in the upstream, it was a step back from the understanding
of the market expressed in earlier government-backed assessments. The JPDC repudiated
this view in its public comments, responding that the committee should record that
"petroleum is absolutely a strategic good, and in future debates over petroleum
development policy the need for strategic decisionmaking must be kept in view.""
The industry association representing upstream firms also did not support the
83 Sekiyu Kogy6 Renmei, "Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genjo to Kadai [Current State and Issues in
Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu K6gy6 Renmei, 1999), ii.84 The committee makeup was heavily weighted towards specialists and consumer groups. Of the eighteen members of
the committee, only two (Mitsui Bussan and Imperial Oil) were involved in the upstream business, with Teikoku
mainly involved in domestic exploration and development projects. The rest were made up of representatives of
consumer groups, and academic and think tank experts.
85 "Ta no shohin to ha sota kotonaru seishitsu wo yii shiteiru."
86 Sekiyu K6gy6 Renmei, "Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genjo to Kadai [Current State and Issues in
Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu Kogyb Renmei, 2000), 143-4.
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proposal that state support for upstream activities should be temporally bounded, and that
policy should "pick winners" by channeling subsidies only to firms judged capable of
growing to a scale enabling them to compete internationally. It responded that picking
winners contravened the stated goal of letting the market determined outcomes.87
"The JPDA recognizes that the formation of a central corporate group is one idea,
however, the actual joining of firms through partnership or merger relates to the very root
of corporate management. For this reason, it is not [a process] that the government or
JNOC should lead, but rather this should be left comletely to private firms, with the
government creating the environment for this to occur."
In introductory remarks to the annual report of September 2001, Japan
Petroleum Development Association (JPDA) and JAPEX chairman Wakasugi Kazuo,
also noted his concern that the upstream sector was not given not given a seat at the table
of those deciding JNOC, and their own, fate, and that any reforms proposed could
eviscerate JNOC's ability to subsidize upstream projects:
"Special government bodies are being reformed, and the organization and activities of
even the JNOC, which has played an important role in the development of our country's
petroleum and natural gas projects, are being reexamined from the ground up. The
content of the reforms are not yet clear, but in the current energy situation I can only be
extremely worried that the direction of reform is being set hurriedly without examining the
fundamental role JNOC plays in enhancing energy security of supply for our country
through the independent development of [energy] projects."89
His concern was understandable, given the number of projects funded by
government money. Of the 67 projects that had reached the production stage between the
years of 1961 and 2003, just ten did not received financial backing from JNOC in some
form and the unwinding of this support was as a consequence likely to make any number
of these no longer viable.
The publication of the August 2000 report into policy intervention in petroleum
87 Ibid., 145.
88 Ibid., 45.
89
, Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genjo to Kadai [Current State and Issues in Japan's Petroleum
and Natural Gas Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu K5gyo Renmei, 2001), i-iii.
167
exploration and development left upstream firms facing a new situation. Quantitative
targets for imports by national flag firms were discarded. Further, a policy process from
which these firms were excluded concluded that only upstream operators with the
potential to become significant international players should receive policy support. For
firms - by their own admission largely uncompetitive in bidding for the rights to develop
upstream projects because of their size - this was a serious threat.
It was also not the end of the challenge. On July 6 of 2001, Horiuchi Mitsuo, the
MITI minister who managed the initial investigation into JNOC finances, met with Prime
Minister Koizumi Junichiro and proposed that JNOC be abolished. Koizumi accepted the
idea, and instructed the minister in charge of administrative reform to draw up plans.90 In
doing so, Horiuchi inserted the problem of JNOC reform into a broader battle over
reforming the plethora of Japanese special government bodies. This dynamic mirrored the
effect of the broader push to deregulation on policy outcomes in the downstream sector
during the low-price environment. Further, because of the work already completed on the
financial position of JNOC, and the intervention of Horiuchi, JNOC was included in the
first group of seven bodies scheduled to be closed or privatized.9 The cabinet passed the
plan on December 19 the same year, and the laws were prepared to be put to parliament
in the first session of the following year.
This new challenge to JNOC did not lead to the withdrawal of policy support for
upstream activities, for two reasons. First, there was the problem of the need to sell-off of
assets held by JNOC in upstream projects, which would take some years. Second,
90 According to reports, when Horiuchi met with Koizumi and explained the situation at JNOC, the prime minister
replied: "Is that the situation? OK, then let's do it, let's abolish it; that is our basic position." Komine Jun, "Chokugeki
Intabyin: Kokumin no Zeikin wo Dobu ni Suteta Sekiyuk6dan wo Haishi Seyo [Interview with Horiuchi Mitsuo:
Abolish the JNOC that Threw the Public's Taxes in the Ditch], Energy Forum, September 2001, 69-77.
91 "Nana H6jin Haishi/mineika [Seven Government Bodies to be Abolished or Privatized]," Nikkei Shimbun,
November 21, 2001, 1.
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Horiuchi and Koizumi had committed to abolishing the body itself, but did not reject
maintaining a role for government in the upstream or maintaining a strategic stockpile.92
Indeed, there remained strong support within state actors for ongoing subsidization of
exploration and production. This meant that while the committee proposal of 2000 to
wind up subsidies for the upstream after ten years remained in place, the gap between
those managing the reform of special government bodies, and MITI and upstream firms,
did not lie in whether support for the upstream should be continued.93 Rather it was
focused on how firms JNOC maintained investments in should be dealt with, and the
extent and types of support the government should be allowed to continue to provide.
The upstream industry was understandably unnerved, and made clear its
objections to the hijacking of the MITI discussions through its association:
"in June 2001 reform of the JNOC law added support for the purchase of not only
exploration rights, but also the purchase of fields already producing to JNOC's
responsibilities. But while these revisions were being carried out to petroleum and gas
policies, reform of special government bodies was being carried out as a central
component of the administrative reform process since last summer. Further, it was
decided that JNOC would be abolished ahead of other bodies as a model case for
reform...This did not take into account our industry or other interested parties' opinions,
and in July this year JNOC was abolished and the new independent administrative body
established, and a program to set up a special purpose company was also put into
law."94
The conclusion of the negotiations between METI, the administrative reform
group, and the LDP represented a compromise. In July 2002 a law passed parliament
abolishing JNOC but also establishing a new public body, the Metal Mining Agency of
Japan (JOGMEC) made up of two previous bodies. In this way administrative reform
92 Komine Jun, "Chokugeki Intabyti: Kokumin no Zeikin wo Dobu ni Suteta Sekiyukodan wo Haishi Seyo [Interview
with Horiuchi Mitsuo: Abolish the JNOC that Threw the Public's Taxes in the Ditch], Energy Forum, September 2001,
69-77.
93,"Tsukinai Kecchaku he Shush5 Futaiten [PM will not Deviate from a Decision by the End of the Month]," Nikkei
Shimbun, November 21, 2001, 3; Kodaira Nobuyori, former Director General, Agency of Natural Resources and
Energy (2004-06) and former Director, Petroleum Planning Division (1995-96), Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry, Interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, July 19, 2007.
94 Sekiyu Kogyo Renmei, "Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genjo to Kadai [Current State and Issues in
Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu Kogy6 Renmei, 2002), 43.
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could claim a victory by cutting the number of government bodies, while supporters of
ongoing upstream policy support also secured this goal.
At the same time, the reforms reduced JOGMEC's capacity to support upstream
oil exploration and development projects in two ways. First, the portfolio of energy assets
held by the government body was reduced through privatization, with companies in
which JNOC held shares broken into three groups. The first group of shares were used as
core assets of a new Japanese major company,95 and were merged and then the new
company listed on the stock exchange. The second set of assets were sold off through a
tendering process." The third set of assets - those of firms not yet in the development
phase - remained in JOGMEC hands.
This sell-off of assets, first recommended in 2000, had its first success with the
emergence of a new and more powerful upstream player, created through the merger of
the former JNOC-financed INPEX and Imperial Oil. The newly listed INPEX, which
operated internationally, and Teikoku Oil, which owned mostly domestic assets,
announced their merger in December 2005. Although still small on international terms,
the two firms, which had been the number one and number three upstream firms in terms
of upstream assets, were scheduled to reach a combined production of 560,000 barrels of
oil equivalent by FY2009.97 In an interview with business daily the Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, the chairman of the newly merged firm, Matsuo Kunihiko, noted that the firm
aimed to grow by five percent per year, and to reach a production level of one million
95 The assets of INPEX and its subsidiaries, along with JODCO were used.
96 Lead companies in these firms were given first bidding rights on the projects, and by February 2005 24 of 27 firms
had been sold off for a total profit of 13.49 billion yen. For a complete list see Sekiyu Kogy6 Renmei, "Wagakuni
Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genj6 to Kadai [Current State and Issues in Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas
Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu K6gy6 Renmei, 2006), 59-60.
97"Jun-meja Mezashite Keiei togO - Sogo Hokan to Kib6 Kakudai de Kaigai Keneki no Kakutoku he [Merger Aimed
at Creating a Mini-Major - Looking to Secure International Development Rights through Mutual Support and Scale
Growth]," Energy, December 2005, 18-19.
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barrels by 2015, making it one-seventh the size of market leader Exxon-Mobil in terms of
its reserves base.98
The second change was that lending conditions to the private sector were
restricted. The provision of loans was halted, and equity capital supplied for overseas
exploration projects reduced to fifty from seventy percent of total capital costs. Loan
guarantees were also cut to fifty percent,9 making government financing far less
attractive to firms. By 2006 JOGMEC had offered no new loans or guarantees to
upstream firms' exploration projects. Although high oil prices were a contributory cause,
the upstream industry also suggested this was also driven by the restrictive lending
conditions, and continued to lobby for JOGMEC to extend funds not only to firms with
the ability to grow into a Japanese major, but also to other firms.'*
4. Intervention Reinvigorated (2001-2006)
Liberalization and privatization led to a qualitative and quantitative reduction in
strategic intervention in the Japanese petroleum sector. As argued above, this was not
because of a rejection of the institutions of national control by either state and firm actors,
however. Instead, the interests of both sets of actors remained in line with continuing
intervention in support of domestic firms.
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the increase in petroleum prices that began in
earnest in the second half of 2003 and a shift in the market structure towards tight supply
conditions led to the reenergizing of policy intervention on strategic grounds. Prior to this
98 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Intabya: Kokusai Sekiyu Kaihatsu Teikoku HD Kaicho Matsuo Kunihiko [Interview:
Matsuo Kunihiko, Chairman of INPEX-Teikoku Oil]," 7.
99 JOGMEC, "Heisei 17-Nendo Keikaku [Plan for 2005]," (Tokyo: JOGMEC, 2004)., 11.
100 Sekiyu K6gy6 Renmei, "Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genj6 to Kadai [Current State and Issues in
Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas Development]"; Tanaka Toshiaki, former employee Mitsubishi Oil and member,
MITI JOGMEC Technical Committee. Interview by author, June 11, 2006.
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change intervention had been reduced and focused: the ceiling on the provision of equity
capital fell, and a quantitative target for upstream acquisitions was abolished. Following
the shift to a high price environment, the direction of policy change was reversed: a
quantitative target for upstream acquisitions by national flag companies was
reestablished, and the amount of equity able to be provided to firms increased
substantially. In contrast with the upstream sector, however, in the downstream sector
policy did not shift towards increased policy intervention. This suggests that the
liberalization that occurred in the 1990s is likely to remain in place.
How can we explain the partial reintervention in petroleum markets from 2001-
2006 on strategic grounds? Using the framework developed in chapter two, I have argued
thus far that the policies of strategic intervention matched the interests of both state actors
and firms. Further, I have argued that the changes in strategic intervention during the
1980-2000 period represented an adjustment to market conditions, but not the rejection of
national control as a goal of public policy: METI, and firms, remained committed to
national control, however the instruments used to pursue this goal were altered in
response to the effects of changes in the international petroleum market.
This framework enables us to explain outcomes in the 2001-2006 period, and in
particular the continued support for upstream intervention over the 1980-2000 period as
opposed to the lack of reintervention in refining and marketing. State actors remained
committed to strategic intervention, while firms supported upstream intervention because
they remained weak in the upstream. Liberalization of the refining and marketing sector,
on the other hand, was more successful than protectionism in creating more competitive
firms internationally, thereby satisfying state goals. Further, the firms themselves
172
adjusted by restructuring, while increasingly taking advantage of opportunities in the
international market in both exploration and production and the sale of petroleum
products regionally. This meant neither was interested in reregulation in the downstream
sector under conditions of high prices.
As in the 1970s the long term policy response to high prices was caused by a
shift in the structure of the international petroleum market, with projections of an ongoing
tight market and growing OPEC marker power. This led to debate over the appropriate
long-term policy response to the new environment. The dynamic of this debate was
affected by the domestic effects of higher oil prices in the 2000s, which different from
those of 1973. Since that time policy support for fuel diversification, and the promotion
of energy efficiency technologies, had reduced the sectoral effects of increasing
petroleum prices. 0
This meant the policy response was driven not by a sense of crisis about the
performance of firms operating in refining and marketing, but rather by the predicted
shift in the structure of the market itself. A METI assessment, for example, argued that
both supply and demand elements meant the international petroleum market was
undergoing a structural change likely to continue for the long term. On the demand side,
METI argued that faster demand growth, focused on China and India, was likely to
continue in the long-term. On the supply side, the same assessment argued that
insufficient investment in energy infrastructure, the fall in non-OPEC supply as fields
101 This does not mean, however, that the effects were non-existent. In 2006, the twelve ministries and agencies set up a
committee to examine the effects of high oil prices on the economy, which concluded that high prices were unlikely to
cause serious economic problems in the short term, but the effects on small and medium sized enterprises should not be
discounted. A survey taken of these firms by METI demonstrated that 71.4 percent of respondents suffered from higher
prices. METI referred to the shift to a high price regime as a "creeping crisis." On the report and survey see Nikkei
Shimbun, April 21, 2006, 5; Nikkei Shimbun, May 17, 2006, 5. For the cite see Ministry of Economy Trade and
Industry, "Shin Enerugii Senryaku Ni Tsuite [on the New National Energy Strategy]," (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy
Trade and Industry, 2003), 15.
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outside OPEC matured, and growing energy nationalism in petroleum producing
countries, all were likely to restrict the supply of petroleum. The end result, according to
this view, was likely to be ongoing tight supply conditions and high prices."
The outcome was an increase in strategic intervention once again. The process
through which the change was instituted utilized the Basic Law on Energy, which into
force in 2002. Under the law the METI minister was charged with establishing a basic
energy policy by the end of 2003, and revising the plan every three years. In the first
plan, passed by cabinet on October 7, 2003, the new strategy removed references to a
shift away from petroleum, instead calling for a best-mix strategy in which petroleum
was placed alongside other fuels as a component of a fuel diversification strategy. The
revised 2006 energy plan then mandated that JOGMEC be given the authority to extend
higher levels of financing to upstream projects. 0 3
The committee presiding over the preparation of the new energy plan noted the
consensus on the importance of energy security of supply.
"To date, METI has been dealing with issues such as the introduction of competition into
domestic energy markets and how to respond to global environmental problems. But
because of the increasingly difficult domestic and international energy situation, it has
been decided to develop a "New National Energy Strategy" that focuses once again on
the axis of energy security. The interim report will be prepared by the end of March, and
the final report by the end of May. Then, it is planned to be reflected in the basic policies
for economic and fiscal reform after discussion within the Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy."104
Most striking amongst the policy changes prefaced in the new energy strategy
was the reestablishment of a target for upstream oil acquisitions, set at 40 percent of total
consumption. The quantitative target was only abolished in 2000, and the reversion to the
102 _ , "Shin Kokka Enerugii Senryaku [New National Energy Strategy] " (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy Trade
and Industry, 2006), 1-5.
103 ,"Enerugii Kihon Keikaku [Basic Energy Plan] " (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2007),
41-42.
104 Sogo Enerugii Bukai, "Briefing Notes," (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2006).
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use of quantitative targets symbolized the policy shift under conditions of higher prices
and the predicted shift in market structure. JOGMEC's mandate under the new energy
strategy was also extended by an increase in the risk money: the organization was given
the authority to increase the amount of equity capital provided to projects if they met a
number of conditions, most notably if the scale of the project is large enough, and if
Japanese firms were operators or national flag firms hold thirty percent or more of the
project rights. If the project reaches the development phase, then JOGMEC is required to
sell its interest in the project.'"5
4.1 Firm and M ETI Preferences
For firms, weakness internationally led them to support ongoing policy
intervention in the name of strategic control, and this included both those whose origins
were in domestic refining and distribution, and those originally engaged in exploration
and production work internationally. During debate over how to adjust the state support
in exploration and production, the industry association of the upstream industry, the
JPDC, requested an increase in the upper limit for loans and loan guarantees to firms
operating in the upstream.'06 In an interview on the new energy strategy the head of the
largest Japanese upstream operator - the newly merged INPEX-Teikoku group also noted
his dissatisfaction with the previous reforms, and signaled his support for the need to
increase loans and subsidies under conditions of higher oil prices:
"The situation has completely changed since JNOC was abolished and oil was ten
dollars a barrel. National development of upstream resources is needed for energy
105 JOGMEC, "Oil & Gas Bijinesu Tsiiru Risutu [Jogmec Business Tool List]," (Tokyo: JOGMEC, 2007), 4-5.
106 Sekiyu Tsushin, June 27, 2006; Sekiyu Kagy6 Renmei, "Wagakuni Sekiyu/Tennen Gasu Kaihatsu No Genj6 to
Kadai [Current State and Issues in Japan's Petroleum and Natural Gas Development]," (Tokyo: Sekiyu K~gy6 Renmei,
2003), 56.
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security reasons. We can't reject the fact that the decision at the time was too short-
sighted, even though resource development policies are [generally] strongly shaped by
the times. 07
State actors most immediately involved in the provision of upstream financing,
when given an opportunity to present to the committee charged with redrawing Japan's
energy policy, expressed their organization's satisfaction that the METI draft that
recommending an increase the amount of risk money made available to upstream firms
both qualitatively and quantitatively.'08
In the downstream sector, on the other hand, there was not support for
intervention. There is little mystery about the lack of support among state actors for
shifting back towards protectionism. The application of trade instruments proved
ineffective in promoting the goal of creating an integrated national oil firm. Trade
liberalization, on the other hand, moved this goal forward by causing mergers and
acquisitions within the industry. For firms in the downstream, on the other hand, the shift
to a high price environment represented a political opportunity. They were faced with two
choices. The first was to use high prices to argue for the implementation of trade and
other restrictions on the market, with the goal of securing advantage over import
competition. The evidence demonstrates, however, that firms in the downstream sector
chose the second option, which was to do nothing.
This shift in position represents an apparent puzzle. Facing a similar situation,
why did firm preferences change between the 1980 and 2000? For almost forty years the
PIL had largely shaped their competitive environment of Japanese refiners and marketers
by offering protection from international competition on strategic grounds. Why then, did
107 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Intabyn: Kokusai Sekiyu Kaihatsu Teikoku HD Kaich6 Matsuo Kunihiko [Interview:
Matsuo Kunihiko, Chairman of INPEX-Teikoku Oil]," 7.
108 Sogo Enerugii Bukai Shoiinkai, "Meeting Notes," (Tokyo: Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry, 2006).
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the increase in oil prices, understood by the regulator to be caused by a structural shift in
the market rather than a short-term phenomenon, not lead firms to lobby for renewed
protection?
The most important cause of the shift in firm policy preferences, as with METI,
was linked to the effects of the liberalization and privatization period of the 1980s and
1990s. As noted above, firms operating in refining and marketing undertook a wide range
of mergers. As well as external reorganization through mergers, they implemented a
series of medium-term strategic plans designed to improve company performance
through diversification geographically and in terms of product lines. These decisions
were informed, as in the case of France, with the knowledge that domestic demand for
refined products was unlikely to grow significantly, meaning profitability needed to be
sought internationally rather than through a return to protectionism at home. Changes
implemented as a result of liberalization and privatization, coupled with falling domestic
demand, led firms to adopt market rather than non-market measures in order to improve
performance and future prospects. This made them disinterested in policy support within
the domestic economy.
The largest of the wholly domestic refiners and marketers, Nippon Oil, for
example, continued to reduce refining capacity throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s,
aided by a merger with Mitsubishi Oil. This strategy was complemented by expanding
geographically in order to engage in exploration and production and become more
vertically integrated, while also expanding horizontally through shifting into business
areas other than petroleum.'09 The management plan for FY2003-2005 made the goal of
vertical integration explicit, establishing a medium-term goal of increasing production
109 "Message from the President," Nippon Mitsubishi Oil Corporation Annual Report 2001, 2-3.
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worldwide to 150,000 barrels per day of oil equivalent by the end of FY2005, from
50,000 in FY2002. This was then extended to the goal of 200,000 barrels per day by the
end of FY2015 in a subsequent strategy. This shift was reflected in capital expenditures,
which were greater in the area of oil exploration and development, and initiatives
designed to expand the firm horizontally (191 billion yen over three years), compared to
investments in refining and sales (150 billion over the same period). In the third strategic
management plan announced by the firm to FY2011 seventy percent of new investments
were slated for use on oil and gas production and other investments in new business
areas." Further, a component of the investments in refining was driven by the
recognition that market growth for petroleum products in Asia represented an alternative
strategy for improving profitability given the projections of future falls in domestic
demand."' The establishment of a subsidiary in Shanghai aimed at developing a
marketing network in China, as well as efforts to increase the marketing of lubricants into
Southeast Asia, reflected this new emphasis on markets outside Japan. The firm also
signed a contract with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to produce refined
products on its behalf, and then agreed to convert its refinery based in Osaka to a joint
operation focused on exports in FY2008.
4. Conclusion
Firms therefore, as well as state actors, supported ongoing intervention in the
petroleum sector on strategic grounds in the 2001-2006 period, however this support was
limited to exploration and production internationally. Policy support in refining and
Nippon Oil Corporation Annual Report 2005, 5.
i Nippon Oil Corporation Annual Report 2002, 7.
178
marketing, in contrast, was not reintroduced. In chapter two of this study I proposed that
instances of strategic intervention can be understood as a meeting of the interests of state
actors and firms. Further, I argued that policy changes can be understood as an
adjustment to the effects of shifts in the structure of the international petroleum market on
the efficacy of the existing policy regime.
The case of Japan presented here suggest this framework accurately captures the
effects of changes in the petroleum market structure on policy. In the 1970s the
profitability of Japanese firms operating in the petroleum sector was harmed by the shift
to a high price environment. The response of almost all these firms was to demand
ongoing protection from international competition. State actors with responsibility for
petroleum policy also advocated heavier intervention in the petroleum market on strategic
grounds. The outcome was increased policy intervention through the passing of two
emergency laws, and greater quantitative intervention in the upstream sector.
During the 1980-2000 period policy intervention in the Japanese petroleum
sector fell markedly. In the downstream sector, long-standing protection of domestic
firms on strategic grounds was abolished. In the upstream, low prices undermined the
financial position of the government vehicle used to provide financing upstream. In both
cases METI sought to adapt existing policies in response to changes in the international
oil market. Against this, domestic firms and others that supported ongoing strategic
intervention in the petroleum market proved incapable of defending the policy status-quo.
The defection of the MITI bureaucrats responsible for oil policy from the provision of
these benefits was at the root of policy change. I also argued, however, that the shift in
the policy preferences of these actors within the state did not amount to a rejection of the
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goal of national control. Instead, it represented an adjustment to the existing instruments
used to pursue this goal, given they had been undermined by the effects of shifts in long-
run oil prices.
Understanding this explains the effects of the shift to a high price environment
on outcomes under conditions of high long-run prices from 2001-2006. Ongoing support
for national control by state actors, as well as the weakness of Japanese firms in the
international petroleum market, meant that a new government vehicle was created to
offer improved terms to national flag firms operating in the upstream. In refining and
marketing, on the other hand, this shift to increased strategic intervention was not
replicated. This can be explained by the causes and effects of change in the previous
period. State actors agreed on the need to liberalize because of the failure of the existing
policies to achieve the desired outcome, a failure that was exacerbated by the effects of
the shifts in long-run prices. As an alternative, liberalization had proven an effective
strategy for achieving this goal. For firms, on the other, liberalization led them to shift
their strategies towards vertical integration upstream, and entering markets for petroleum
products in the Asian region. This made downstream firms interested in securing support
from the state for their exploration and production activities, but also made them no
longer interested in protectionism downstream.
In the following two chapters I extend the analysis of institutional changes in the
petroleum sector to France and the United States: two countries with substantially
different national institutions, political actors, and domestic resources, to Japan.
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Chapter Five - France Case
"In time of peace as in war, oil is an indispensable primary product in the economy of an
important nation...Oil produced and refined in France should be the objective."
Decree establishing the Bureau de
Recherches de Petrole, cited in Leslie E.
Grayson, National Oil Companies, 26
"We were like priests not believing in God anymore."
Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-
1989), Ministry of Industry, July 18, 2008
1. Outline
This chapter documents changes in petroleum policies in France over the 1980-
2006 period. France, like Japan, entered the 1970s with a comprehensive set of
regulations governing the oil market and designed to support national firms in the name
of enhancing national control. The legal basis for regulating the domestic petroleum
market was the 1928 oil law, which established a state monopoly on the importation of
crude and crude products, and then delegating this right to national firms. The French
government, in contrast to the governments of Japan and the United States, held
significant stakes in these firms, both of which were engaged in exploration and
production internationally, as well as refining and marketing within the French market.1
By the end of the period examined in this study, policies designed to support
Direct intervention through state ownership was characteristic of French policy intervention across economic sectors.
For a summary see Pepper D. Culpepper, "Capitalism, Coordination, and Economic Exchange: The French Political
Economy since 1985," in Changing France: The Politics That Markets Make, Peter A. Hall and Bruno Palier, and
Pepper D. Culpepper ed., (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
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national champions in the oil sector seek were abandoned. The two oil firms in which the
government retained shareholdings and managerial representation - Elf-Aquitaine and
Total - were privatized over the 1990s, and merged into a wholly independent firm in
2000. This created the fourth largest global integrated oil major, and left state actors with
no explicit controls through which to shape firm behavior in order to meet public policy
goals. In the domestic market the government relinquished the monopoly it had over the
importation of crude and crude products, and which it had delegated to national firms,
and released its control over prices.
The robustness of this transformation was demonstrated by the new French
energy law passed in 2005, following the rise in long-run oil prices; the French
government increased policy intervention in energy markets, but did not return to the law
of 1928. Instead, new measures were designed to shape the supply and demand for
energy, but not in ways calculated to enhance strategic control over petroleum resources.
The new pattern of policy intervention therefore fits within the liberal convergence
hypothesis. It also suggests that the old French goal of enhancing national control over
the petroleum supply through strategic intervention is dead.2
2 This outcome is overdetermined, given that reneging from European commitments on energy policy would be likely
to have significant and negative consequences, which shifts the balance in favor of retaining a liberal approach to
petroleum policies regardless of the position of domestic firms. Research showed no demand for a return to strategic
intervention among policymakers and firms, however, suggesting that it is not only European constraints, but also the
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The questions become, therefore: how did this change come about? Why did the
policy preferences of state actors shift in away from supporting national oil firms in the
name of enhancing national control over petroleum, and what was the response of firms?
And why was the retrenchment of policies of strategic intervention more robust than in
the cases of Japan and the United States?
To return to the hypotheses developed in chapter two of the study, I argued that
the liberal convergence hypothesis proposes a secular decline in strategic intervention
over time. On this reading of the evidence presented in this chapter, outcomes in the case
of France appear to be consistent with the hypothesis. In this chapter I explain this
outcome by a shift in the preferences of firms away from strategic intervention. For firms,
the commercial importance of the French market fell over time relative to other markets.
This implied that the protection afforded by the 1928 law was less significant in attaining
commercial goals. Changes in the international oil market led French firms to further
diversify their sources of production globally, undermining their interest in remaining
within the policy regime developed by the state. Finally, state ownership acted as a
constraint on the expansion of these firms. When questions of liberalization and
privatization were raised, therefore, they did not face significant costs in the dismantling
change in policy strategic adopted by state actors and firms, that is the most important cause of policy stability in the
case of France.
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of the status quo, and also expected benefits from acquiescing to such change.
The decision to jettison the policies promoting national control occurred not only
because of the shift in the policy preferences of firms, however, but also because the
Directorate of Hydrocarbons - the division in charge of the petroleum sector within the
Ministry of Industry - was no longer interested in defending the status quo. In particular,
unlike in Japan where METI still had a role in championing its weak petroleum industry,
the role of the directorate in supporting industry through regulatory and other means was
no longer necessary given the increasing strength of the firm, and the desire of its
management for greater autonomy.
This shift meant that negotiations with other actors within the state was smooth.3
At its most general level, as Levy, Culpepper, Schmidt and others have noted
liberalization and privatization reflected a change in the strategy adopted by state actors
in the 1980s and the 1990s in order to restrain inflation and promote economic growth.
This shift encompassed parties of both the left and the right, and was reflected by a move
away from dirigisme, and towards a greater reliance on the mechanism of the market to
allocate goods and services.4 In particular, the Ministry of Finance began to support price
3 The contrast with the electricity and gas sectors here is instructive. Although European recommendations to liberalize
the French markets in gas and electricity were made simultaneously to those in oil, the latter proceeded far more
2 uickly.
Jonah D. Levy, "Economic Policy and Policy-Making," in Developments in French Politics 3, ed. Alistair Cole,
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liberalization in the petroleum sector as prices began to decline in the 1980s, because of
the expectation that this would help reduce inflation. Political leaders agreed with this
strategy. Likewise privatization, as a method for reducing government debt, also
extended into the petroleum sector. Aside from securing petroleum supplies, therefore,
the goals of promoting macroeconomic stability and economic growth no longer fitted
with the policy of strategic intervention in the petroleum sector.
This general shift towards economic openness matched, therefore, the particular
effects of changes in the international oil market on the policy preferences of firms and
their supporters within government. By the time of the decision to loosen prices and
relinquish the system of licensing, therefore, the effects of changes in the international
petroleum market meant the directorate, in the pithy phrase of its director, was made up
of "priests not believing in God anymore."5 When a third set of actors based in Europe -
the European Commission, Directorate General of Competition (DGC) and European
Court of Justice (ECJ) - began to propose changes in French oil policy in the 1980s as
they pursued their mandate to complete the internal market envisioned in the Rome
Patrick Le Gales, and Jonah D. Levy (Houndmills, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).; Culpepper, "Capitalism,
Coordination, and Economic Exchange: The French Political Economy since 1985"; Vivien A. Schmidt, From State to
Market? The Transformation ofFrench Business and Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
5 Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July
18, 2008.
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treaties, therefore, they found no resistance from within the state.6 Strategic intervention
was therefore jettisoned in favor of a response to the problem of reliance on the
international market for petroleum embedded in Europe.
In this reading of the evidence, European Commission proposals were an
alternative model for organizing a policy response to the reliance on the international
market for the supply of petroleum, and although they did not solely determine outcomes,
they acted as a catalyst for policy change in two ways. First, as Smith notes, there is a
systematic bias towards a policy preference for liberalization of national markets, and
away from national modes of regulation, built into the structure of European
organizations. This meant the insertion of the DGC and European Commission into
French decision-making provided the impetus for the dismantling national regulatory
regimes in the petroleum sector across member states.' Second, European institutions
played a more active role in changing French policy on two occasions. First, the DGC
pushing for licenses to import petroleum products to be allocated to new firms. Second,
the ECJ forced the abolition of the government's golden share in Elf-Aquitaine that
represented the last vestige of state control over the public and public-private firms that
6 Indeed, the memorandum of the meeting at which national governments debated the recommendations of the EC to
liberalize energy markets makes no note of objections because of the petroleum sector, and the chief negotiator for the
French government has no recollection of receiving instructions to resist the proposals related to the petroleum sector,
in contrast to the electricity and gas sectors.
Mitchell P. Smith, States of Liberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe (2005), 23.
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were envisioned to secure France's supplies of petroleum.
To understand the instruments utilized in France to shape the national response
to the increasing reliance on the international petroleum market for the supply of
petroleum, I review French petroleum policies period prior to 1980. I also describe
European policymaking in the petroleum sector, in addition to French national policy,
before moving on to consider in more detail the mechanisms through which French
national institutions transformed over the 1980-2006 period shifted from a focus on
national control towards a liberal response to the reliance on external markets for the
supply of petroleum.
2. Initial Conditions
French petroleum policy was not initially shaped by notions of the strategic
character of oil. This is unsurprising given that use of products derived from oil was
similarly limited to illumination and lubricants. Firms and the state were nevertheless
interested in the market for petroleum products for more typical reasons of political
economy. Tariffs imposed in 1871, for example, were designed to shield a nascent oil
shale industry from increasing oil and oil product imports sourced from the United
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States.!
As oil security of supply became an issue of security following World War One,
policy became linked to the penetration of the domestic market by the international oil
majors for reasons of national security, rather than economic protectionism.' This made
national purpose inseparable from private gain: both state and firm actors sought policies
designed to protect the domestic market, firms for reasons of profit, and policymakers in
order to enhance control by French firms over petroleum exploration and production
internationally."
Strategic intervention in France was more successful than in Japan. Access to
upstream reserves - crucial in establishing an integrated oil firm capable of loosening the
grip of international firms on the domestic market - was secured by French firms. First,
in 1921 the French government was allocated a twenty-five percent share in the Turkish
Petroleum Company (TPC), renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1927. The
conference that led to the signing of the Treaty of San Remo was convened in 1920 in
order to dispose of the assets of the Deutsche Bank, which relinquished them following
8 Gregory Nowell, "Realpolitik Vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the
World Oil Cartel, 1860-1939" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 108. For import data see 106.
9 French leaders feared import dependence of during French reliance on imports from the United States during WWI,
and the cancellation of U.S. traffic across the North Atlantic. John Zysman, Political Strategiesfor Industrial Order:
State, Market, and Industry in France (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 67.
10 Guy de Carmoy, "The New French Energy Policy," Energy Policy (1982), 181
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Germany's defeat in World War One. Their share in the joint exploration and production
firm was allotted to the French government. In 1923 industrialist Ernest Mercier was
invited to organize French commercial interests in order to exploit this share. Mercier
established the CFP in 1924. French President Raymond Poincare, who wrote to Ernest
Mercier at the time of its establishment, clarified the public purpose of the private firm:
"[It should be a] policy instrument capable of carrying out a national oil policy. The
company must be essentially French and remain completely independent. It will try to
develop oil production under French control in different productive regions." 1
CFP took a 23.75 percent stake in the TPC/IPC in 1927. (Shares taken by other
firms were: British Petroleum 23.75 percent, Royal Dutch-Shell 23.75, Near East
Development (Standard New Jersey and Socony Mobil) 23.75, Partex Gulbenkian, 5.)
The success of theTPC/IPC in discovering oil deposits in Mosul (in present day Iraq)
represented the first instance of a French-flagged firm gaining access to a significant
share of oil for export to France.
Access to upstream crude could not alone solve the problem of the dominance of
multinational firms in domestic refining and distribution. Given this, private and public
interests demanded further regulatory action be taken with direct and indirect policy
instruments. First, the government directly intervened in the domestic refining market
11 Cited in Nowell, "Realpolitik Vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the
World Oil Cartel, 1860-1939", 309.
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through the establishment of the refining firm CFR in 1927, which was allocated the right
to refine a volume of crude equivalent to twenty-five percent of French consumption. In
this way CFR became the refining outlet for CFP in the French domestic economy. 2 This
relationship was cemented by the shareholding structure, with CFP holding fifty-five
percent of shares at the time of CFR's establishment. A further thirty-five percent were
allotted to the five largest French refining firms." The goal of CFR remained focused in
refining. It met success in this endeavor, supplying almost twenty percent of domestic
demand by 1936. In terms of marketing, it had a complex set of agreements with
independent marketers that precluded it from selling its products domestically, other than
to large industrial users in cement, electricity, and other industries."
The second initiative was the 1928 oil law, which established a system of import
quotas for both crude and crude products. It was designed to ensure that French owned
firms controlled at least half of the domestic petroleum infrastructure, complementing a
national target for international crude production of fifty percent of crude imported to be
owned by French firms. License holders of both types were also required to maintain
three months of supply in storage within France. Although they were not required to own
12 The government also took a stake in CFP, after originally taking none, because of conflict between domestic
interests. It secured a thirty percent share.
1 Nowell, "Realpolitik Vs. Transnational Rent-Seeking: French Mercantilism and the Development of the world Oil
Cartel, 1860-1939", 353-4.
14 Leslie E. Grayson, National Oil Companies (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1981), 50.
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the physical storage itself, there were few options for leasing available, meaning
ownership of storage was the typical means through which this requirement was met.
This created a further barrier to market entry. Other components of the law established
the legal authority for the government to force private-sector firms to submit to national
supply contracts." The result of the French law was to raise the barriers to market entry in
domestic refining and distribution, thereby serving to shield French firms operating in the
sector from international competitors.
The 1928 law was administered through a system of licensing. Crude import
quotas were issued for twenty year periods (known as "A20"), with eleven firms given
the right to import crude through the first allotment. In this allocation French firms
represented 54.2 percent of total quota rights. Imports of refined products, on the other
hand, were issued for three year periods ("A3"). They placed regulatory restrictions on
the importation of petrol and lubricants, but not other products. The former was typically
carried out by seven to nine firms, of which two were the French firms of CFP and the
SNEA.
Holders of licenses for importing crude oil were required to own refinery
capacity in France equivalent to ninety percent of their sales of refined products, while
1s Dominique Finon, "French Energy Policy: The Effectiveness and Limitations of Colbertism," in European Energy
Policies in a Changing Environment, ed. Francis (ed.) McGowan (1996), 24.
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A3 licensees were required to purchase eighty percent of their products either from A20
license holders, or through equivalent long-term suppliers. Finally, maximum retail prices
were fixed by the Ministry of Industry, as were average margins for storage and refining.
These were adjusted on an annual basis following negotiations between firms and the
government and in response to inflation and changes in the cost of crude. Prices were set
in order to ensure that France remained profitable for refiners to invest in, further shaping
the market in order to increase the share of oil refined within domestic borders. This final
step, in turn, was predicated on the unilateral setting of prices by international oil firms in
producer countries.16
The goal of the quota system and fixed prices was not to limit consumption:
rights to import were initially awarded in excess of total domestic consumption. Rather,
the goal was to redistribute market share in order to encourage the growth of the French
refining sector, and the share of French firms within that sector. The success of the law
can be seen in the establishment of fifteen refineries in France after it was passed, with
the two largest owned by CFR. Refinery capacity increased from three hundred thousand
in 1927 to eight million tons/year in 1938; imports of refined products as a ratio of total
16 Fixed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system also facilitated the pricing structure by ensuring a stable
franc-dollar rate. This was important given that oil was prices in dollars, while products sold in the domestic market
were priced in francs.
17 Grayson, National Oil Companies, 25.
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consumption consequently fell from ninety-four percent in 1929, to eighteen percent in
1938.18 Evidence to support its success is also found in the fall in imports of petroleum
products, and rise in crude imports, that occurred following the introduction of the law.
French Oil Imports in the 1870s
(Unit: 1000s of kgs)
Year Crude Refined Total
1869 19,200 13,800 33,000
1870 19,484 19,052 38,536
1871 13,251 23,220 36,471
1872 31,130 13,436 44,568
1873 39,546 15,000 54,546
1874 34,565 12,000 46,565
1875 29,847 13,800 43,647
Source: Nowell, dissertation, p. 116
The import quota system of 1928 was reestablished after the interlude of the war
(during which CFP's international interests were protected in London, although CFP's
crude reserves located in the Middle East were cut off by Allied forces). It had slightly
altered conditions: the twenty year licenses for crude oil imports were reduced to thirteen
years, and when they came up for renewal once again in 1965 the licensing period fell
once again to ten years. The implied market share of French refining and distribution
firms at this time remained steady at 49.6 percent following the distribution of quotas in
1950.
18 Mohamed Sassi, "The Emergence of a French Oil Industry between the Two Wars," Business and Economic History
On-Line (2003), http://www.thebhc.org/publications/BEHonline/2003/Sassi.pdf,19-20.
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Crude Import Licences
(unit: percent)
A20 A13 A10 A10
1931-1951 1951-1964 1965-1975 1976-1985
International 45.8 50.4 38.7 44.5
National 54.2 49.6 61.3 55.5
Source, Grayson, p. 41
The importance of national control to the policy preferences of state actors is
demonstrated by the most significant change to French oil policy following World War
Two: the creation of new national firms. These increased policy intervention above
existing regulation of the domestic market through the 1928 law and the minority stake of
the state in CFP. Specifically two firms - the SNPA and the RAP - were established with
the aim of carrying out exploration and production work for gas and oil with France
itself. In 1945 President Charles De Gaulle then ordered the establishment of BRP to give
added impetus to the drive for increasing national control over the production and
refining of crude. BRP was established as a wholly public company, and the shares in
firms owned by government-controlled entities, other than CFP, were shifted under the
umbrella of this firm." The decree establishing the company demonstrates the intention
of using the firm to enhance national control over the petroleum supply chain:
"In time of peace as in war, oil is an indispensable primary product in the economy of an
19 CFP was not fully nationalized and used as the vehicle for De Gaulle's post-war aims in petroleum because its
private shareholders, and significant international relationships, meant even after nationalization it would be less able to
privilege public over private goals. See Grayson, National Oil Companies, 52.
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important nation ... Oil produced and refined in France should be the objective."2 0
In contrast to CFP, which was a private-public partnership but with majority
private shareholding, the BRP was wholly publicly owned. The structure of the firm
combined that of Japan's Imperial Oil (which began operations as a firm focused on
domestic production) and the JPDC (which was able to finance, but not directly
participate in, upstream ventures). It was also designated as the umbrella firm under
which the various holdings of the French state were placed, including both RAP and the
government's fifty-one percent holdings in SNPA.
By the 1950s, therefore, the full panoply of policy instruments were deployed in
order to enhance national control over the oil supply. Numerous firm entities were
involved in the exploration, refining and distribution, and marketing of oil and oil
products. The 1928 oil law served to increase their market share, and limit that of
multinational firms operating in the French market.
Unsurprisingly, the market share of French firms within France increased
significantly in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of these measures. Across petroleum
products, for example, the share of international oil majors in the French domestic market
fell from an average across products of 80.5 percent in 1945, to 60.4 percent in 1955, and
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20 Ibid., 26.
then to 53.4 percent in 1965.2 At the end of the 1950s the two major French integrated
groups held approximately twenty-three percent of the market share each, secured at the
expense of the multinationals and smaller independent French firms.
An important influence on the success of French oil policy was the emergence of
Franc Zone oil, which served to achieve the goal of ensuring crude supplied from French
territories matched domestic demand, and was also beneficial from a balance of payments
perspective. CFP began its exploratory work outside the Middle East for the first time in
1948 in the Algerian Sahara. Its first big find was achieved there in 1956 (with
production commencing in 1958).
French Oil Imports 1947-1966
unit: 1000s tons
Franc Zone Rest of World Finished
Products
1947 0 5029 2102
1956 34 24979 1286
1957 122 23940 2744
1958 814 27610 1749
1959 1438 27733 2125
1960 7321 23702 2687
1961 12013 23005 2642
1962 13520 23641 3070
1963 15999 27259 4047
1964 17974 31218 4415
1965 18498 40057 4068
1966 19218 43534 4916
Source: Grayson p. 39
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21 Ibid., 52.
Franc Zone Production 1946-1966
unit: 1000s tons
France Algeria West Africa
1946 51.6 0.2 0
1956 1263.6 33.5 0
1959 1610.2 1232.4 753.3
1960 1976.5 8599.7 853.6
1963 2522.2 23646.4 998.9
1966 2932 33257.2 1509.5
Source: Grayson p. 39
In the early 1950s CFP began to produce more crude than CFR could refine,
chiefly because of success in Iraq and Qatar. Unsurprisingly, given how long it became in
crude, investments in the 1960s therefore focused on expanding downstream operations,
with the largest investments focused on expansion in markets outside France. CFP first
secured a share in distribution through a distribution company in West Africa (where it
was not constrained in entering the downstream sector by existing commercial
agreements). By 1970 sales of petroleum products continued to be greater in France than
outside, but only marginally, standing at 21,497 million tons, compared to 19,050 tons
outside. As Grayson notes, the expansion of CFP operations both vertically (from the
upstream to downstream) and geographically, meant that by the time of the
nationalizations of the 1970s "the group was... a multinational operation, with markets
outside France in Britain, Italy, Germany, and Portugal, most of Africa, Australia, and the
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United States, and production in the Middle East, North Africa, and Canada.""
The expansion of CFP operations occurred not only organically, but also through
the gradual acquisition of independent French firms throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The
appearance of the TOTAL brand in 1953, and its adoption in France in 1957, was
coordinated by CFR. It allowed some twenty independent French marketers to sell under
a single brand, and by 1960 only the independents Desmaris Freres (later acquired by
CFR in 1966) and ANTAR (acquired in 1970 by Elf-ERAP and others) remained viable."
Franc Zone oil was also developed by BRP. The most significant finds were in
Algeria and Gabon. Following these successes it faced, like CFP, the problem of finding
adequate avenues for refining and marketing produced crude, a problem made more acute
given that crude oil in West Africa and Algeria was more expensive to produce than that
of the Middle East. One solution was to use the regulatory powers provided for in the
1928 law to order firms operating in France to take a share of Franc Zone crude. A
second solution pursued was the created of a new firm dedicated to refining France Zone
crude. The UGP was established to this end by the state, with BRP made the majority
shareholder. It quickly established a market share of four percent within France through
the purchase of existing refinery and distribution operations owned by Caltex within
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2 2 Ibid., 56.
23 Ibid., 60.
France. In 1963, when new quotas were announced, some three-quarters of BRP crude
sourced from within the Franc Zone was sold through government mandated purchases
by firms operating in the French market, with the remainder sold through UGP.
The creation of UGP to stand alongside BRP, as well as the existence of other
firms under their umbrellas, led to a complex set of shareholding structures. These were
rationalized in 1965 through the creation of the public firm ERAP, under which BRP,
RAP, SNPA and UGP were placed. The Elf trademark emerged in 1967 and subsumed all
firms other than SNPA, leading to the creation of the two major groups of CFP and Elf-
ERAP. Oil production across the Elf-ERAP increased during the 1960s from 603
thousand barrels in 1960 to 5.14 million barrels in 1965 and 8.275 million barrels in
1969.24 Capital spending in exploration also increased from seventy nine million Francs
in 1963 to 217 million in 1966, and 378 million in 1969, while spending on production
increased from seventy nine million French francs in 1963 to 207 million over the same
period."
24 SNPA annual Reports, various years.
25 SNPA annual Reports, various years. Figures are for both oil and gas exploration and production.
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Restructuring of French Public Firms into ERAP
Company Subsidiary Activity
BRP CREPS, SPAFE Gabon, Oil exploration and production
SOFRepal, SPAFE Congo,
SAFRAP, SNRepal
RAP Oil and gas production
SNPA SNGSO, CeFeM, Oil and gas exploration; oil, gas, and sulphur
ORGANICO production,; gas distribution,
'petrolechemical production
UGP UIP, Cie Nat de Navigation Oil refining and distribution, and
I I_ itransportation
Source: Grayson, p. 79
French policy entered the 1970s, therefore, with a well developed set of
regulations designed to increase the share of French firms in the domestic industry by
limiting the share of the international oil majors in refining and marketing to
approximately half the domestic French market.26 This met with success: two major
French groups with partial government holdings enjoyed approximately twenty three
percent of the domestic market share each across petroleum products. Further, these firms
- which later operated under the umbrellas Elf-ERAP and CFP/CFR - owned productive
capacity equivalent to total French consumption, thereby achieving another of the public
policy goals established at the outset of France's national oil policy.
This achievement can not be attributed solely to the success of strategic
intervention. History also mattered. In the case of France successful exploration work of
CFP in the Middle East and the Elf-ERAP group in Algeria, and elsewhere in the Franc
26 Horst Mendershausen, Coping with the Oil Crisis : French and German Experiences (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1976), 30-31.
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Zone, were both obtained from French diplomatic and military successes. The
entrepreneurial skills of figures such as CFP's de Mez, who dominated the firm for a
quarter of a century, has also been identified as important to CFP's successes.
Nevertheless, the 1928 law was effective in redistributing market share within French
refining and distribution, and the state also provided financing to French firms. Absent
public policy intervention, it is unlikely that the rapid expansion of the firms would have
been achieved.
2.1 European Policies
In the introduction to this chapter I noted that European organizations played a
role, along with shifts in the oil market, in shaping outcomes. In this section I use
statements of the European Commission to identify the European preferences towards
energy policymaking prior to 1980. I argue that the European Commission had stable
preferences towards reducing barriers to trade and investment between member countries
in order to complete the European single market. Their effect on member countries'
policies during this period, however, was limited.
At first glance this appears paradoxical. The possibility that energy might
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become a source of conflict among European states played an important role in the
decision to negotiate the Treaties of Paris, signed on April 18, 1951 establishing the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)." The ECSC sought to create a common
market for coal throughout the six founding countries, thereby establishing trade, rather
than military force, as the instrument through which to secure coal supplies (then the
dominant fuel within national economies). The ECSC, did not, as its title suggests, extend
to energy resources other than coal.2" The EEC also committed to reducing obstacles to
the creation of an internal market encompassing all goods and services between their
countries, implicitly including crude and petroleum products. The history of the
engagement of European institutions in the petroleum policies of national governments,
as well as gas and electricity, is largely one of a movement towards the attainment of this
goal.
Despite European pretensions, energy policymaking in fuels other than coal
continued to be governed by national, rather than supranational rules. This was explicitly
recognized in the first attempt by the European Commission to formulate a set of
27 Explanations of the sources of European integration are contested. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choicefor Europe:
Social Purpose and State Powerfrom Messina to Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1998) for a review.
28 Janne Haaland Matlary, Energy Policy in the European Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 16. The Treaties
of Rome, signed on March 25, 1957, created a second energy-related institution - Euratom - which was intended to
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
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guidelines, albeit non-binding, for national energy policies across the member states of
the EEC. Released by the European Commission in 1968, the First Guidelinesfor a
Community Energy Policy, noted that "in contrast to the situation regarding products of
the other industries and of agriculture, there are still serious obstacles to trade within the
Community as regards to energy products."2 9 In keeping with its mandate to complete the
internal market in Europe, the Commission also made explicit the view that national
regulatory schemes designed to limit trade in energy products undermined this goal:
"If the situation does not improve, and if a common energy market is not achieved in the
near future, the level of integration already attained in this field will be
endangered... measures at the national level are leading to a gradual disintegration of the
Community's energy economy; uneconomic systems of aid, consumption taxes varying
form country to country, and increasingly nationalist supply and marketing polices are the
result. This dangerous trend can only be changed by a Community energy policy which
fully integrates the energy sector into the common market."30
The 1968 guidelines on energy policy did not amount to a binding set of
regulations, or directives designed to extend to energy resources the principles outlined in
the founding treaties." Instead, national policies were recognized as legitimate by the
Commission, given the non-competitive structure of energy markets. To frame a
European energy project, EC guidelines instead focused on increasing information on the
29 Commission of the European Communities, "First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy," (European
Community, 1968), 5.
3 Ibid., 5.
3 The European Council plays the legislative role in the European institutions. Directives or Regulations, which
amount to the legislative output, are binding on Member States, and can only be initiated by the Council. It creates this
legislation based on recommendations made to it by the European Commission. For a summary of the European
institutions see R. L. Leonard and Leo Cendrowicz, Guide to the European Union, 9th ed. (London: The Economist,
2005).
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energy sector available to the European institutions, proposing the implementation of a
process of medium-term energy forecasting at the European level, including monitoring
supply and demand, and investment and import requirements in the oil and gas sectors.
Further, the guidelines noted that, aside from information gathering, a European
stockpiling program for crude oil and oil products would be useful in mitigating the risks
associated with supply disruptions.32
Although not included through the proposal for specific legislation, the 1968
guidelines also recognized that the energy sector was not exempt from the common
market principles established through the Treaties of Rome. They noted that a common
customs tariff for oil products, as well as the harmonization of oil product standards
across all member countries, represented a necessary step in establishing a common
market. The guidelines also recommended that state monopolies, such as those
established in France through the 1928 oil law, should be dismantled in accordance with
Article 37 of the EEC Treaty, and that firms should be forced to compete with one
another on a non-discriminatory basis.3 ' Each of these European statements of principle
stood contrary to existing French institutions, which gave authority to the government to
regulate the domestic refining market in order to discriminate in favor of French firms.
32 Commission of the European Communities, "First Guidelines for a Community Energy Policy.",10-1 1.
3 3 Ibid., 10-17.
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The only move of the European institutions to actively shape the policies of
member governments had more limited goals than completing the internal market.
Following the Suez Crisis of 1967, a 1968 European Council Directive required member
states to hold the equivalent of sixty-five days of oil consumption in the form of stocks.34
There were no provisions in the directives for oil sharing or the joint release of stocks,
however. This meant that although the scheme market the first significant entry of the
European institutions into the energy sector, it did not promote the pooling of sovereignty
over the management of oil stocks, and did not therefore undermine the nationally-based
program of positive discrimination in favor of domestic firms that stood at the heart of
French oil policy.
The first oil shock of 1973-1974 did not change this conclusion. The first
recommendations to emerge from the European Commission were short-term, and, much
like in the case of the United States, designed to enable better information to be gathered
at the European level about imports and exports to and from member countries, and
consumption of crude oil and petroleum product within them. In a request submitted to
the European Council for action, the Commission proposed that the Council order
member governments to institute a system of automatic licensing for trade in both crude
34 This was increased to ninety days under a subsequent 1972 Directive. The relevant directives are 68/414/EEC and
72/425/EEC.
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oil and oil products. In the scheme proposed by the Commission, member governments
would be required to automatically issue, for free and in any quantity, export licenses to
firms, and member governments would then inform the Commission of the details of firm
transactions.
Limited to this, the European initiative was an information gathering exercise.
The Commission also requested, however, that European institutions be given the
authority to suspend the authorization of licenses in order to ensure security of supply.
The European Council accepted the recommendation, issuing a binding regulation
mandating that member governments implement an automatic licensing system for all
exports to third countries. The decision was time-constrained, however, with the
Commission recommending it be conferred these powers until June 30, 1974."
The incompatibility of the policy preferences of the European Commission with
French policy is clear in the initial proposal of the European Commission to the question
of how to enhance the security of supply of member states. The Commission examined
the question of how to guarantee physical supplies of petroleum, but the recommendation
of the Commission was decidedly supranational. Existing European initiatives focused on
3 The legal justification for this decision was found in European regulation (EEC) 2603/69, articles five and six of
which given the European Commission the authority to track, and restrict, exports of goods across the member
countries.
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collecting information about supply and demand patterns from the member countries, but
the potential application of the authority conferred by the Council to regulate exports of
crude oil and petroleum products focused on exports from European member states to
third-countries. Exports between European member countries, on the other hand, were not
subject to regulation, nor was the ability of member governments to restrain trade with
other member states within the EEC recognized as legitimate. This emphasis on shifting
of the authority to restrict trade in the name of security of supply from individual member
countries to the member countries collectively, was noted in non-binding guidelines
issued in 1973 prior to the Commission regulations.
"The main object here is to preserve effective competition and ensure freedom of
movement within the Community. The achievement of this aim is being impeded, inter
alia, by technical obstacles resulting from differences in the specifications of petroleum
products; these will need to be harmonized. In addition it will be necessary to frame
without delay a common set of rules on imports and exports of hydrocarbons, including
surveillance of oil imports in connection with which controls can be introduced in case of
need."36 [italics added]
The second binding decision made by the Council of European Ministers related
to the petroleum sector focused on demand management. On November 7, 1977 the
Council of Ministers issued a regulation conferring on the European Commission the
authority to set a Community-wide target for reducing petroleum consumption by ten
percent, acting on the request of a member country, or on its own initiative. The
36 Commission of the European Communities, "Guidelines and Priority Actions under the Community Energy Policy,"
ed. European Communities Commission (European Communities Commission, 1973), 6.
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effectiveness of the target was limited, however, to a two-month period, after which a
new mandate was required from the European Council."
In sum, the authority of the European Commission over the petroleum policies of
member states was extended during the 1970s to include the capacity to initiate short-
term responses to supply shocks, and to ensure security of petroleum supplies to member
countries by restricting exports of crude oil and petroleum products. European
Commission initiatives attempted, but failed, to lower trade and regulatory barriers to
trade in oil or oil products between member states, however, and also did not succeed in
harmonizing state aid towards national firms operating in the petroleum sector. The
initiatives did not, therefore, undermine French institutions designed by France to
enhance national control over the petroleum supply chain. The frustration of the
Commission at its inability to extent its mandate was evident in its communication to the
European Council in October 1981:
"In the course of recent years the European Council has repeatedly declared the need for
the Community to face up to the energy challenge... But it has not led to the
implementation of an overall strategy comprising action by the Community, Member
states and producers and consumers. The inadequacy and inconsistency of the action
taken in the wake of these expressions of political will can only be deplored."38
37 A number of other directives and regulations were passed by the Council of Ministers related to electricity, coal,
demand management and others. See Annex 1, , "Energy Policy in the European Community: Perspectives and
Achievements (Communication from the Commission to the Council)," ed. Commission of the European Communities
(1980).
38 ,"The Development of an Energy Strategy for the Community: Communication from the Commission to the
Council," ed. Commission of the European Communities (1981).
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2.2 Effects of Oil Shocks
Despite European pressure it was the effects of the oil shocks that facilitated the
transformation of policies of strategic intervention in France. This occurred in two ways.
First, these effects weakened the position of French oil firms that were central to the
strategy of state actors seeking to enhance security of petroleum supplies through
strategic intervention. They did so by reducing their reserves and cutting demand for
products. Second, as in Japan and the United States, the oil shocks reduced aggregate
demand for petroleum products, and shifted the structure of demand. This not only
harmed firms, but also undermined the domestic regulatory structure by rendering the
system of fixed prices unmanageable. Both changes had the effect of shifting the policy
preferences of state and firm actors away from the ongoing strategic intervention on the
petroleum sector.
For the Elf-ERAP group, the upheavals of the 1970s harmed them both because
of the renegotiation of prices and taxation structures through the Teheran and Tripoli
Agreements of February 14 and April 2, and because of nationalizations. Initially, French
firm holdings in Algeria were secured through negotiations over Algerian independence;
on July 29, 1965 the French and Algerian governments reached an agreement to change
the legal structure for exploration and production work, with a joint venture established
209
called the Societe Petroliere en Algerie (Sopefal) between ERAP and the Algerian firm
Sonatrach. French companies were then required to give any exploration permits they
held to the joint firm in return for a payment of the book value of the asset. Following the
completion of the Sonatrach pipeline in March 1966, this enabled the Algerian El Gassi
field in which SNPA maintained a holding, to gain a significant share of overall
firmproduction, with production increasing to 12,535,000 barrels in 1966.39
On February 24, 1971, however, the Algerian government nationalized both gas
and oil, leading to new agreements signed for CFP (June 30, 1971) and Elf-ERAP
(December 15, 1971) with less accommodative terms. For Elf-ERAP, the loss of Algerian
production was a significant blow. Until 1970 Algerian crude had dominated their
production through the El Gassi field. After Algerian independence it remained the
second largest center of production, after Gabon, however by 1976, Algerian production
was wholly lost to the firm.4 "
CFP production levels were also harmed by the nationalizations. Production in
Algeria, which along with Iraq dominated production prior to nationalization, fell by
more than half. The operations of the IPC in Iraq, which CFP continued to hold equity in,
were nationalized in 1972, although CFP assets in the south of Iraq through the Basrah
39 SNPA, annual report, FY1966.
40 SNEA/Elf-Aquitaine, annual reports, various years.
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Petroleum Company were left untouched by the nationalizations. By 1976 production in
Iraq had also dropped by greater than half from its peak in 1974. Total CFP production
fell by sixteen percent by 1976 from its peak in 1974.41
Although not initially predicted, a second blow to the firms came in refining and
marketing, where margins fell because of reduced demand for refined products and
refinery overcapacity.42 As in the other countries considered in this study, the rapid
increase in oil prices had a significant and negative effect on the demand for refined
petroleum products, both because of failing demand, and because of a shift in the
composition of demand for electricity generation and other industrial processes away
from oil. Between 1973 and 1975 French demand for crude fell by 330,000 barrels per
day, equivalent to a fall of more than twelve percent from 1973 levels. Between 1979 and
1985 demand fell by almost 650,000 barrels per day, or a quarter of the level of demand
in 1973. The total drop in demand represented 770,000 barrels of oil per day between
1973 and 1985 period, or some thirty percent of aggregate demand.43 Elf-ERAP noted in
its annual report for FY1979 that "refining is an industry that is destined to decline, at
41 Figures taken from CFP, annual reports, various years.
42 SNPA, for example, predicted in its annual report for FYI 972 that demand for petroleum products would continue to
row at an average of five percent annually for the next twenty years. See SNPA Annual Report FYI972, 5.
Calculated by author from BP Annual Review of Statistics.
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least in volume terms.""
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44 SNEA, annual report, FY1979, 2.
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Part of the problem for the firms lay in the fact that they were being forced for
the first time to buy crude oil using prices not determined by them, but were constrained
by the government from raising prices for petroleum products within the domestic market
during the 1973 crisis. (This did not happen during the 1979 price increase, driven by the
nationalization of Iranian oil). The state also forced the refining and distribution arm of
Elf-Aquitaine to sell to preferred customers and independent retailers, meaning they had
to buy crude on the open market and sell at a loss.45
For state actors, on the other hand, in the broadest sense, the oil shocks
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45 SNEA, annual report, FY1973, 3-4.
contributed to the problems of inflation and low growth that afflicted the French economy
through the 1970s and 1980s, and which was a major preoccupation of economic
policymaking. The oil shocks also had more specific effects on the French institutions of
national control, outlined below. Most notably, they introduced two sources of instability.
First, as noted above, they harmed the firms that were at the centerpiece of the French
strategy by stripping them of a portion of the oil they relied on for production, and by
dampened demand and shifted the composition of demand domestically. Second, the oil
shocks undermined the existing regulatory structure by introducing instability into the
procedure used for price fixing. Central to the system of maintaining market share for the
French national firms was the fixing of retail prices, which were regulated at each step of
the production chain. The price of contracts for crude was itself then set by the firms
through negotiations with producing countries. The oil shocks undermined this structure,
as price renegotiations, and then nationalizations, removed control over crude price
setting from French firms and handed it to the governments of the producer countries.
The loss of price-setting power for crude contracts occurred in advance of the
nationalization of the production assets, beginning with the Tripoli Agreement of 1971 as
noted in chapter two. Other sources of price instability were rising inflation and the break
of the franc-dollar exchange rate, both of which served to introduce further volatility to
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crude oil prices.4 6
3. Explaining Policy Transformation:1980-2000
From 1980-2000 French national petroleum policies were transformed from the
stable equilibrium centered on majority share ownership of Elf-Aquitaine and CFP/Total,
coupled with fixed prices and a system of licensing conferring to the government
authority to intervene in the domestic market in order to increase the market share of
these firms. Price controls were abandoned by 1986, and a revised version of the
petroleum law was passed on 31 December 1992 that eschewed firm discrimination on
national grounds. This marked the end of policies designed to enhance strategic control
over petroleum that had been in place for over sixty years.
The abolition of the system of fixed prices and import licensing, coupled with
privatizations, occurred in three stages over a ten year period. The system of fixed prices
was the first component of the national regulatory system to be adjusted. It was initially
relaxed in 1982 in order to more closely link domestic prices with the international
market, and was finally abandoned in 1985-6, along with fixed margins for refining and
storage. Second, the system of licensing was abandoned over a ten year period, ending in
46 The loss of control over price setting was noted by ERAP in its annual report. See ERAP, annual report FYI 973.
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1992 in line with commitments made to the European Commission and the International
Energy Agency. Third, privatization was carried out as part of a broad shift towards
reducing the role of the state in the market, but was crucially not opposed by firms or
state actors this was done without opposition from the firms.
The new law did not ignore the problem of security of supply. Instead, it
discarded the goal of ensuring French security of petroleum supplies through shaping
flows of crude and crude products in order to provide advantage to French firms. The first
article of the law demonstrated the difference in approach from the law of 1928:
"Article 1: Subject to compliance with the provisions of this Act, the import and export,
processing, transportation storage and distribution of crude oil and petroleum products
can be conducted freely."A
Instead of intervention under normal market conditions, the maintenance of
strategic stocks became the focus of policy in managing the problem of security of
supply. This was, in other words, a choice to bring France in line with multilateral
solutions to the security of supply problem in the petroleum sector: free trade,
harmonized regulations, and strategic stocks maintained for emergency purposes. In fact,
the 1992 law explicitly states it was designed to be in line with European directives in the
petroleum sector. Regarding strategic stocks, importers of crude oil and petroleum
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47 Law No. 92-1443.
products were required to store quantities of each equivalent to ninety days.48 The new
law also required firms operating in the petroleum sector to respond to government
requests for information about import and export plans for crude oil and petroleum
products.49
The government also privatized both Elf-Aquitaine and Total. The most
significant reduction in state holdings in Total came in 1992, when the share held by the
State fell from 31.7 percent of outstanding shares, to 5.4 percent. The sale was not simple
in structure. In June of 1992, the government firms offered 12.4% of its holdings for sale.
At the same time, it sold 7.7% to three French financial institutions: AGF, GAN and
Credit Lyonnais, giving these three firms jointly a ten percent stake. Further, these sales
included an agreement with the government that they would not sell their shareholdings
for a further ten years. Finally, the government exchanged 6.1 percent of its shares for
non-voting certificates, bringing its interest in Total to 5.4%. In 1992 the government also
reduced its representation on Total's Board of Directors from four members to two, and
abolished its right to veto the election of directors and the appointment senior
management other than the Chairman. The firm became a wholly commercial entity as
part of its merger with Elf-Aquitaine in 2000. Shareholdings in Elf-Aquitaine were also
48 Articles Two and Three, Law No. 92-1443.
49 Article Seven, Law No. 92-1443.
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relinquished, falling from 66 percent in 1975 to 51.6 percent in 1992, thirteen percent in
1994, and finally zero percent in 1996. In 2000, the government also relinquished its
"golden share," through which it maintained the ability to veto any attempted takeover by
another firm if deemed not to be in the national interest.
State Shareholding in Elf and CFP-Total
CFP-Total Elf
1975 35% 66%
1986-88 31.7% 53.9%
1992 5.4% 51.6%
1994 5.4% 13%
Source: Adapted from Finon, 1996
There is one caveat to the broad transformation of French national institutions.
At odds with the trend towards abolishing policy intervention in the domestic market and
maintaining strategic reserves only for use during emergencies, was the fact that a
remnant of the 1928 petroleum law remained intact: Article Eight of the law required
refiners to notify the government of plans to build or scrap refining installations one
month prior to the implementation of such a plan, and conferred to the government the
authority to reject such a change if it determined that it might serve to disrupt the supply
of petroleum products within France. The government also retained the ability to sanction
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firms failing to comply with an order by penalizing it a fine of up to ten million francs.4
In chapter two I argued outcomes are best explained as a function of the policy
strategies adopted by state actors and firms. In the case in France, as described above, the
preferences of both led them to support national control in the petroleum sector until the
1980s. From the 1980s, I find that both groups of actors shifted their preferred policy
strategy away from strategic intervention. This led to a complete reversal of earlier policy
preferences in which both state and firm policy preferences were aligned in support of
strategic intervention.
For state actors I argue the change was driven by three factors: first, the effects
of changes in the international petroleum market on firms, meant the Directorate of
Hydrocarbons, which had previously championed the policy within government, to
follow the lead of the firms in shifting away from strategic intervention; second, other
political and bureaucratic actors within the state - most notably The Ministry of Finance
and the leaders within the Socialist government - supported liberalization and
privatization in order to solve problems with inflation and government indebtedness; and
third, at key moments the Directorate General of Competition, and the European Court of
50 Article Eight, Law No. 92-1443. Interviews suggest this article is designed to allow the government to maintain veto
power over changes in refinery structure for reasons of local employment and local supply conditions, rather than on
national security grounds.
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Justice, influenced policy in ways that shifted it away from strategic intervention.
Without the first of these, in particular, it is more likely that French policy in petroleum
would have followed that of the electricity and gas sectors, both of which were insulated
from the shift towards liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s.
Firms, on the other hand, acquiesced to liberalization because of changes in their
material interests. This occurred because of the gradual shift in the structure of the firms:
the French domestic market became less important as they shifted increasingly into
international markets, and government ownership became a hindrance as they sought to
expand further. This shift was accelerated by the effect of changes in long-run petroleum
prices. Firms responded by expanding internationally in the search for assets to replace
those nationalized in the 1970s, and in the search for greater revenues to make up for
losses in the domestic refining market because of falling demand. In this way, both sets of
actors rejected the institutions of national control, and acceded to their transformation
into a new set of institutions designed to insure against petroleum security of supply
problems through the liberal response designed by European institutions.
3.1 State Actor Policy Preferences
The general shift towards support for liberalization and privatization across the
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French economy (outlined below) is necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the
transformation of French policies of national control in the petroleum sector." The
importance of sectoral dynamics in explaining outcomes is suggested by the resistance to
liberalization and privatization that continued in the other major sectors of France's
energy industry - electricity and gas - throughout the 1980s and 1990s, as noted above.
Although all three were the focus of European Commission initiatives, petroleum policies
were adjusted quickly compared to those of electricity and gas, for which national policy
dominated throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Indeed, as Schmidt notes, energy was one of
a few sectors of the economy that remained insulated from the urge to liberalize in the
late 1980s, ostensibly because of its strategic character.
The missing piece of the puzzle in explaining the transformation of French
institutions of national control lies, I argue, in the particular effects of the shift on long-
run prices on the French petroleum sector. In fact, the effects of changes in the
international petroleum market had already undermined the policy status quo by the time
of the general shift in political preferences towards liberalization and privatization across
the French economy. This meant that the drive to reduce the role of the state in the
economy, supported by the proposed changes to petroleum regulations made by the
51 A similar point is made by Matlary, Energy Policy in the European Union.
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European Commission in 1987, occurred in an environment in which there was little
interest among state actors, and firms, in isolating the petroleum sector from the broader
institutional changes being wrought across the French political economy. Absent state
actors willing to defend the policies of national control, and with the existence of an
alternative proposal in the shape of the European Commission, French policies of
strategic intervention in the petroleum sector were jettisoned.
As in Japan, the poor performance of domestic refining and distribution opened
the debate over the structure of domestic policy. Price variability, and falling demand,
resulted in significant losses in refining for the firms, in the order of US$700 million in
1980-1981 alone according to one estimate." The performance of the industry through
the 1970s was dismal, as shown below.
French Refinery and Distribution Sector Performance 1973-1979
(unit: millions current French Francs)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Revenues 27.239 56.97 56.459 67.981 73.516 76.616 101.685
Annual Investments 3.342 3.523 2.812 2.456 2.921 2.847 3.082
Net Income 193 112 -386 -87 -608 -859 2.113
Profits -462 -3.658 -1.193 -2.482 -1.999 927 -7841
(Source: La Vie Francaise, 19 January, 1981, p. 28)
These losses revealed a deeper problem with the system of fixed prices that
governed the sector: the need to adjust prices to reflect the new structure of the
international oil market, in which price setting for crude oil was no longer internal to the
52 Roger Vielvoye, "Jitters in France," Oil and Gas Journal, May 25 1981.
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international oil firms, but was determined by firms and governments of producer
countries. This variability in crude prices was accentuated by the pricing of oil in U.S.
dollars, meaning that the abandonment of the franc-dollar exchange rate exposed firms to
exchange rate risk given that revenues from sales within France were calculated in French
francs, while firm procurement of crude oil from outside the Franc Zone were made in
U.S. dollars.
The shift of the position of two state actors on the position of price liberalization
was key. First, for the Directorate of Hydrocarbons, which had traditionally supported the
interests of firms in policymaking, lobbying from firms, who had suffered significant
losses as a result of the increased prices of inputs coupled with fixed prices for outputs,
led them to change their position." For The Ministry of Finance, on the other hand, price
volatility initially made them less positive about liberalization, because of fears of its
potential effects on inflation. As prices began to recede, however, liberalization held out
the promise of contribution to a lessening of inflationary pressure, given the important
role of petroleum products across the economy more generally. Agreement was therefore
easily reached among the firms (see below), the Directorate of Hydrocarbons, and the
Ministry of Finance that existing system of fixed prices was inadequate. The decision was
5 Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July
18, 2008.
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taken in the Prime Minister's office, with the details of the new pricing mechanism
determined through negotiations between the Directorate of Hydrocarbons, firms, and the
European Directorate General of Competition. For the former, as noted, price flexibility
promised to enable firms to adjust prices in response to shifts in crude input costs,
thereby partially arresting the huge losses the firms were accruing in the refining sector.54
The new pricing mechanism, implemented in 1982, linked domestic prices for
the major petroleum products to international prices, rather than allowing them to be set
unilaterally within the Directorate of Hydrocarbons. Prices were linked to crude and
product prices in the international market by linking to the Rotterdam spot market, and an
average of prices for petroleum products across members of the EEC. Prices within
France were then adjusted automatically in response to international movements. The
shift was applied to regular and super gasoline, home heating oil, and diesel, and
represented the first adjustment in the regulatory edifice shaping outcomes in the French
domestic petroleum market."
A second adjustment to the price mechanism was made under the Socialist
Mauroy cabinet in 1985. The shift in price mechanism was once again supported by the
Ministry of Finance. Indeed, as oil prices fell the Minister for Economy and Finance
54 Senior policy maker in oil sector, interview with author, Paris, France, August 20, 2008.
5 Staff reporter, "France Agrees to Ease Grip on Products Prices," Oil and Gas Journal, May 3, 1982.
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Pierre Beregovoy (1984-1986) supported price liberalization because of the positive
effects it was likely to have on reducing inflationary pressures in the economy. The
Directorate of Hydrocarbons also supported the change in formula because the problems
price fluctuations were having on firm profitability, as well as because of the expected
positive effects on inflation. The decision to do so was taken by the Prime Minister. 56
Prices were allowed to float freely across petroleum products, marking the end of the
system of fixed prices that ensured firm profitability.
The second significant change in policy preferences related to the delegated
monopoly on trade in crude oil and petroleum products retained by the state, and
implemented through licensing and trade restrictions. The idea of loosening the issuing of
licenses was first raised by the Minister of Economy and Finance Beregovoy at the time
of the shift to the full liberalization of prices in 1985-6. Beregovoy supported relaxing the
requirement that marketing firms purchase eighty percent of their products from licensed
companies. Doing so, it was estimated, would allow firms to take advantage cheaper
products in the Middle East and elsewhere, thereby reducing prices in the domestic
market and cutting inflation."
56 Senior policy maker in oil sector, interview with author, Paris, France, August 20, 2008.
57 Jean Du Rusquec, Advisor to the CEO, Total and former member of Ministry of Finance, interview with author,
Paris, France, July 23, 2008.
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This proposed change was more controversial than the relaxation of prices. This
is unsurprising: as shown in the preceding pages the system of licensing lay at the heart
of the law of 1928 had been the key to securing market share for French national firms
domestically, in conjunction with the system of fixed prices and margins that served to
limit price competition between firms already established within France in refining and
marketing. The abolition of this system of licensing was seen, therefore, as a significant
step away from the strategic intervention, and towards an open market for the supply of
petroleum products.
Reflecting the more controversial nature of the idea of abolishing the system of
licensing, the State Secretary for Energy M. Martin Malvy, initially opposed the change
on the grounds that the regulatory changes could negatively affect French firms already
struggling with problems of overcapacity. Over the long-term, firms' position in the
domestic refining market had been guaranteed through the requirement that eighty
percent of products sold by distributors be obtained from within France, as noted above.
Removing this requirement promised to allow cheaper products into the French market,
but also could have the effect of ceding national flag firms market share to refiners with
capacity outside France, and to distribution firms in France with access to refined
products produced outside France.
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The support of the Directorate of Hydrocarbons which was responsible for
administering the licensing system towards abolishing the delegated monopoly meant
baulking at this change was likely to be short-lived. As with prices, the directorate
followed the lead of the firms. While the directorate continued to require firms applying
for A3 licenses to obtain the right to import petroleum products, the procedure had
become increasing redundant because of the national firms' success in establishing
themselves in the domestic market, and because the firms themselves were becoming less
reliant on the domestic market - a trend exacerbated by their responses to the oil shocks.58
Their secondary goal, after ensuring security of petroleum supplies, of supporting
national firms, was therefore best met by enabling deregulation of licensing, rather than
continuing to enforce it even though the firms it was designed to protect were no longer
interested in maintaining it. Indeed, the firms supported the one change Malvy did
implement during his tenure; on August 15, 1982 he announced that this requirement
could be fulfilled through refinery capacity throughout Europe, rather than within France
alone. This suited the interests of Total and Elf-Aquitaine, both of which were
diversifying their refinery assets outside France and into Europe and elsewhere.
This change to allow European refinery capacity marked the first shift away
58 Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July
18, 2008.
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from a sole focus on the French market. It also presaged the complete dismantling of the
system of delegated monopoly. The change to the so-called 80/20 rule, whereby refiners
were expected to purchase eighty percent of their crude from holders of crude import
licenses - was relaxed by Industry Minister Alain Madelin.59 Madelin announced a
number of measures, most importantly the immediate suspension of the rules of 80/20
and 90/10, which required importers of refined products to purchase from European
refineries, and refiners to maintain refinery capacity equivalent to ninety percent of their
domestic sales within France. He also extended by a period of six months the existing
import authorizations of refined products ("A3") to enable a new system to regulate trade
to be determined.'
A second influence on the decision by the Directorate of Hydrocarbons to
acquiesce to the dismantling of the delegated state monopoly was pressure from the
European DGC to shift the allocation of licenses, and specifically pressure on Ministry of
Industry to provide a greater share of licenses authorizing the importation of petroleum
products to supermarkets which were seeking to enter the market at the retail level. This
was done on the grounds of increasing competition within the domestic French market,
59 This occurred under the cabinet of newly installed Prime Minister Jacques Chirac (1986-1988). Staff reporter,
"Petrole: Une Reformette," L'Express, 7 June 1985; Veronique Maurus, "La Regime Le La Loi De 1928 Sera
Maintenu," Le Monde, 25 May 1985.
60 Edouard Thevenon, "Produits Petroliers: Importations Plus Faciles," Le Figaro, 25 September, 1986.
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and was supported by the Ministry of Finance because of its expected positive effects on
inflation.
What, then, of the firms that were at the center of French national petroleum
policy?
3.2 Firm Policy Preferences
Strategic intervention prior to the transformation of the French institutions of
national control served the interests of French firms in addition to the state. How then,
can we explain their support for policy change? In this section I argue that the
commercial interests of Elf-Aquitaine and Total predisposed them to support
liberalization and privatization of the French petroleum market for two reasons. First,
because the decreasing importance of the French market to the firms made domestic
regulatory changes less relevant to their businesses; and second, the effects of the
changes in the international petroleum market made them support greater flexibility in
firm operations, leading them to favor liberalization and privatization. The increasingly
international character of the firms, and the greater profitability to be found in markets
outside France, meant that both firms responded to changes in the petroleum market by
increasing investments in international markets, rather than attempting to lobby for the
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use of regulatory measures domestically in order to protect market share at home. There
was hence no demand for ongoing protection by either Total and Elf-Aquitaine.
In the long-term, nationalization caused the firms to pursue a set of responses
that reflected the fact that growth existed in developing new markets internationally in
crude production and the marketing of products. This reduced their interest in fighting to
protect market share in the domestic French market for petroleum products. Tax policy
remained important, given firm headquarters remained located on French soil, however
policies designed to enhance strategic intervention within the domestic French market
became increasingly unimportant to the firms. Indeed, to the extent they hindered growth,
firms supported the weakening the institutions of national control.
Data drawn from the annual reports of both firms demonstrates the decreasing
importance of the French market to the Total and Elf-Aquitaine groups.' Elf-Aquitaine
began to diversify away from refining prior to the 1970s. Recognizing that production of
gas from the Lacq field that initially dominated revenues would plateau, the firm began to
expand internationally in crude as well as in natural gas. This is demonstrated by the
increase in spending in oil exploration, which grew from forty-four million Francs in
61 Veron also uses revenues and other data to examine the increased internationalization of European national
champions across a number of sectors. See Nicholas Veron, Farewell National Champions, ed. Bruegel, Bruegel Policy
Brief (Brussels: Bruegel, 2006).
230
1961 to fifty eight million in 1962, and then eighty million in 1963 and 119 million in
1964. By 1964 about two-thirds of all spending in exploration (oil and gas) was located
outside France, in Africa, North America, Australia and New Zealand,6 2 a shift noted by
the Chairman in his address to shareholders for fiscal year 1968.63
The price increases and nationalizations of the 1970s accentuated this trend. The
main goals established by the firm in 1973, aside from improving productivity and
lobbying to increase domestic prices, focused on using firm resources on exploring for
new sources of petroleum for exploitation. A secondary goal was diversifying out of
refining in recognition that nationalizations were likely to lead to the entrance of Middle
Eastern suppliers into the petroleum products market, and a consequent loss of market
share and profits.64
The decision of the firm to shift out of the domestic products market was also
driven by the fact that the refining infrastructure of Elf-Aquitaine, which was focused on
62 SNPA, annual report 1964, 8-11. It is worth noting that much of this test drilling ended in failure, with the notable
exceptions of the discoveries at Rainbow Lake in Canada, and later at the El Gassi field in Algeria, both of which
served to increase commercial crude production by the firm.
63 "Extract from the Chairman's Address," Annual Report FY1968, 4.
64 Elf-Aquitaine Annual Report, 1973, 4-5. It is worth noting that Elf-Aquitaine was already an integrated firm across
natural gas, sulfur/sulfuric acid, crude and products, petrochemicals, and later hygiene and healthcare. Sales were
initially dominated by gas, with crude and products increasing in importance rapidly in the late 1960s and 1970s. In
1966, for example, sales of crude and petroleum products made up sixteen percent of total sales, which increased to 21
percent in 1971 and 32 percent in 1975. The other business sectors Elf-Aquitaine was involved in are gas (1975: 27%),
sulfur ( 7%), chemicals (13%), hygiene and health (19%) and coal (2%). Data compiled from Elf-Aquitaine Annual
Reports, various years.
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the French market, rarely made a significant contribution to group profits.65 This had two
causes. First, falling demand and overcapacity, combined with the high costs of
restructuring refining facilities due to changes in product structure, meant revenues
obtained from the refining of petroleum products fell while costs increased. In 1973 Elf-
Aquitaine owned shares in five French refineries: Ambes, Feyzin, Gargenville,
Grandpuits, and Hauconcourt), and four others in Europe, but outside France: Reichstett,
Albatross, Speyer, and Klarenthal). ANTAR, in which it had a significant stake, had
shares in three French refineries: Donges, Vern-s-Seiche, and Valenciennes), and two
outside Europe: Klarenthal and Herrlisheim. However, in response to falling demand Elf-
Aquitaine, along with other firms, shut down refinery capacity in the domestic market, as
shown below.
65 Staff reporter, "Elf Aquitaine," Petroleum Economist, August 1989 1989, 246.
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Refinery Closures in France 1976-1985
unit: millions tons/year
1976-1980 1981-1984
BP Dunkirk 0.8 4.4
BP Lavera 2.5
BP Vernon 3.4
CFR Gonfreville 6.8
CFR La Mede 3.1
Esso Bordeaux 2.9
Elf Gargenville 6.1
Elf Valenciennes 3.3
ElfAmbes 2.1
Elf Vern-s-Seiche 1.45
Mobil Frontignan 0.3
Mobil Gravenchon 0.5
Shell Berre 7.2
Shell Petit-Couronne 8.1
Raff. De Strasbourg-Herlisheim 4.6
Raff. De Lorraine-Hauconcourt 5.1
Total 7.151 55.5
Source: COM (85) 32 final
This reduced interest of Elf in maintaining the existing regulatory structure,
which had initially been designed to increase the shares of French firms in domestic
refining and distribution. Indeed, the long-term problems with refining were noted by the
Elf Chairman as part of his remarks to shareholders in the Annual Report for 1983:
"The future of this sector looks bleak. World excess refining capacity (and particularly in
Europe), and the awaited arrival of products from the Middle Eastern refineries, raises
the question of just how much refining capacity France really needs."66
The poor performance in the downstream did not mean that the firms were
wholly disinterested in refining. Instead, management from both firms were interested in
entering in the U.S. market in order to extend the geographic scope of downstream
66 Chairman's Address, Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, June 6, 1984.
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operations. 67 Elf, for example, made investments in the United Kingdom and Spain, with
the long-term goal of becoming a significant player in the downstream business across
Europe as a whole, rather than simply in the French market.68
A second reason firms shifted their policy preferences away from ongoing
support for the institutions of national control was because of the differences in interests
that emerged between the firms and state actors in the wake of the oil shocks. In France,
as in Japan, state actors decided to disallow Elf-Aquitaine and other firms from fully
passing-on the increased crude oil procurement costs to consumers within the French
domestic market during the 1973-4 crisis, harming profitability.69 Performance in the
refining division improved in 1979-80 given this problem did not occur, however firms
remained pessimistic about the long-term prospects for the division, noting in 1979, as in
1973-4, that "refining is an industry that is destined to decline, at least in volume
terms."7
As well as increasing its geographic spread in refining, Elf, for example, was
bullish about its prospects in developing reserves of crude oil internationally, and indeed
67 "Elf Eagerly Courts Downstream Investment by Producing Countries," International Petroleum Finance, vol. 11,
No. 10, 1988, p. 1. See also Elf-Aquitaine, annual report, FYI 991, 2.
68 Staff reporter, "Elf Chairman Eyes Profits, Not Sentiments," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, September 30 1991, 8.
Staff reporter, "French Refiners Face Shakeout with Soaring Costs, Downturn," Oil & Gas Journal, September 20,
1993.
69 SNPA, annual report FY1973, 3; SNPA, annual report FY1975, 26.
70 Elf-Aquitaine, annual report FY1979, 2.
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saw this as crucial to its long-term future. At the Annual General Meeting for FY1979,
for example, the president noted that the problems of the 1970s demonstrated that access
to equity oil was crucial in ensuring firm success, and that Elf was not relegated to the
role of a services company. He therefore made the development of international
exploration and trading "absolute priority" within the firm.7" The sale of crude
internationally which made an increasing contribution to Elf-Aquitaine's profits, and the
number of countries from which Elf-Aquitaine produced crude grew, in reflection of this
increased emphasis on international markets.
7 President's Address to Annual General Meeting of Shareholders June 12, 1980, 2.
72 Staff reporter, "Elf Aquitaine", 246.
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This diversification strategy was mirrored by Total, which extended into
refining and distribution outside France and increased investments upstream. Sales of
refined petroleum products in France as a ratio of total sales, for example, fell from forty-
one percent in 1983, to thirty-five percent in 1990, to nineteen percent in 2004, meaning
that sales in the rest of the world grew from fifty-eight percent to eighty-one percent over
the same period." The share of sales in Europe, as a component of total sales outside
7 Includes sales of gasoline, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil, fuel and heating oils, lubricants, and other more minor
products. Data here, and below, calculated by author from Total annual reports, various years.
2.36
France also increased over this period, and grew particularly rapidly following the
entrance of the firm into Eastern Europe.
Total reflected the change in corporate strategy by reorganizing business
operations in 1990 in order to promote international operations. The reorganization of the
business was made, in the words of the 1990 annual report, because "Total's basic
refining and marketing operations now cover the whole of Europe, while its downstream
activities are worldwide in their reach. The reorganization is designed to adjust to this
new situation."74 In refining it unified its management structure for Europe, meaning that
it no longer had a national organization around the refining and marketing of petroleum
products, but rather optimized operations across Europe. For Total-CFP also, the
utilization rate in French refineries stood at only sixty percent, compared to close to
ninety percent in the four refineries operated in Total Petroleum North America.""
Other trends accentuated the decreasing importance of the French market for
Total. Although data is available only from 1983, for example, sales of crude oil, as
opposed to products, fell in France as a ratio of total sales. In 1983, for example, the Total
group sold some 18.8 million tons of crude in France, which increased to twenty one
million tons by 1990 (an increase of nine percent). Sales to the rest of the world, on the
74 Total, Annual Report 1990 (Paris: Total, 1990), 18.
7 Staff reporter, "Total-CFP," Petroleum Economist, July 1988, 266.
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other hand, grew from 24.2 million tons to forty seven million over the same period.
The decision of the firms to respond to weaker performance and future prospects
within France by expanding internationally (and across business segments for Elf-
Aquitaine), was reflected in the shift into more profitable markets for refining and
distribution, and greater investment in exploration and production.
In addition, evidence suggests they supported transforming the institutions of
national control because of the greater flexibility this provided in organizing commercial
operations. This was most clear in the case of the liberalization of fixed prices in 1982
and 1985-6. Fixed domestic prices under conditions of newly floating fluctuating crude
oil prices - as well as a floating dollar-franc exchange rate - limited the ability of the
firms to adjust end-used prices based on the changing costs of inputs. Requests by the
management of Elf-Aquitaine to the state to increase prices for products in June 1972
went unheeded, and although price increases eventually approved by the State, they were
inadequate to enable the firm to recoup its increased costs of crude procurement.76 This
significantly harmed the performance of the refining division of the firm.
The contribution of the system of fixed prices to the difficulties in the domestic
refining sector meant Elf-Aquitaine supported the loosening of prices. Indeed, the firms
76 SNPA, annual report, FY1973, 3; SNPA, annual report, FY1974, 3.
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initially lobbied the Directorate of Hydrocarbons to reform the price-setting system so
that adjustments were made on a monthly rather than an annual basis, in order to better
reflect the new reality of shifting prices for inputs.7 7 Their support extended to the full
removal of price controls in 1985:
"A major event in early 1985 was the removal of price controls, which was announced by
the Government at the end of January.. .We have no objection to this measure, and
indeed the entire industry has been calling for it."78
Firms preferences towards the relaxation of licensing requirements implemented
by Malvy and Madelin were similarly positive.79 This was firstly because the loss of
mandated market share through the licensing system was balanced against greater control
over market share afforded by the greater flexibility to organize refining." Further, the
existing regulatory structure had proven itself under conditions of high prices and supply
instability to be a burden, rather than of benefit to the firm.
"The Government is going to have to review this country's now outdated petroleum
policy. It may opt for a genuinely protective dirigisme, enabling firms to finance industrial
conversion, or alternatively it may opt for a laissez faire policy leaving them to shoulder
both the risks, and the opportunities, of achieving this by their own efforts. The main
priority is to break out of the existing hybrid system, which is gradually bringing about the
demise of refining in France."8 1
Secondly, as noted above the domestic market for refined petroleum products
7 Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July
18, 2008; Du Rusquec. Elf-Aquitaine, annual report, 1973, 4.
78 Chairman's Address, Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, Elf-Aquitaine, May 30, 1985.
79 Gilles Bellec, Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989), interview with author, Ministry of Industry, Paris, France, July
18, 2008.80 Thevenon, "Produits Petroliers: Importations Plus Faciles."
81 Chairman's Address, Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, SNEA, May 21, 1981.
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was not seen as a growth sector by the management of the Elf-Aquitaine and Total
groups, both because of falling demand and because of low expected future margins
given overcapacity and the entrance of Middle Eastern producers to the refined products
market. The strategies adopted by both firms therefore focused on expanding beyond the
French domestic market into Europe, the United States, and the Asia-Pacific, rather than
defending market share domestically. Reflecting this, Elf-Aquitaine began to optimize its
refining operations across Europe rather than simply France in the early 1980s, with a
single program determining how supplies were distributed for the European market as a
whole, rather than simply for the French domestic market. 2
The transformation of the French institutions of national control was completed
through the privatization of Elf-Aquitaine and Total. As is the case with price and the
removal of regulatory control over the domestic market, the firms supported the change
because of the constraints government ownership placed on their business operations.
The government had less control over Total than Elf-Aquitaine, with a maximum
shareholding of thirty-five percent, compared to sixty-seven percent for Elf-Aquitaine.
Total was also considered by managers to have more of the characteristics of a private,
rather than a state firm, in comparison to Elf-Aquitaine. Total welcomed privatization, as
82 Olivier Abadie, Director of Downstream Oil Europe, Cambridge Energy Research Associates, interview with author,
Paris, France, July 16, 2008.
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is made clear in management's assessment of the significance of the reduction in the
government's share of control over the firm, and which is worth citing in full:
"The events of the past year mark the culmination of the transition of Total to a genuinely
private, commercial entity as the Company revised its historical links to the French State.
Management is fully aware of its responsibilities to the Group's new and enlarged
shareholder base and of the need to make an even greater effort to improve
performance, communication, and above all, to create value for our shareholders.. .The
transition from a State-controlled to a private commercial entity provides Total with
access to a broader international investor base and more financial flexibility, while
improving the liquidity of the market for Total's shares."83
The issue of state ownership was more significant for Elf-Aquitaine, given the
larger shareholding of the state. Like the Total group, its view on privatization was
positive. This was firstly because of constraints the two-thirds government shareholding
placed on the firm, but also because the value of firm shares were understood by
management to be undervalued relative to competitors because of government
shareholdings, a complaint borne out by the valuation of the stock relative to its
competitors." The CEO noted in an interview that Elf was "already an international
company confronted by international competition, and we seek the state's help neither
financially nor politically. [Privatization] would only mean a greater involvement of
private shareholders." 5
83 Total, annual report 1992, 6-7.
84 Jean Du Rusquec, Advisor to the CEO, Total and former member of Ministry of Finance, interview with author,
Paris, France, July 23, 2008.
85 Petroleum Economist, May 1986, cited in Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transformation ofFrench Business
and Government, 147.
241
The support of Elf-Aquitaine for privatization was also driven by the divergence
in the interests of the state actors and the firm: the government, through its rights as the
largest shareholder in Elf-Aquitaine, actively blocked an acquisition planned by the Elf as
part of its strategy of dealing with problems in the domestic refining and distribution
market. In 1981 Elf wanted to enter the U.S. market however it was blocked by the
Socialist government, which frustrated management.86
It is unsurprising, therefore, that the firms responded to the challenges of the
nationalization of production and falling refining margins by redeploying firm resources
towards greater international exposure, rather than calling for increased protection within
the domestic market. Elf s focus outside the French market is laid bare in a 1989
interview with the Elf-Aquitaine CEO Loik Le Floch-Prigent: "The general objective is
very clear. Elf is to be one of the world's leading companies in oil and gas. And we will
be ready to react to other good opportunities and do even more."87 Both companies also
sought to develop refining and marketing internationally. The CEO of Elf-Aquitaine, for
example, noted that he "thought the company needed to develop its downstream activity,
because we were weak in that. Thus we made the Amoco acquisition in the UK, and we
86 Jean Du Rusquec, Advisor to the CEO, Total and former member of Ministry of Finance, interview with author,
Paris, France, July 23, 2008.
87 Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, "Elf Chairman Eyes Profits, Not Sentiments," Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,
September 30, 1991 1991, 8.
242
took an interest in the Spanish refining and marketing company Cepsa, initially at 25%
and going to 34%."88 This strategy recognized that, within the refining sector, Elf
remained dependent on sales of petroleum products within France and needed to expand
the geographic share of its sales.89
3.3 Negotiations with Other Actors
The shift of French firms, and the DGH, towards support for liberalization and
privatization mirrored that of other domestic actors both within the state and in Europe. In
this sense outcomes are overdetermined; support existed for liberalization across the
political spectrum and within the oil firms, and there was little opposition. In general
terms parties of the left and right began to pursue economic growth and macroeconomic
stability through a shift away from etatism." Ongoing poor economic performance was
important in the initial shift first towards greater state intervention under the government
of President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Mauroy government (1981-1984), and then
away once again. The French economy, along with the other advanced industrial
88 Ibid., 8.
89 Staff reporter, "Designer Oil," The Economist, January 30 1993, 68.
90 The details of this change are described in Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transformation ofFrench Business
and Government; Levy, "Economic Policy and Policy-Making"; Peter A. Hall, "The Europeanization of Policy-
Making," in Developments in French Politics 2, ed. Alain Guyomarch and etal (2001); Vivien A. Schmidt, "The
Changing Dynamics of State-Society Relations in the Fifth Republic," West European Politics 22, no. 4 (1999), 141-
165.
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economies, performed poorly following the oil price shocks. In response, the Socialist
Mitterrand/Mauroy adopted a range of expansionary economic measures, including
raising the minimum wage, introducing a range of other social benefits, and nationalizing
firms. As a result, government spending increased by some 27.6 percent in 1982.91
Nationalization was the centerpiece of the increased interventionism. Beginning
in 1981 the Socialist government nationalized firms across a wide range of economic
sectors determined to be strategic in response to poor economic performance. Some forty-
six firms in all were nationalized, representing 15.4 percent of all revenues for French
industrial firms in 1980.92 In the end the government owned thirteen of the twenty largest
French firms, as well as maintaining controlling shares in other firms.93 Nationalizations
were carried out across the banking and industrial sectors, and included sectors
determined to be 'strategic' to national economic performance in which the goal was
partly to reduce dependence on external markets.94 Given the existing holdings in the
petroleum sector through the Total and Elf-Aquitaine groups, nationalizations were not
carried out in the petroleum sector. This makes intuitive sense: petroleum had for many
91 Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transformation ofFrench Business and Government.107. See also Vivien A.
Schmidt, "Business, the State, and the End of Dirigisme," in Chirac's Challenge: Liberalization, Europeanization, and
Malaise in France, ed. Martin Keeler John & Shain (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996).
92 Pascal Dumontier and Claude Laurin, "The Financial Impact of the French Government's
Nationalization/Privatization Strategy," EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings (2003). A succinct review of the technical
process behind nationalization can be found on pages 8-9.
93 Schmidt, From State to Market? The Transformation ofFrench Business and Government, 116-118.94 Ibid., 98.
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years been identified as a strategic sector, with policies designed to increase national
control in place, and state holdings justified in these terms. Nationalization was therefore
unnecessary.
The government was forced to abandon these measures, however, both because
of capital flight, which was threatening French membership of the EMS, and rising
inflation. Rather than abandon France's position in the EMS and continue with existing
economic policies, Mitterrand made the decision to keep France in European institutions.
In doing so it implemented a "Great U-Turn" towards fiscal austerity and deflationary
policies, including reducing state subsidies for firms and reducing public spending.95 In
terms of firm ownership, the process of nationalizations was replaced by the opposite
trend: a wave of privatizations, which extended into the petroleum sector. The state
initially divested its shares in the firms nationalized over the 1981 to 1983 period, as well
as a number of other firms in the banking and insurance sector.96 Both Elf-Aquitaine and
Total were privatized as part of the shift to reduce direct ownership of firms by the state,
and this occurred because, unlike in electricity and natural gas, there was little opposition
from state actors, or firms, to oppose this change. Indeed, the firms actively supported
95 Ibid., 112.
96 On the technical procedures behind nationalization see Michel Berne and Gerard Pogorel, "Privatization Experiences
in France," CESifo Working Paper (2004).
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privatization because of the increased capacity it provided them to raise capital in order to
fund expansion internationally, and the Directorate of Hydrocarbons also acquiesced to
the change both because of firm support for privatization, and because it did not have the
power to veto the proposed privatization given support across the political spectrum for
it.97
Major IPOs and Sales of Shares by the State
Year Industry Services Banking & Insurance
1986 Saint-Gobain
CGCT, Compagnie Generale TF1, Havas Paribas, Compagnie Financiere de
d'Electricite Suez, Societe Generale, Credit du
Nord, Caisse Nationale de Credit
Agricole, BNP, UAP, Societe
1987 Lyonnaise de Banque
1988 Matra
1993 Rhone-Poulenc
1994 Elf-Aquitaine, Total
SEITA, Pechiney, Usinor-Sacilor
1995
1996 AGE
1997 Bull Air France
1998 Thomson-CSF CIC
199 Dassault1999 DasutCredit Lyonnais
2000 Thomson Multimedia, EADS
2001
Autoroutes du Sud de la France
2002
2003 _Thomson, Dassauly Systems _______________________________
Source: Adapted from Berne and Pogorel (2006)
3.4 European Institutions - Policies
By the time European organizations began a concerted push to change French
national institutions, therefore, the interests of firms and state actors that previously led
them to favor strategic intervention had changed."8 This mean that when the European
9A Senior policy maker in oil sector, interview with author, Paris, France, August 20, 2008.
98 If the answer to the question of whether changes in state actor policy preferences towards ongoing strategic
intervention in the petroleum sector represents an independent shift in policy preferences within France itself, as
opposed to the influence of European initiatives, lies in identifying whether French political and bureaucratic officials
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Commission sought to complete an internal market for goods and services envisioned, as
envisioned in the Rome treaties, it found no opposition from the French government to
carrying this out in the oil sector. The Commission pursued this mandate vigorously,
making recommendations about the French regulatory structure in petroleum specifically
in 1987, in order for the French government to be in compliance with the 1986
intergovernmental agreement.
Little direct negotiation took place between the Commission and the French
government prior to the 1980s. The main focus of European institutions in the 1970s was
tracking the poor performance of the refining sector in member countries because of the
potential implications for regional employment and security of supply. On both questions
it reached sanguine conclusions: regardless of the poor performance of the sector in the
face of falling demand, underutilized capacity, and increasing petroleum product imports
from non-member countries, intervention was unwarranted on employment or public
security grounds, and "solutions...will have to reflect the traditionally liberal attitude of
the Community to trade policy."99
The Commission alluded to two potential justifications for public intervention in
opposed changes proposed by the European Commission, then, the evidence presented here suggests that the
convergence of French on European policy in the petroleum sector reflected a shift in state actor preferences that
occurred independently of the European initiative to dismantle the dirigiste model of French governmental intervention.
99 Commission of the European Communities, "The Situation in the Oil-Refining Industry and the Impact of Petroleum
Product Imports from Third Countries," ed. Commission of the European Communities (1985), 2
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response to the poor performance of the sector. The first was to provide adjustment
support for those made unemployed. Employment losses caused by the closing of thirty-
five refineries were estimated by the Commission to be approximately 16,000 (although
eighty percent of people losing their jobs being either reemployed, or made redundant
through early retirement). This meant total employment in the refining industry within
member countries fell from 142,000 in 1975 to 126,000 in 1985, a reduction of eleven
percent of total employment over the decade. The Commission did not, however, view
this as significant enough to warrant recommending public intervention to the Council.'00
The second potential justification for policy intervention lay in ensuring security of
supply, however the Community was also sanguine about the implications of falling
refinery capacity, and rising imports. It found that the existing closing or mothballing of
refineries, coupled with future projections of refinery closures, was unlikely to reach a
level which would lead to concern over security of supply in final products derived from
petroleum. This assessment was confirmed at meetings of the European Energy Council
on 15 March, 20 June and 11 November 1985, where the question of increasing imports
of petroleum products from non-Community countries was taken up.'*'
As a result, the position of the Commission on the problems of the refining
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1 Ibid., 3.
101 Ibid., 12.
sector, like that of the initial response to the price shocks of 1973-4, was to present the
harmonization of member countries' policies and completion of the internal market for
energy products as the most effective mechanism for managing the problem, as well as
the larger issue of ensuring security of supplies for petroleum products. This view was
given backing by national governments through the major agreement negotiated between
the governments of the member states to complete the internal market first envisioned in
the Treaties of Rome. Ensuring security of supply was relegated to a secondary
justification for the liberalization of national laws and regulations limiting the free flow
of energy products.
"It must be acknowledged that a more integrated energy market is a significant additional
factor as regards to the security of supply for all Member States. Greater interconnection
of equipment would make it possible to increase both the solidarity between member
states and the flexibility of the industry. It would therefore increase the emergency
resources available in the event of a crisis and create the possibility of additional
trading."
The decision by national governments to complete the internal market gave the
opportunity to the Commission to pursue the dismantling of trade and other regulations
that acted as obstacles to trade in energy products and competition between firms
operation across the energy sector. This implied the abolition, as the Commission
asserted, not only of regulations hampering the free circulation of goods and services, but
also implied harmonization of competition rules, abolition of subsidies provided to state
,"The Internal Energy Market," ed. Commission of the European Communities (1988), 6.
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monopolies, and of the laws and regulations governing such firms that impeded
competition.
The mandate acquired by the Commission covered the electricity and gas
industries, as well as petroleum. The Commission quickly asserted its authority in the
petroleum sector. At its request the Council of the European Commission, which included
the French Permanent Representative to Brussels Francois Scheer, accepted unanimously
that the Commission should draw up a list of the obstacles that existed in national policy
blocking the creation of an internal market for energy.'"3 This began the process of
liberalizing French oil policy, and hence the dismantling of France's national legal and
regulatory barriers to trade.
The Commission opened its assessment of the national changes in legislation
required to complete the internal energy market with a quotation taken directly from the
1968 guidelines: "There are still considerable barriers to trade in energy products within
the Community. If this state of affairs does not alter and if a common energy market is
not achieved in the near future, the degree of integration achieved in this sector may well
be jeopardized."' 4 This signaled both the lack of progress in moving forward to
achieving an internal market in energy since the initial statement, as well as the continuity
103 Council of the European Communities, 11 71st Meeting of the Council - Energy, 117 1st Meeting, 2 June 1987.
104 ,"The Internal Energy Market", 2.
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in Commission policy preferences in seeking to achieve this goal.
The decision of those governments to complete the Single European Market
(SEM) gave the Community the mandate it required to recommend to the European
Council that binding legislation, in the form of regulations and directives, be issued in
order to implement an internal energy market across member countries. At the Council of
Energy Ministers meeting of June 2, 1987 the ministers of the national governments
endorsed the Commission's request to identify obstacles to the completion of the SEM in
energy, and then make recommendations to the Council on how to remove these in order
to achieve the goal by the 1992 deadline.' This mandate was noted in the Commission's
subsequent report on internal energy market:
"With the adoption of the Single Act in December 1985 and especially with the recent
decision by the European Council to assign the resources needed for the Community to
make a success of the Single Act, the way is at last clear for making a reality of the
European internal market. Completion of the large market by the end of 1992 has
become a key objective and the focal point of the revival of the European Community." 06
The Commission pursued this mandate by issued recommendations for the
harmonization of policies that applied first to all member countries. Specifically, it stated
that the creation of the SEM by 1992 required that regulations across product
specifications for petroleum products that varied across the member states needed to be
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1os Ibid., 2.
106Ibid., 2.
harmonized, and pointed to the problems that existed in the national regulatory schemes
of individual member states. Unsurprisingly, French national law featured prominently,
and the Commission stated they should be removed for France to be in compliance with
the intergovernmental agreement reached to form a single market for Europe by 1992.""
Table: 1988 Commission Recommendations for Changes to French National Law
Regulation Recommendation for French Law
Restrictions on imports of crude oil and/or petroleum
products from certain non-Community countries.
Obligation to accept crude oil acquired by the State
The obligation to use national-flag shipping for the
carriage of crude oil and/or petroleum products by
sea
Exclusive right of refining
Prohibition of trans-frontier deliveries affecting
distributors not approved in the country of destination
Differences in rules and technical norms applying to
petroleum products
Obstacles as the result of the existence of oil
monopolies
France has limitations on the entry into its territory of crude oil and products imported
directly from non-Community countries. The creation of an internal space without frontiers
makes it necessary to develop common arrangements and a common policy for trade in
oil and petroleum products with non-Community countries. (44)
France [and Spain]...require their oil reinfers to accept oil which has been acquired by the
State. The policy of state-to-state procurement of oil grew up in the years of the oil crisis
as a means of ensuring a country's oil supplies. In the present, and foreseeable, state of
the oil market it is no longer warranted." (45)
No longer allowed. (45)
No longer allowed. The adaptation of oil monopolies has so far affected only commerical
aspects, in particular the liberalization of trade in refined products between Member
States. The monopoly in refining...has remained outside the scope of the various
adjustments of monopolies. (46)
In these member states legislation relating to oil provides for a special status for
importers/wholesale distributors of oil products. (48)
Harmonization required.
To complete the adaptation of commercial monopolies.. import restrictions, import
licenses, and price systems and to review certain provisions concerning the monopolies
which are at present accepted, exclusive right of refiningm exclusive right of marketing
national Droducts. and orohibition of cross-frontier deliveries. (54-551
By the time the Commission made these recommendations, however, the major
actors that supported and benefited from the policies of national control were willing to
accept European directives in petroleum, as noted above. The decision to abolish the
system of fixed prices and licensing that had been at the center of the 1928 system, in the
final analysis, were therefore carried out as the codification of a set of regulatory changes
107 , "The Community Oil Market, Its Oil Refining Industry, and the External Trade in Petroleum Products," ed.
Commission of the European Communities (1986), 29.
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that had already occurred, rather than a new and contentious initiative. The redrawing of
the law of 1928 into the 1992 law governing the petroleum sector, and the privatization of
the national flag firms that had been at the center of the French strategy, therefore
proceeded with little opposition. Rather than attempting to retain articles in the legislation
that maintained barriers to market entry designed to support French national firms, or
resist directives from the European Commission, therefore, debate within the DGH on the
new legislation designed to govern the oil sector focused on more mundane issues of
ensuring compatibility with exiting laws, and ensuring consistent use of language. 108
Why was this process so orderly? As I have shown above, this outcome is
attributable to the changes in policy strategies of both firms and state actors, neither of
whom saw benefit in maintaining strategic intervention. In the case of the firms, the
response to the oil shocks of the 1970s and subsequent collapse in demand within France
was to seek market share elsewhere, and diversify out of the petroleum sector in the case
of Elf-Aquitaine. State ownership of the firms proved a hindrance to these objectives, as
did the restrictions on pricing and licensing structure that had given them market share.
They therefore welcomed the jettisoning of strategic control, and at times lobbied for it to
be moved forward.
108 Senior policy maker in oil sector, interview with author, Paris, France, August 20, 2008.
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For state actors, the cause of the shift of policy strategies was more varied. First,
the shift in the structure of the international petroleum market made the existing system
of fixed prices untenable, which acted as a shock leading to a review of overall policy. It
also directly led to the jettisoning of the fixed-price regime in favor of a floating price
regime. The Directorate of Hydrocarbons, which had traditionally championed the
interests of the national firms within the system of dirigisme, therefore supported the
relaxation of prices, in line with the position of Elf and Total. The Ministry of Finance
also supported price liberalization as crude prices began to recede, believing this would
help control inflation.
These changes directly related to the petroleum sector were added to by the
general shift in strategy of state actors towards the question of how best to achieve
economic growth and macroeconomic stability. The privatization of Elf-Aquitaine and
Total, for example, came about as part of a larger program of privatization, and the
entrance of the Chirac government to power in 1986 was followed closely by the
beginning of the dismantling of the delegated state monopoly that had played a crucial
role in securing market share for the national firms. Finally, European institutions,
notably the Directorate General of Competition and the European Commission, played a
role in the liberalization of the delegated state monopoly, which had been managed
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through the system of licensing.
It is also important to note that there was no opposition to these proposed
changes by those who had previously benefited from the institutions of national control.
In other words, there were no domestic actors willing to defend the status-quo against the
proposed transformation of the policies of national control. Renegotiation of the existing
policy therefore led smoothly to its transformation, rather than its adjustment as occurred
in the case of Japan and the United States. This also meant that the idea of strategic
control, as reflected in these policies, was jettisoned in favor of a new equilibrium
focused on Europe as a response to the ongoing reliance on external markets for the
supply of petroleum. For France oil became a commodity - certainly one with political
implications - but nevertheless a commodity, rather than a strategic good requiring the
intervention of the state in order to ensure national control.
4. Europe, Prices and Policy: 2001-2006
As shown above, the idea of strategic intervention was given shape through
national policies adopted in France, as in Japan. The policies of both countries shared a
common origin in the attempt to regain control over the domestic market from non-
national firms, and to extend the control of national-flag firms over reserves of petroleum
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located internationally. This strategy enjoyed the support of both state actors and firms,
and in both cases they proved remarkably durable.
The common thread of the national petroleum policies of the two countries
continued into the 2000s. Japan passed a Basic Law on Energy in 2003, mandating the
creation of a Shin Kokka Enerugii Senryaku, or 'New National Energy Strategy,' every
three years, as noted in chapter three. Similarly, the French parliament passed in 2005 a
law titled Strategie energetique Nationale, or 'National Energy Strategy' (Law 2005-
781), designed to promote energy security of supply, as well as shape markets in order to
achieve environmental goals. It had four major goals: 1) controlling energy demand; 2)
diversifying fuels; 3) developing energy related research and development; 4) ensuring
the stability of energy transmission and storage networks. 9
The crucial difference, however, between the new strategies announced in the
French and Japanese energy laws, lay in the rejection of the need for national control as a
means to achieve petroleum security of supply in the case of France. Indeed, the
commitment to protect the domestic market and promote French exploration and
production internationally were absent from the new legislative regime. Further, there
was no attempt to regain control over the newly integrated major Total. Indeed, the
109 M M. Roggenkamp et al., Energy Law in Europe: National, EU, and International Regulation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 531.
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French government in the 2001-2006 period has continued to reduce its shareholding in
energy firms more generally, including in EDF and GdF.
Instead, limiting growth in the demand for energy was named as the first and
most important goal in the strategy, with a target established of improving energy
intensity (the amount of energy required to produce a unit of GDP) by two percent
annually by 2015, and 2.5 percent by 2030. This was to be achieved through a mix of
regulations, voluntary commitments and the provision of information to consumers. The
second major goal - fuel diversification - was to be achieved through further research
into nuclear reactor technologies, and development of renewable energies. France's 2005
energy strategy, therefore, applies a range of policy instruments in order to manage
failures in energy markets stemming both from market structure, and from environmental
externalities associated with the burning of fossil fuels.
In Japan, as in France, the new energy strategy promoted the ongoing
investments in fuels that act as a substitute for petroleum products such as nuclear power.
Japan also promoted investment into technologies that could serve to reduce the share of
petroleum products in the transportation sector, where they continued to dominate
consumption. The most significant difference, however, lay in the reinvigoration of the
institutions designed to enhance strategic control over the petroleum supply chain:
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national control remained a feature of Japanese policy landscape in the petroleum sector.
This chapter has shown that the crucial difference in the case of France is the
shift in policy preferences of both firms, and state actors, for the policy of national
control, in contrast to Japan, where firms, and state actors, continued to support these
policies. As we shall see in the next chapter on the United States, national control - under
the moniker of Energy Independence - also remained a feature of U.S. policy despite
adjustments to the existing set of policies driven by changes in the international
petroleum market.
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Chapter Six - The United States
"the interests of the [U.S.] companies were basically identical with the U.S.
national interest - ... the measures necessary to assure the United States and its
allies a secure source of crude oil at reasonable prices could safely be left to the
companies."
"Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy,"
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate,
January 2, 1975, 15.
1. Outline
In this chapter I extend my analysis of policy adjustment and transformation in
petroleum markets to the United States. I show that policies promoting strategic
intervention were implemented in the United States, as in Japan and France. Further, in
common with the case of Japan, and in contrast to France, I find that the changes wrought
in the 1970s and 1980s to U.S. petroleum policies represented a case of adjustment rather
than transformation; strategic intervention remained a goal of petroleum policies, but the
instruments used to pursue this goal were restructured rather than abandoned. I suggest
these adjustments were made because of the effects of changes in the structure of the
petroleum market on the policy strategies adopted by state actors and firms.
The relationship between state actors and domestic industry in the case of the
United States has been more arms length than Japan and France. Unlike in the latter two
countries, in which the state played an important role in establishing and building up a
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domestic petroleum industry, in the United States policy intervention in the petroleum
sector emerged after the industry was already an important part of the industrial
landscape. Firms preceded the state, rather than the state creating firms.
As imports overtook exports, however, federal government interest in security
of petroleum supplies became a component of state interests; as noted by Katz, "from the
very beginning of America's dependence on oil, concern had been expressed about the
consequences if the supply was interrupted." The existence of domestic resources in the
case of the United States meant that the policy focus was not on developing firms capable
of competing internationally, however, as French and Japanese decisionmakers were
forced to do. Instead U.S. policymakers concentrated on enhancing national control by
increasing the ratio of domestic production relative to total consumption."
The pursuit of greater domestic production was supported by firms. This is
notably so for independents - firms that produced the majority of their crude within the
continental United States. They lobbied the federal government to introduce policies that
promoted domestic production."'
110 James Everett Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy (New Brunswick, N.J., U.S.A.: Transaction Books,
1984), 12-13.
I' The difference in the production profiles of independents and the U.S. majors, and its effect on their policy
preferences, is also noted by Milner. Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and
International Relations, Princeton Paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 160.
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In this chapter I show that the result of this matching of state actor and industry
interests was the imposition of quotas on the import of crude oil, first implemented under
the Eisenhower Administration. This policy strategy matched the preferences of both
state actors and firms. For the former, a rise in crude oil imports driven by the increase in
production in the Middle East was taken as a threat to security of petroleum supplies. For
many firms in the U.S. petroleum industry, on the other hand, imports represented a
competitive threat. Both sought to limit imports of crude oil, therefore, in the name of
enhancing security of petroleum supplies.
Other policies were implemented in the name of national control. First, import
restraints were augmented by price controls. These were originally introduced on crude
and crude products in order to control inflation, and were matched by price controls
across the U.S. economy as a whole. In the case of the petroleum sector, however,
controls were retained after others had been abandoned, and were adjusted in order to
promote domestic production. Second, regulatory powers retained by the federal
government were used to control the exploration and production of crude oil on federal
lands, and remained the focus of political battles over the merits of increasing strategic
control over petroleum.
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Significant changes were made to the policies of strategic intervention between
the 1970s and 2000s. Most importantly, trade restrictions promoting domestic production
were abandoned, as were price controls. Divisions within Congress, and the division
between the executive and legislature in the case of the United States, meant these
decisions were fraught; each president considered in this chapter introduced a major
policy statement on energy at the start of his tenure, and each was forced to accept a
watered down version of his initial proposals following the legislative process within
Congress. Despite this, however, national control - under the banner of energy
independence - remained a component of petroleum policy.
2. Industry Preferences and Policy Strategies
That strategic intervention played a role in U.S. policy setting at all is
surprising: of the advanced industrial states the United States is one of the few with
significant domestic petroleum resources. Indeed, until 1930 U.S. firms maintained a
market share of the world petroleum market of between twenty and thirty percent, and the
United States itself was self-sufficient in the supply of petroleum.112
112 Harold Francis Williamson, The American Petroleum Industry, Northwestern University Studies in Business
History (Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1959), 246, 509.
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World Crude Production 1929-1960
(Unit: millions of barrels)
1929 1937 1949 1960
Indonesia 39.3 56.5 44.9 150.5
Libya & Algeria 0 0 0 67.2
Middle East 42.9 117.5 511.4 1926.4
United States 1007.3 1279.2 1841.9 2574.9
USSR 99.5 193.2 232.2 1080.4
Venezuela 137.5 186.2 482.3 1041.7
Total 1326.5 1832.6 3112.7 6841.1
Source: Cowhey, p. 83
Zone, Qatar and Saudi Arabia
Despite the early dominance of U.S. production in the world oil market,
industry support for some form of strategic intervention increased over time. In
particular, for industry there was a bifurcation between the integrated oil majors that
retained significant international interests, and the independents noted above, which
produced crude oil mainly within the United States. These firms were threatened by the
rise in cheap exports from the Middle East, providing them with an incentive for seeking
protection against imports. This was most notable for the independent producers, which
were in direct competition with imports. For the U.S. majors on the other hand, the
industrial association they were a member of - the American Petroleum Institute (API) -
also supported the quota on imports, although the position of member firms was not
uniformly in support of this policy. Following the nationalizations of production in the
OPEC countries, access to hydrocarbons upstream became a more important focus. This
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made federal licensing over lands with potential petroleum resources an important focus
of industry interest.
1.2 State Actor Preferences and Policy Strategies
For state actors, the existence of domestic petroleum resources and strong
separation of the executive and legislature made decisionmaking more complex than in
the cases of Japan and France." 3 The fragmentation of power between the executive and
legislature, in particular, decreased the coherence of decisionmaking in energy policy by
increasing the possible number of veto players towards any presidential proposal; each
president entered office proposing a comprehensive energy policy, and each was forced
to compromise on significant portions of their initial proposal. Further, although each
president has typically taken the lead on energy policymaking, there is less continuity
given eight year terms, than in the cases of France and Japan, in which the major
ministries with competency for energy policy have provided a greater degree
policymaking stability across time.
Yet despite these differences in institutions and domestic resources, strategic
intervention remained a component of the policy strategies adopted by state actors. In
113 Richard H. K. vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business Government Relations, Studies in
Economic History and Policy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 350.
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explaining this outcome, I follow Ikenberry by choosing primarily to focus on the
presidency." 4 I do this for two reasons. First, the most important laws implementing
strategic intervention in the case of the United States have been applied through the
president, who has been conferred this power by Congress. Under the Trade Agreements
Extension Act of 1954, for example, the president was given the power to limit imports in
the name of national security. This control was passed to the Department of the Interior
(Dol) during the tenure of President Johnson, but returned to the White House with
President Nixon.
Second, the framing of petroleum policy as a national security issue gives the
president a central role in agenda setting in petroleum policymaking given his mandate to
act in the national interest.' '5 Further, the president has more prosaic reasons for making
strategic intervention a component of petroleum policymaking; increasing domestic
production has remained popular among the voting population as a solution to volatility
in the petroleum sector. This provides the president with an incentive to respond to public
concerns by promoting increasing domestic petroleum production.
14 G. John Ikenberry, "Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil
Decontrol," International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988).
"1s Brandice Canes-Wrone, Who Leads Whom?: Presidents, Policy, and the Public, Studies in Communication, Media,
and Public Opinion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 7. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the
Modern Presidents : The Politics of Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1990).
Further, in relation to petroleum policies, the interests of individual congressmen from petroleum producing states tend
to map to the policy preferences of industry. Examining the policy preferences of firms through the major industry
associations is therefore adequate. See Douglas R. Bohi and Milton Russell, Limiting Oil Imports : An Economic
History andAnalysis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 108.
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1.3 State and Firm Relations
The relationship between the president and the petroleum industry has been
more adversarial than that between state actors and firms in the cases of France and
Japan, as noted above (although it has by no means been wholly harmonious in these
countries either). Firms, for example, have worked to actively shape the policies adopted
by the state through Congress, where congressional leaders in states with significant
domestic petroleum resources have championed the causes of the industry domestically.
The major oil firms have also been targets of presidential criticism during periods of high
oil prices.
Yet despite these differences with France and Japan, the argument made in
chapter two accurately captures outcomes in the case of the United States. President have
continued to remain committed to strategic intervention as a response to the reliance on
international markets for the supply of petroleum. For presidents strategic intervention
also made sense not only because of fears of supply disruptions, but also because strong
public support for energy independence gave them the incentive to continue to pursue
such policies.' Given this support for liberalization of the petroleum sector represented a
116 This was also the case with ethanol, where public support for indigenizing production, coupled with industry
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restructuring, rather than a rejection, of the policies of national control. For industry, on
the other hand, strategic intervention promoting domestic production helped them attain
commercial goals. It is this matching of interests, that meant that increasing domestic
production of petroleum remained a feature of policy outcomes in the case of the United
States.
As with the other empirical chapters, I begin by describing initial conditions in
the U.S. petroleum sector. I then go on to outline changes in strategic intervention over
time.
3. Initial Conditions
The early industry within the United States was dominated by John D.
Rockefeller's Standard Oil holding company and its subsidiaries. Standard Oil enjoyed
ninety percent market share of domestic petroleum products in 1899, and set prices for
crude, with its competitors following."7 Standard Oil's grip over the industry did not last,
however, for two reasons. First, new fields in Kansas, Oklahoma, California, the Gulf
Coast, and elsewhere, reduced barriers to market entry. This is demonstrated by the
sport, led to wide-ranging subsidies for agricultural producers of corn.
Williamson, The American Petroleum Industry, 235.
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emergence of new producers. By 1925, for example, Texas Company (5.9%), Sinclair
(5%), Gulf (4.8%), Shell-Union (4.4%) and Tidewater (3.4%), which each went on to
gain significant shares of the domestic gasoline market, which became the largest market
across petroleum products.' Second, despite this gradual loss of market share, the
Standard Oil holding company was ordered dissolved in 1911 by a decision of the
Supreme Court, which determined that it had contravened the 1890 Sherman Act on anti-
trust.'1 9 The structure of firms in the United States therefore became bifurcated, with a
divide between the progeny of Standard Oil, which dominated the early industry and
became vertically integrated in the early years of the industry, and the so-called
"independents" - firms such as Gulf Oil, Texaco, and Sun Oil - which took advantage of
new discoveries in East Texas, Oklahoma and elsewhere to enter the domestic U.S.
market, but which maintained limited operations internationally.
Policy in the earliest years of the industry was established in a piecemeal
fashion, and was primarily designed to curb over-production. It included both state and
federal components. At the state level, policies limiting production through the regulation
of drilling and well operation were introduced in oil producing states from 1919, when
118 Norman E. Nordhauser, The Quest for Stability: Domestic Oil Regulation, 1917-1935, Modem American History
(New York: Garland, 1979), iii.
119 For a review see Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964 (Pittsburgh: 1968), 14-15.
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the Texas Railroad Commission declared wells should be spaced at least forty feet
apart."' At the federal level, policy initiatives in the 1920s were of three types. The first
promoted voluntary cooperation between firms and the state in order to restrain
production. This took the form of the Federal Oil Conservation Board (FOCB), which
was created on December 18, 1924 as the key policy body for setting federal oil policy. 21
The second was to adjust the tax regime to assist oil producers. This was done by
adjusting depletion allowances to 27.5 percent, which represented a subsidy for oil
producers.2 2 Finally, licenses were used to regulate production on federal lands, when an
executive order was signed by President William Taft in 1909 setting aside three million
acres of public land in California and Wyoming for the federal government." 3
Cooperation between government and industry over managing the supply of
petroleum was not restricted to the domestic market. State actors also used diplomatic
and regulatory instruments to secure access to petroleum supplies in the Middle East and
the Dutch East Indies for U.S. firms, which were dominated by Anglo-Persian (later
British Petroleum) and Royal Dutch Shell (later Shell). The State Department, for
2 0 Ibid., 15.
121 williamson, The American Petroleum Industry, 310.
122 The depletion allowance is a component of tax law that determines the amount producers of exhaustible resources
can deduct from gross income in recognition of the reduction of assets. Setting a higher depletion allowance reduces the
amount of income subject to taxation, thereby increasing the incentive to produce. On the FOCB see Nash, United
States Oil Policy 1890-1964, 87.
123 Ibid., 17.
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example, protested the signing of the San Remo Agreement by the United Kingdom and
France."14 State actors also used domestic regulatory instruments in order to obtain access
for firms. In the 1920s, for example, the Department of the Interior used the Mineral
Leasing Act to refuse drilling licenses rights to Shell unless the Dutch government gave
reciprocal rights to U.S. firms in the Dutch East Indies, from where they had been
excluded. In 1928 Shell was recognized as an equal under the act after Jersey Standard
subsidiary Koloniale was granted access to the Djambi fields in Central Sumatra."15 For
state actors, this aggressive international diplomacy was driven partially by fears of
falling domestic production. For the U.S. firms that dominated world trade in oil
products, on the other hand, gaining a share of growing international crude production
was necessary for them to retain their dominant trading position in world markets.12
Initial efforts by state and federal governments to regulate domestic production
were consolidated in the late 1920s and 1930s. In 1929 President Hoover issued an
executive order halting the issuing of new leases for drilling on federal lands. The
problem, however, was that oil production from these lands made up only ten percent of
124 Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 2nd ed.
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005), 17-18.
125 Ibid., 29.
126 william Stivers, "International Politics and Iraqi Oil, 1918-1928," The Business History Review 55, no. 4 (1981).
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national production."1 7 At the state level, the Texas Railroad Commission ordered
production limited to 750,000 barrels per day within the area of their jurisdiction in
August 1930. Their initiative was followed in Oklahoma.12 s Like the constraints imposed
on drilling on federal lands, attempts to restrain production implemented at the state level
were bound to fail, however, because of the lack of controls on petroleum flows in and
out of oil producing states.
This failure demonstrated that restraining production required placing limits not
only on federal lands or within individual states, but also limiting the transportation of
petroleum between states and controlling imports. The latter was provided through the
1932 imposition of an import tariff, which was set at twenty-one cents per barrel. It led to
an immediate reduction in imports.12 9 Industry supported a tariff on imports of crude in
order to prop up domestic production and gain relief from competition from imports. 3 0
The former was carried out through the curbing of the transport of oil from state-to-state
under Clause 9b of Roosevelt's National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA), passed as part
of the New Deal in June 1933. This was changed to the Interstate Compact to Conserve
127 For details see Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 100-104.
128 Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964, 115-117.
129 This was a significant amount. Crude prices at the time were between thirty-one cents per barrel (1933) and eighteen
cents (1937). Ed Shaffer, The Oil Import Program of the United States; an Evaluation (New York,: F. A. Praeger,
1968), 10-11.13 0 vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business Government Relations, 92.
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Oil and Gas (also known as the "Connally, or Hot Oil Act") after the Supreme Court
struck down NIRA as unconstitutional in 1935. The Connally Act authorized the
Department of the Interior to regulate interstate oil shipments, and made it an offense to
ignore the state quota settings established by the Texas Railroad Commission.1 3 ' The
Connally Act formed the basis of federal regulation of the sector until the outbreak of
World War Two.
Authority was centralized in the hands of the government during World War
Two, in common with other industrialized countries. In May 1941 President Roosevelt
established the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense, later renamed
the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for War, and then in December 1942 the
Petroleum Administration for War (PAW). It retained statutory authority for coordinating
the production, transportation and distribution of petroleum. Pricing was left in the
control of the Office of Price Administration.1 12
PAW was granted the authority to create a public firm through which to directly
intervene in the petroleum sector on strategic grounds. The firm was named the
131 Williamson, The American Petroleum Industry, 548-9. Interestingly, the military were disinterested in oil from a
security standpoint at this time. The Department of War, for example, did not include oil in its list of strategic
materials. The director of the planning branch stated that "as oil is one of these materials for which we consider the
domestic supply ample, we have not prepared elaborate plans for restrictive control." Randall, United States Foreign
Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 82-83.
132 Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 166-67.
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Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC), and was created on June 26, 1943. It was tasked
with acquiring foreign oil reserves."3 As Randall puts it, the establishment of the PRC
was backed by "an important consensus in 1943 among civilian and military
policymakers and significant segments of the petroleum industry that vigorous support
for American enterprise abroad was essential for private enterprise to retain its foreign
concessions, and for the United States to ensure American security and economic vitality
in the postwar era."134
Truman nevertheless largely dismantled to wartime controls
production, distribution and pricing of petroleum following the end of the war."5 The
wartime experience did leave two lasting institutional legacies, however. First, the Oil
and Gas Division was created within the Department of the Interior, with the role of
drafting legislation relevant to the petroleum and natural gas sectors.'36 Second, the
National Petroleum Council (NPC), which was established during the war as the main
coordinating body between the government and private sector firms, remained in place as
13 Ibid., 172.
134 Opposed, however were the independents because the PRC privileged international over domestic oil in policy. See
Ibid., 131-2. See also Michael B. Stoff, "The Anglo-American Oil Agreement and the War-Time Search for Foreign
Policy," Business History Review 55 (1981), 67-8.
135 Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964, 189-90.
136 Ibid., 185.
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over the
an advisory body to the Secretary of the Interior. It was made up of business leaders from
across the major petroleum producing firms, refiners, trade associations and others." 7
Despite this retrenchment of policy intervention in the petroleum sector under
Truman, the 1950s saw the most significant peacetime increase in government
intervention in the sector. This occurred in two ways. First, through the establishment of a
quota system over the import of petroleum and petroleum products; and second, the
assignation of property rights to the outer continental shelf to the Federal Government
through the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act in May 1953.138 Both played an significant
role in future debate over national control over petroleum.
The emergence of trade controls as a policy issue emerged in the 1950s because
of changes in the structure of the international petroleum market, most notably the
increase in production from the Middle East, which caused a significant increase in
imports of crude oil into the United States. Imports doubled between 1945 and 1950,
caused by the growth in Middle Eastern production, and the push of the U.S. majors into
international markets. The United States became a net importer for the first time since
WWI in 1948.'
137 Ibid., 186.
138 Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945 : A Study of Business Government Relations, 18-19.
139 Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964, 202; Thomas W. Zeiler, "Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade
Doctrine," The Business History Review 62, no. 2 (1990), 289. Shaffer, The Oil Import Program of the United States;
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In response to the rise in imports as a share of aggregate petroleum
consumption, President Eisenhower set up a Commission on Energy Supplies and
Resource Policy in order to study how to shape an energy policy that provided for
national defense, economic growth, and security of supplies, on July 30, 1954. It
concluded on February 26, 1955 that imports of petroleum should be voluntarily
restricted to the same ratio of imports to domestic production recorded in 1954 on
national security grounds. 140 The IPAA, along with other industry associations, initiated
the process leading to the establishment of quotas on imports in 1957 by petitioning the
ODM in 1955 to take formal action on oil imports, using the national security clause in
the 1955 Trade Act as justification.14 ' Later that year the Office of Defense Management
(ODM) threatened to recommend to the President that curbs on imports be implemented
on national security grounds because of the ongoing growth in imports of crude and
residual fuel oil.14 2
The Suez Canal incident of 1956 delayed action by ODM on the question of
imports until mid-1957. When it recommended to the president that imports may be a
an Evaluation, 15 has a list of the concessions held by U.S. firms.
140 Associated Press, "Cabinet to Study US Energy Hoard," New York Times, July 31, 1954, Charles E. Egan, "Panel
Seeks Curb of Federal Rule for Natural Gas," New York Times, February 27, 1955.
141 Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business Government Relations, 105. For details of the
industry position see page 134.
142 unknown, "O.D.M Threatens Oil Import Curbs," New York Times, September 14, 1955; Staff reporter, "O.D.M
Threatens Oil Import Curbs," New York Times, September 14, 1955.
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threat to national security - the first such action under section seven of the Trade
Agreements Extension from 1955 of the Reciprocal Trade Act - the president ordered a
study be conducted of these recommendations. Its findings reflected the fact that
projected imports stood at 17.4 percent of domestic production, significantly greater than
the ten percent from 1954. The ODM report to the president made clear the link drawn
between imports and national security concerns:
"The investigation clearly established that the rate of imports could reach a point at which
the incentive for exploration and development in this country would be so reduced as to
make us dependent on overseas oil supplies to meet our national energy requirement.
Further, the investigation gave substantial to a finding that a significant increase in
imports...would threaten this impairment in our national security.143
On July 29, 1957, President Eisenhower responded by calling for voluntary
constraints on imports of twenty percent, which would serve to reduce imports to ten
percent of total 1954 consumption - the amount initially identified as the line beyond
which U.S. national security was impaired. The voluntary restraints were managed by a
newly created Oil Imports Administration (OIA) within the Department of Interior. By
February 1958, however, the Administration judged that voluntary import restraints were
failing, and increased the sanctions for non-compliance by excluding firms from
government purchases of crude and crude products.144 A mandatory system of import
143 Richard E. Mooney, "President Plans Oil Import Study; Sees Peril to Us," New York Times, April 26, 1957 1957,
unknown, "U.S. Renews Study of Oil Import Curb," New York Times, March 7, 1957; Staff reporter, "U.S. Renews
Study of Oil Import Curb," New York Times, March 7, 1957.
144 Richard E. Mooney, "New Curb Studied on Imports of Oil," New York Times, February 9, 1958; Richard E.
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controls was then imposed on March 10, 1959 that required imports of crude and crude
products to be equivalent of those of 1957, with import licenses issued by the Secretary
of the Interior.145 The Secretary, in turn, was charged with controlling the issuing of
licenses so that imports of petroleum and petroleum products did not exceed a
predetermined amount.146
The IPAA, along with other industry associations, strongly supported the
implementation of the quota system in 1957, as well as the shift to mandatory quotas in
1959. 147 Controls were justified in law under the national security provisions of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of 1954. The mix of public and private purpose was made
explicit in the statement made by the president in announcing the program:
"The new program is designed to insure a stable, healthy industry in the United
States.. .The basis of the new program, like that for the voluntary program, is the certified
requirements of our national security which make it necessary that we preserve to the
greatest extent possible a vigorous, healthy petroleum industry in the United States." 48
Domestic firms were split on the merits of the mandatory scheme. The most
influential non-governmental organization supporting the change was the Independent
Petroleum Association of America (IPAA), as noted above, which argued that increased
Mooney, "Eisenhower Sets Oil Import Curbs," New York Times, March 28, 1958.
145 Felix Beliar Jr., "All Oil Imports under Hard Curb," New York Times, March 11, 1959.
146 Nash, United States Oil Policy 1890-1964, 203-06. For a detailed outline of the structure and operation of the
program see Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business Government Relations, 119-145.
147 Bohi and Russell, Limiting Oil Imports: An Economic History andAnalysis, 43, 54.
148 Cited in Ibid., 67.
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imports harmed national security.1 4 9 Consumer groups, on the other hand, opposed import
barriers on the principle that they were likely to increase end-user costs."'
The position of U.S. firms with substantial international reserves was
ambivalent. On the one hand, restrictions on imports threatened flexibility by harming the
competitiveness of oil produced internationally and imported into the United States. On
the other hand, many of these firms continued to hold significant domestic reserves, and
therefore stood to gain from the imposition of controls over imports. Further, opposing
import quotas was likely to impose political costs by drawing the ire of congressional
representatives from oil producing states who were influential across a wide range of
regulatory issues associated with energy policy. Given this, the position the integrated
U.S. majors eventually came to support the imposition of controls, as reflected in the
NPC report of 1966."'
This program of mandatory import quotas was maintained for fourteen years,
and remained the centerpiece of the attempt to enhance national control over petroleum
resources. Its demise came as a result of a change in market structure - specifically an
irreversible fall in U.S. production, followed by the price increases of the 1970s. This left
149 Staff reporter, "President Decrees Federal Policing of Oil Prices and Orders Curbs on Imports," Wall Street Journal,
March 11, 1959.5 0 Bohi and Russell, Limiting Oil Imports: An Economic History and Analysis, 101.
15s Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study of Business Government Relations, 134.
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the federal government with the more limited instrument of manipulating the leasing of
federal lands in order to boost domestic production.
No significant changes were made through the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations. As Barber notes: "In the 1960s the concerns of a decade earlier about
the long-run adequacy of energy supplies for a growing American economy had largely
vanished... In this environment it was understandable that little urgency was attached to
the formulation of a comprehensive energy policy for the longer term."" 2 Under the
Kennedy Administration Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall ordered a review of
the program, as did the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM)."3 Although
some evidence suggests President Kennedy opposed to the quota system, these reviews
did not lead to major changes, in part because Kennedy saw benefit in promoting his
broader policy agenda by maintaining existing policy." 4 Under the Johnson
Administration no significant changes were made despite a probe held by the Department
of the Interior (Dol) into the program, other than decision by Johnson to shift the
152 William J. Barber, "Studied Inaction in the Kennedy Years," in Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems,
Yesterday's Solutions, ed. Craufurd D. W. Goodwin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), 287.
153 Staff reporter, "Agency to Study Impact of Fuel Oil Imports on National Security " Wall Street Journal, May 22,
1961.
, "Oil Import Quotas Set by President " Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1962. For a review of crude oil
policies during the Kennedy Administration see Thomas W. Zeiler, "Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade
Doctrine." The Business History Review 62, no. 2 (1990), 286-3 10.
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responsibility for national oil policy to Dol in order to avoid the appearance of potential
conflict of interest given his Texas roots.'"
2.1 Changes in Market Structure
Two changes in market structure in the petroleum market caused adjustments in
the policies of strategic intervention in the United States. First, the peaking of U.S.
production meant that it became impossible to maintain controls on the importation of
crude oil without forcing price rises, given growing domestic demand for petroleum
products. Second, as with France and Japan, the oil shocks led state actors to review the
existing policy regime because of its effects on the status quo.
2.2 Fall in U.S. Production
The system of quotas was predicated on U.S. production being able to meet
demand without causing significant price increases. As the graph below shows, after
steep increases in production throughout the beginning and middle of the twentieth
155 , "Dealing with the Oil Lobby," New York Times, December 19, 1963. The only other adjustment made was
the abolition of import restrictions on heavy oil because of inflationary pressures. See William M. Blair, "Import Curbs
Ended on Heavy Fuel Oil " New York Times, March 26, 1966 1966. On the Johnson Administration's policies in oil in
general see James L. Cochrane, "Energy Policy in the Johnson Administration: Logical Order Versus Economic
Pluralism," in Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions, ed. Craufurd D. W. Goodwin
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981).
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century, the production of crude oil peaked in 1970, and then began to decline. This stood
in contrast to domestic consumption, which continued to grow significantly over the same
period. A gap therefore emerged between consumption, and the capacity of domestic
production to provide adequate supplies at reasonable prices. This fall did not mean an
immediate decline in U.S. production, which remained substantial as can be seen.
Nevertheless, it meant that it became increasingly difficult to maintain restrictions on
imports while keeping prices constant.
Reflecting this, in January 1973 - prior to the embargo of April 1973 -
President Nixon's Secretary for the Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, testified that price
increases within the United States were likely not only because of changes in the
structure of supply internationally as OPEC members asserted control first over pricing,
and then ownership over upstream resources, but also because of the inability of domestic
production to meet growing demand.156 This meant that policy adjustment was inevitable,
and began with the Nixon Administration, prior to the first oil shock, as described below.
156 Thomas O'Toole, "Oil Import Rule Change Urged " Washington Post, January 11, 1973. Bohi and Vietor make the
same point about the depletion of domestic reserves ultimately dooming the system of import quotas. Bohi and Russell,
Limiting Oil Imports : An Economic History andAnalysis, 193-201. See also Ikenberry, "Market Solutions for State
Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil Decontrol," 154. A second effect limit the capacity
of U.S. production to make up for shortfalls in supply from other locations, as it did during the Suez Crisis.
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U.S. Crude Production and Consumption: 1860-2001
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2.3 Effects of Oil Shocks
The second significant change was the oil shocks of 1973-4 and 1978-9. The
effects of the oil shocks on the domestic economy was conditioned by the wage and price
freezes put into place under the Nixon Administration on August 15, 1971, which were
designed to combat inflation. These were gradually loosened for most goods and services
by 1973, however price regulations remained in place for both oil and oil products, and
became permanent with the passing of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA)
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of 1973. This remained in place until dismantled in 1981 under the Carter Administration,
although price ceilings for most products were removed over the 1976 to 1979 period.157
The general effects of the oil shocks was to worsen an already difficult
inflationary environment. Oil import costs, for example, increased from 8.5 billion U.S.
dollars in 1973 to 25.2 billion the following year.158 The effects on the industry, on the
other hand, were more diverse because of the price controls, as noted below. The largest
U.S. firms with production facilities profited from the increase in crude prices driven by
the embargo.
Net Corporate Income of Five Largest U.S. Majors and Independents
Oct. 1, 1972 - Oct. 1, 1973 -
Sept. 30, 1973 Sept. 30, 1974
Total - 5 domestic independents 1377.5 2645.8
Percent Increase over previous year 92
Total - 5 international majors 5397.4 8422.6
Percent Increase over previous year 56
Note:
Independents: Richfield, Philipps Petroleum, Shell Oil (U.S.), Standard Oil (Indiana, Union Oil (Cal.)
Majors: Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, Socal, Texaco
Source: "Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy," p. 162.
There was strong support within Congress for maintaining price controls
because of the benefits they conferred on users of petroleum products. Dedicated refiners
also benefited. For some domestic producers operating in the petroleum sector, on the
157 Joseph P. Kalt, "The Creation, Growth, and Entrenchment of Special Interests in Oil Price Policy," Harvard
Institution ofEconomic Research Discussion Paper Series 939 (1982). See also Ikenberry, "Market Solutions for State
Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil Decontrol."
158 Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, "Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy," ed. United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
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other hand, the price controls reduced their ability to take advantage of higher crude
prices.
As Ikenberry notes, the controls themselves failed to increase the ratio of
domestic production to imports, which remained the policy strategy adopted by state
actors, and actually had the opposite effect by stimulating demand beyond what it would
have been without their imposition. This fact, combined with the inflationary pressures
caused by the rise in prices, meant that oil policy inevitably became the subject of
renegotiation between state actors and firms. 159 Below I first describe the changes in
policy, and then explain how these outcomes were a function of the changing strategies of
presidential and firm strategies, but did not reflect a rejection of strategic intervention
itself.
2.4 Policy Outcomes
Under the Nixon Administration energy policy was treated as one component of
economic policy prior to the first oil shocks. The first phase of Nixon's Economic
Stabilization Program froze prices of petroleum products and crude oil for a ninety day
period from August 15, 1971, along with wages and prices for other goods. The goal of
159 Ikenberry, "Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics of American Oil
Decontrol", 164.
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the initiative was to restrain inflation, and was enabled by the Economic Stabilization
Act. In the case of petroleum, however, prices were not relaxed along with other
products, but rather controls remained in place until January 1981 under the provisions of
the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) (enacted in November 1973), and the
Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) of 1975.160
A second significant change implemented prior to the 1973 oil shock was the
restructuring of the mandatory quotas on oil imports to exclude heating and diesel oil,
with the goal once again of easing supply constraints that were fueling inflation. This was
initially done for a period of four months from January 17, 1973. Mandatory quotas were
then replaced with a tariff, creating a system that promoted domestic production over
imports as had the system of mandatory quotas imposed by President Eisenhower, but no
longer placed an absolute constraint on the amount of crude oil or petroleum products
imported into the United States. Imports of both began to increase as a result:
160 Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy, 17-18.
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The Arab embargo of October 18, 1973 shifted the focus of energy policy from
fighting inflation, towards dealing with the implications of volatility in the petroleum
market itself. The most important initiatives undertaken by the Nixon Administration
following the OAPEC embargo were announced under the banner of Project
Independence, on November 7, 1973. The administration announced that the proposed
measures would make the United States self-sufficient in oil by 1980.'
The most important legislative initiative introduced was the EPAA. This
introduced a range of policies, however the most important in terms of oil production was
161 Ibid, 20.
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the two-tiered pricing system, under which oil prices were divided into two types: "old"
and "new" oil. Prices were fixed for "old" oil, while prices for "new" oil - that produced
from new wells, or incremental increases above April 1972 production - were allowed to
float. This was designed not only to control prices for reasons of inflation, but also to
increase the incentives for carrying out exploration and production domestically; while
price ceilings on oil produced from old wells served to limit inflation, prices charged for
oil from new production were allowed to float, meaning greater profits could be obtained
from its sale. This measure was effective in the short-term, arresting the decline in
production within the U.S. and increased exploration wells. This is shown below:
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Congressional initiatives were not limited to supporting domestic production.
Indeed, a major preoccupation of Congress in the period after the embargo and price rises
that came along with it, was to investigate charges of price gouging on the part of U.S.
industry. Most famously, the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on relations between international oil
companies and the Middle Easter producer countries, and in particular investigated
charges that the firms had been involved in establishing a global cartel to limit crude
production in order to boost prices. Although outside the bounds of this study, it is also
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worth noting that other congressional initiatives focused on reorganizing federal
institutions to enable better data gathering, and promoting federal funding of research and
development into energy.'62
The major initiative undertaken during the Ford Administration was the EPCA,
although over one thousand bills related to energy were introduced independently into the
ninety-fourth Congress that began in January 1975.163 President Ford's initial proposal,
titled the Energy Independence Act, was designed to boost domestic production and cut
imports, as well as establish a strategic petroleum reserve and other measures. The
centerpiece of his initiative to increase production was price decontrol, which would
increase the incentives for producing within the United States. When the EPCA was
finally passed it was substantially changed from the initial Ford proposals, but
nevertheless included a number of supply side and other measures designed to increase
domestic production. The incentives provided for domestic production were increased by
the decision to open lands on the OCS to exploration and production through easing
licensing procedures. Imports of crude were also taxed in order to make them
16 2 For details see Ibid.; Vietor, Energy Policy in America since 1945: A Study ofBusiness Government Relations.
163 Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy, 59.
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comparatively more expensive; at an initial rate of one dollar per barrel in February 1975,
and then an additional dollar a barrel in June.'
The second oil shock led to further changes in petroleum policies. As was the
case with the Nixon and Ford Administrations (and those of the Bush Administration,
described below) the initial proposal by the president was substantially more ambitious
than the eventual legislation that was passed. Nevertheless, strategic intervention
remained a component of the final legislation signed into law by President Carter, even
after the difficulties in the Congress.
The first initiative of the Carter Administration were implemented through the
National Energy Act, signed into law in 1978 by President Carter, which included a mix
of both supply and demand side policies. The target of the Carter proposals was reducing
U.S. dependence on imported oil - indeed, the Carter Plan measured success by the
number of barrels of oil not imported and established a target of cutting the level of 1985
imports from twelve million barrels per day to six million barrels - however the major
164 This was proposed as a strategy for limiting demand, and as a complement to supply-side measures in achieving the
goal of energy independence. Ford also began the process of decontrolling prices on "old" oil in order to cut demand
and promote production, and used the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) to decontrol prices for petroleum
products. See White House, "A Transcript of the State of the Union Message to Congress by President Ford " New York
Times January 16, 1975; william D. Smith, "Most of Oil Industry Backing Ford's Plans " New York Times, May 29,
1975.
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initiatives were in areas outside of conventional oil, focusing on the conservation of
energy, and the shift of demand away from oil and gas and towards coal.165
The second energy plan, proposed by the Carter Administration in 1979, was
similarly focused on reducing imports of oil, and included a range of supply and demand
side measures. On the supply side, for example, an Synthetic Fuels Corporation (SFC)
was created in order to create oil substitutes. Tax and other incentives were also put in
place in order to promote the development of oil shale within the United States.
The most significant change implemented under the Carter Administration,
however, was the decontrol of prices of domestically produced oil, carried out in 1975
using his authority under the EPCA. Gradual decontrol began on June 15, 1979, with total
decontrol planned for September 30, 1981. The goal of the measure was to reduce
consumption in order to cut imports. A windfall profits tax was also passed on April 2,
1980 in order to ensure that oil firms did not gain the benefits of domestic price rises,
and also provide funding for the SFC.
By the time of the Reagan Administration, therefore, major changes to the
policy regime governing the U.S. petroleum sector had already been implemented. The
165 Institutionally, the major initiative implemented under the Carter Administration was the creation of the Department
of Energy, designed to oversee energy policymaking. This followed initiatives by both Presidents Nixon and Ford, who
had proposed the creation of a similar organization but had failed to get it through Congress. The National Energy Plan
proposed by Carter was a complex set of proposals. For a summary of the major initiatives and their progress through
Congress see Katz, Congress and National Energy Policy, 102-103.
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Reagan Administration was responsible therefore for two changes relevant to the
petroleum sector. First, under his administration the date for completing price decontrols,
already mandated under the Carter Administration, were brought forward by eight
months. Second, in a sign of the ongoing intermittent debates over strategic intervention
in the United States, leasing of federal lands and the OCS was loosened.
How, then, can we explain these outcomes? Below I argue that ongoing
strategic intervention in the United States, as in the cases of Japan and France, was a
function of the policy preferences of both state actors and firms. For firms the benefits
were obvious: access to domestic hydrocarbons and increased incentives to produce
them. For the president on the other hand, aside from the obvious goal of ensuring
economic security, the decision to continue to pursue strategic intervention was driven by
the ongoing popularity of energy independence gave the presidents an incentive to
implement policies that promoted this goal, even if it was unlikely to be achieved.
2.5 State Actor Policy Preferences
There is considerable evidence to support the proposition that the policy
changes implemented in the wake of the oil shocks did not amount to a rejection of
strategic intervention. As noted above, President Nixon placed national oil policy back
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under the control of the White House soon after entering office, and immediately ordered
a review of the import quota program.' Nixon's incoming Secretary of the Interior noted
following his appointment that he intended to review the program of import quotas as a
priority.167
The Cabinet Task Force on Oil Imports was established on March 25, 1969, and
made responsible for reviewing the quotas on oil imports. It was a commission led by the
Secretary of Labor, and included the Secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Interior,
Commerce, and the Director of Emergency Preparedness. Observers also attended from
the Department of Justice, as well as the Bureau of the Budget, Council of Economic
Advisors, Office of Science and Technology, Office of the Special Trade Representative,
and Federal Power Commission.'
Rather than reject strategic intervention, the purpose of the task force was to
clarify the meaning of the statutory reference that enabled the quota on oil imports to be
put in place.169 The import quota had initially been justified under the 1954 Trade
Agreements Extension Act, as noted above, and later through section 232 of the 1962
166 Spencer Rich, "Nixon Acts on Oil Trade " Washington Post February 21, 1969.
167 Staff reporter, "U.S. Oil-Import Program to Be Reviewed, Incoming Secretary of Interior Indicates " Wall Street
Journal, December 19, 1968.
168 Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, "The Oil Import Question," (Washington, D.C.: Cabinet Task Force on
Oil Import Control, 1970), 1.
169 Ibid., 8.
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Trade Expansion Act. The task force was therefore required to examine the question of
the relationship between crude imports and national security.
In clarifying the relationship, the task force argued that interruptions to oil
supplies did not represent a threat to the operation of U.S. military forces. Instead, supply
cutoffs were noted as important because of their potential effect on defense production
and the civilian economy."' The conclusion it reached confirmed a relationship between
crude imports and national security, but argued that the quota system was poorly
designed to meet the stated goal of enhancing U.S. security of supply. The problem lay, it
concluded, in the fact that the level of imports was arbitrary and was costly to consumers,
rather than the fact the goal of national control itself was meaningless.
The task force did not recommend the abandonment of import controls. 7'
Instead, it recommended replacing quotas with a tariff system. 2 Problems had already
emerged with the system of import quotas when the price increases of 1973 functioned to
further undermine the existing institutions of strategic intervention. The head of the
170 Ibid., 30-31.
171 Ibid., 128-13 1.172
m Bohi and Russell, Limiting Oil Imports: An Economic History and Analysis, 194-5. This conclusion was opposed by
the Departments of Interior and Commerce, who opposed it on the grounds that it would be "making us dependent on
insecure foreign supplies by discouraging exploration and development." Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control,
"The Oil Import Question," 343. Around one hundred Congressmen opposed the conclusion, as did the major industry
bodies. In the face of this opposition, the recommendations of the committee were ignored, other than the
recommendation to create the Oil Policy Committee to make policy in place of the role formerly played by the
Secretary of the Interior. Bohi and Russell, Limiting Oil Imports : An Economic History and Analysis, 200.
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Office of Emergency Preparedness, George A. Lincoln, initially noted that the shift from
quota to tariff should be shelved because of instability in the international oil market.173
More drastic proposals were advanced for greater strategic intervention outside
the White House that were opposed by industry. These targeted production of crude both
domestically, with the aim of promoting further development of domestically located
resources, and internationally, in order to increase the volume of crude produced by U.S.
firms operating outside the continental United States. Adlai Stevenson III, for example,
proposed the creation of an Energy Corporation of America, which would retain
monopoly power over the development of oil projects on U.S. land, and finance the
development and purchasing of oil internationally. An alternative proposal from Senator
Henry M. Jackson advocated the creation of a National Energy Production Board, with
the power to coordinate regulatory policy in order to promote the development of
petroleum resources located within United States territory.
Nixon's initial response following the October embargo was to announce on
November 7, 1973 that the U.S. should become energy independent and develop:
"...the potential to meet our own energy needs without depending on any foreign energy
sources. Let us pledge that by 1980, under Project Independence we shall be able to
meet America's needs from America's own energy resources." 17 4
173 Edwin L. Dale Jr., "U.S. Will Retain Oil Import Quota; Rejects Tariffs," New York Times, August 18, 1970.
174 Cited in Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, "Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy,"
151.
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The conclusion of the report produced by the Project Independence team was
that energy independence for the United States was feasible in the medium term through
demand restraint and the stimulation of supply, most importantly through the decontrol of
crude oil.
Decontrol was accomplished under the Carter Administration; the inflationary
environment facing Nixon meant that price decontrol was politically not feasible.
However the Nixon White House continued to argue for the importance of boosting
domestic production, and took more limited means as an initial step. As well as
introducing the tariff scheme described above in order to promote exploration and
production within the United States, it increased leasing in federal lands in the Gulf of
Mexico, and made new refineries exempt from paying three-quarters of the tariff on
imports for the first five years of operation."5
Full price decontrol was implemented by the Carter Administration through the
1975 EPCA. The EPCA gave the president the power to set limits on increases in prices
of domestic crude to September 30, 1981. Once again the goal was to reduce imports of
oil: the White House noted that phased decontrol of prices would reduce the amount of
175 Thomas O'Toole, "Energy Plan Ends Quotas on Oil Import " Washington Post, April 19, 1973.
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oil imported in 1980 by 180,000 to 200,000 less than they otherwise would have been.'76
Indeed, during the Carter Administration the goal of this and other policies was explicitly
to reduce the consumption of imported oil: the success or failure of policies were
measured in terms of millions of barrels of oil per day not imported."7
To summarize thus far, through the Nixon, Ford, and Carter presidencies, the
instruments of strategic intervention were adjusted in ways that reduced policy
intervention in the petroleum sector: import quotas changed to tariffs, and were then
abolished completely. Price controls were also gradually abolished. By the time of the
Reagan presidency, therefore, the major adjustments to U.S. policy had already been
made in favor of liberalization. These changes did not occur because of a shift of the
policy strategy in favor of a liberal response to the problem of relying on international
markets for the supply of petroleum. Instead, the shift took place because of the failure of
the existing instruments to achieve the desired goal. Across the three presidencies,
national control remained a goal, and was promoted on the supply side. by adjusting the
policy instruments used to increase domestic production as a ratio of total domestic
consumption.
176 James L. Cochrane, "Carter Energy Policy and the Ninety-Fifth Congress," in Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's
Problems, Yesterday's Solutions, ed. Craufurd D. W. Goodwin (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981),
613.
177 Ibid., 557.
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The alternative hypothesis that the policy changes made in the petroleum market
were driven by ideational change, and represented a decisive break from strategic
intervention rather than an adjustment to changed market conditions, is found with the
Reagan Administration. Evidence shows, however, that the Reagan Administrations
effect on domestic petroleum policies were limited; the major changes in domestic
policies were already in place by the Carter Administration. Further, the collapse in oil
prices in the mid-1980s led energy independence to reemerge as a frame through which
the Administration promoted further measures to increase domestic production.
Energy policy did not play a significant role in the Reagan-Carter presidential
election, as prices were stable and had fallen from their peak of the previous year. A
spokesperson of U.S. major Chevron noted that Reagan, as a candidate "promised very
little and revealed very little, so it's a blank page."' Upon entering office the president
ordered immediate price decontrol on January 28, 1981, bringing forward the date of
determined by the Carter Administration by eight months. In an executive order,
President Reagan mandated that all crude and refined petroleum products should be
exempted from price and allocation controls implemented under the EPCA, and
178 Oil and Gas Journal, November 10, 1980.
298
instructed the Secretary of Energy to revoke all regulations affected by the order.179
Exceptions already granted to controlled oil meant, however, that the amount of crude
still subject to price controls immediately prior to the decontrol order coming into effect
amounted to approximately fifteen percent of total U.S. crude production.18 0
Aside from this, the most significant change to petroleum policies implemented
under the Reagan Administration was the relaxation of regulatory controls over the
leasing of federal lands. As noted earlier, one instrument through which the federal
government exerted influence over production levels within the United States was control
over the leasing of land within the continental United States or in the OCS. According to
an American Petroleum Institute (API) assessment made in 1980, the federal government
had ownership over 775 million acres onshore, and 528 million acres on the OCS. These
federal lands, according to the API, accounted for 37 percent of undiscovered oil
resources, but were responsible for 16 percent of national production. Further, they also
held 80 percent of recoverable reserves of oil shale and 95 percent of tar sands, both
forms of unconventional oil. Finally, the API estimated that approximately two-thirds of
179 Oil and Gas Journal, February 2, 1981, 25.
180 Oil and Gas Journal, February 2, 1981, 25.
299
onshore federal lands faced some kind of regulatory restriction over the exploration for,
and development of, crude oil and other hydrocarbons.'81
Altering the terms of land leasing on federal onshore lands or the OCS in order
to increase domestic production did not require the passing of a new set of laws. Rather,
these were covered by the Mineral Leasing Act and the OCS Lands Act, both
administered by the Department of the Interior. In 1981 the Reagan Administration
announced that it would increase the number and acreage of leases made available under
the OCS Lands Act.182 It also expedited the regulatory procedures covering leasing of
onshore federal lands in order to make more land available to firms interested in
exploring and producing petroleum products.'83
The question is how to attribute causation to these changes instituted under the
Reagan presidency. On the one hand, as in the case of France, it is clear that a general
commitment to liberalization was an important motivation for Reagan's policies in the
petroleum sector, as elsewhere. This choice to liberalize formed part of the larger project
of increasing the rate of economic growth by removing barriers to production in domestic
181 Oil and Gas Journal, November 10, 1980.
182 Oil and Gas Journal, April 20, 1981, 42.
183 Other changes to energy policy were also introduced. The windfall profits tax that was enacted under the Carter
Administration, along with gradual decontrol of prices, was first reduced, and then repealed under Reagan. Initial
changes were made as part of the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, which reduced the tax on revenues secured by firms
operating in the petroleum sector secured as a result of price rises under gradual decontrol. Oil and Gas Journal,
October 19, 1981, 246. The windfall tax was then fully repealed as part of the omnibus trade bill signed by President
Reagan in August 1988. Oil and Gas Journal, August 29, 1988, 12.
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energy industries, as well as an ideological bias that saw deregulating and liberalizing
markets as an end in itself, removing the pernicious influence of government over private
citizens. When speaking about energy policy before being elected, for example, Reagan
criticized President Carter's approach, calling it "an utter fiasco" and stating that his
preference was for "removing government obstacles to energy production."'84 He further
noted that:
"Currently, U.S. policies are geared towards decreasing demand, regulating markets, and
lowering growth. We see the results of these policies in price controls, plans for rationing,
energy taxes, withdrawals of lands from mining and petroleum exploration, thoughts of
banning weekend driving, and a foreign policy increasing dictated by foreign
producers. 185
The Secretary of Energy, James B. Edwards also made an explicit link of the
policy strategy of the Reagan Administration to the failed policies of the previous
administration, and the importance of free markets:
"[Regulation] has only been an experiment - and it has proved not to be a very good one,
especially in the field of energy. The free market allows consumers and the entrepreneur
to experiment and to make mistakes. But it doesn't subject the whole country to the
alchemy of planners in Washington."186
Further, in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention,
Reagan cited economic growth as a key goal of energy liberalization, rather than
increasing domestic production, as Carter and previous presidents had done:
"America must get to work producing more energy. The Republican program for solving
184 Oil and Gas Journal, March 31, 1980, 51.
185 Cited in Oil and Gas Journal, March 31, 1980, 51.
186 Cited in Oil and Gas Journal, November 16, 1981.
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economic problems is based on growth and productivity. Large amounts of oil and
natural gas lay beneath our land and off our shores, untouched because the present
administration seems to believe the American people would rather see more regulation,
taxes and controls than more energy... Make no mistake. We will not permit the safety of
our people or our environment heritage to be jeopardized, but we are going to reaffirm
that the economic prosperity of our people is a fundamental part of our environment."' 8 7
Other evidence supports the importance of economic growth as the motivation
for deregulation and liberalization. Soon after the inauguration of the Reagan
Administration, Secretary of Energy Edwards noted that the decontrol of prices was
designed to "stimulate greater efficiency and productivity in the U.S. economy.""' Price
decontrol was also offered in the White House Report on the Program for Economic
Recovery, issued on February 18th, 1981, as one of the five achievements of the
administration as it sought to stimulate economic growth, although it was also noted that
price decontrol served to increase dependency on foreign oil, and that removing price
controls would reverse the trend towards greater dependency by stimulating domestic
production.189
Yet while officials in the Reagan Administration viewed deregulation and
liberalization as important ends in themselves, they also argued that reduced regulatory
oversight would be beneficial for increasing petroleum production within the United
States. This suggests, in turn, that the goal - increasing domestic production in order to
187 Ronald Reagan, "Acceptance Speech at the 1980 Republican Convention," July 17, 1980.
188 Oil and Gas Journal, February 23, 1981, 41.
189 John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of
California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43427.
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enhance security of supply, was not wholly rejected by Reagan Administration officials,
but rather that liberalization provided the means for doing so.190
The dual purpose of the ends to which Reagan's energy policies in the
petroleum sector were directed can be seen in the conclusions reached by his preparatory
team. Chairman of Reagan's Energy Advisory Task Force and head of the transition team
for energy policy Michel Halbouty, for example, linked a future reduction in intervention
in energy markets to the long-standing goal of increasing energy self-sufficiency. This
points to the ongoing importance of the end of policy: to increase domestic production
and therefore strategic control over petroleum:
"If all price controls on oil and natural gas are removed, if punitive and counterproductive
controls, regulations, and restraints are elimination, and if environmental and
conservation measures that impede maximum use of our energy resources are
realistically eased, I am convinced that within 5 years after these releases have been
accomplished, a positive trend will be established that if continued for another decade,
will provide the nation with an almost respectable energy self-sufficiency.
The Reagan Administration also exhibited a renewed commitment to domestic
industry as an important component of its petroleum security of supply strategy during
the mid-1980s, when petroleum prices fell to their lowest point. The decision of the
president to order a policy review on national security grounds in 1986 of the
190 Robert J. Lieber, "Energy Policy and National Security: Invisible Hand or Guidling Hand?," in Eagle Defiant:
United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, ed. Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber, and Donald Rothchild (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1983), 174; Don E. Kash and Robert W. Rycroft, U.S. Energy Policy: Crisis and Complacency
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), 260.
Cited in Oil and Gas Journal, December 15, 1980, 32.
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implications of the oil price collapse on the domestic petroleum industry, conducted
under Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy William Martin, demonstrates an
ongoing concern in the Administration with the national security implications of levels of
domestic production.'92
The report concluded that the weakness of the domestic industry, and increase
in levels of imported oil, represented a national security threat, with Secretary of Energy
John S. Herrington concluding "it is clear, based on these findings and this review, that
initiatives must be taken to strengthen the U.S. oil and gas industry and to reduce [the]
growing dependence on insecure imported oil."'93 The report also linked energy security
explicitly to the ability of U.S. industry to develop resources domestically: "One crucial
ingredient of U.S. energy security is a more competitive domestic oil industry that will
explore for and develop U.S. oil reserves."'94 Herrington further emphasized the
importance of domestic industry to energy security in July remarks:
"The crisis in the domestic petroleum industry, an industry that is critical to our energy
security, is taking an enormous toll and is creating serious problems for the future. We
cannot afford to be complacent, Energy security is a vital part of the foundation on which
our foreign and domestic policies - and our economy - rest. As a nation, we must
recognize the warning signs and take thoughtful and prudent action that meets our
responsibility to consumers, industry, and the nation alike."195
192 Oil and Gas Journal, December 15, 1986, 13.
193 Oil and Gas Journal, March 23, 1987, 13.
194 Oil and Gas Journal, March 23, 1987, 13.
195 Oil and Gas Journal, July 6, 1987, 14.
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The secretary refused to countenance a tariff on imported crude and petroleum
products, preferring to recommend to the president alternative measures, such as tax
changes designed to promote domestic production, including increasing the depletion
allowance for producers to 27.5%. The rationale given by Secretary of Energy Herrington
in testimony before the Senate was that high energy costs brought about by an import
tariff would harm U.S. industrial competitiveness. He also alluded, however, to the
problems of exemptions that plagued the system under the previous administrations, and
which played a role in the removal of the fee, as well as over-bureaucratization.196
The policy outcome of the policy review saw the Department of the Interior
adjust licensing regulations governing offshore leasing, with the goal of increasing
domestic production, and urging Congress to make changes to depletion allowances and
approve the plans of the Department of the Interior for offshore leasing and the
exploration of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Each of these adjustments
and proposed adjustments in regulatory instruments were designed to increasing domestic
production, as made clear by Secretary of the Interior Don Hodel's comments in a House
Committee on the proposed new offshore drilling schedule and issuance of exploration
rights to ANWR:
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196 Oil and Gas Journal, May 5, 1986, 61.
"We should not sit back and entrust our national destiny to an organization [OPEC]
dedicated to the use of oil in a way that whipsaws our economy and undermines our
national policies.. .The psychological effects of this new twist may prove even more
detrimental to the U.S.'s long-term security than the earlier embargo."
2.5.1 Public Opinion and Presidential Policy Preferences
An important motivation for the president to support policies designed to
increase national control over petroleum is the strong public support for energy
independence. In other words, even if strategic intervention in the form of increasing the
ratio of domestic production to total consumption is no longer an effective response to
reliance on external markets for the supply of petroleum, strong public support for energy
independence means there are benefits to the president in supporting this position.
Uniform time series data on the popularity of strategic intervention is not
available. Nevertheless, there are a wealth of data available that asks, in different ways,
about the question of energy independence and the utility of increasing domestic
production. Although it is impossible to precisely determine how the popularity of energy
independence has changed over time because of the different wording of polling
questions, taken together the results suggest the popularity of energy independence
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197 Oil and Gas Journal, July 6, 1987, 14
among the public.'98 Given the incentive for presidents to adopt publicly popular policies,
it is therefore possible that the ongoing commitment to strategic intervention across time
and presidencies is driven by this dynamic.
Following the Iranian Revolution and spike in oil prices, for example, polling
indicated that people both felt dependent on external sources of gasoline and oil and
supported measures, including increasing domestic drilling, in order to decrease this
reliance on external markets. In an ABC news poll taken in November 1978, for example,
seventy nine percent of respondents agreed that the United States was dependent on the
rest of the world for the supply of gasoline and oil, with sixteen percent agreeing that it
was a little dependent. This meant that some ninety five percent of respondents felt
dependent on external supply for gasoline and oil. In a survey taken between April 6 and
April 15, 1979 respondents were asked whether "too much dependence on foreign oil
imports.. .is a very important reason for the.. .energy situation. Some ninety one percent
of respondents agreed that it was very important or somewhat important. In the same poll
eighty-one percent of respondents agreed that the decline in domestic production was
either a very important or somewhat important cause.
198 All data are taken from the Roper Center for Public Opinion.
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Public opinion also supported the idea of increasing domestic production across
time. In a December 1978 poll, for example, fifty-seven percent of respondents agreed
that increasing domestic production was the best response to the problem of growing
imports of crude oil, and a further ten percent agreed this should be done in conjunction
with increasing conservation measures. Even on the question of price control, some sixty-
five percent of respondents to the same survey agreed that price decontrol for domestic
oil was reasonable policy response in order to increase domestic production. In a similar
poll taken between March 8th and March 12 1979, seventy-six percent of respondents
were in favor of increasing production of crude oil on federal lands, with just thirteen
percent opposed and eleven percent unsure.
President Carter's proposals of a mix of greater domestic production and the
introduction of measures to control demand also met with high levels of support, with
eighty-six percent of respondents supporting such policies in order to cut imports of oil
by fifty percent by 1990. Indeed, survey data suggests people were willing to pursue the
goal of cutting imports even if it meant they incurred increases costs: a poll taken
between April 4 and April 5 for example, found that fifty-six percent of respondents
agreed with price decontrol if it led to increased production domestically, even in the case
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that it led to an increase in the price of gasoline. In contrast, some thirty-eight percent
opposed and six percent unsure of how to answer.
Public opinion data suggests that the public continued to support the merits of
increasing domestic production even after the price of crude oil began to fall in the 1980s,
although this support was tempered by environmental concerns. Once again consistent
time series data is not available; however the opinion poll data is suggestive with regard
to a variety of policy instruments used to promote domestic production. When asked in
April 1986 about the merits of the oil import tax being sought by the IPAA in order to
increase domestic production, for example, forty-two percent of respondents thought it
was a good idea even if could lead to increased inflation and led to greater
unemployment, compared to thirty-six percent who opposed. In October of the same year
forty-four percent of respondents supported the tax, against thirty-three percent who
opposed.199
On the question of providing greater tax incentives to oil firms, opinion data
suggests that public support was greater. In the wake of the first Gulf War, some fifty-
199 The question read: "Supporters of an oil import tax say it would be a good idea because it would decrease US
(United States) dependence on foreign oil by encouraging energy conservation, oil exploration, and business
investment in alternative fuels. Opponents of an oil import tax say it would be a bad idea because it would increase
inflation and cause unemployment in industries dependent on oil and petroleum products. Do you think an oil import
tax would be a good idea or a bad idea?" Cambridge Reports/ Research International opinion surveys carried out in
April and October 1986.
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nine percent of respondents supported offering oil firms tax incentives for increasing
exploration of oil domestically, against thirty-eight percent who opposed, in order to
reduce dependence on foreign oil.200 In a similar question asked on December 1990, fifty
percent of respondents were strongly or somewhat in favor of tax incentives for U.S. oil
firms in order to reduce imports of oil."' In March 1994 fifty-six percent of respondents
favored tax incentives for exploration and development within the United States, with
thirty-eight percent opposing.202
The above data is suggests that there is support among the public for policy
intervention in order to increase the share of domestic oil as a ratio of total oil consumed
within the United States, although data also suggests this is tempered by environmental
concerns. This suggests that the president has some incentive to support strategic
intervention in the petroleum market, in the form of increasing domestic production.
2o The question read: "(Here are some possible elements of a new national energy policy to promote conservation and
reduce our dependence on foreign oil. For each element, please tell me if you would strongly favor it, moderately favor
it, moderately oppose it or strongly oppose it.)... Offering oil companies tax incentives to increase their exploration for
oil in the U.S. Opinion survey carried out by Penn & Schoen Associates, August 18, 1990-August 19, 1990 and based
on telephone interviews with a national adult sample of 677.
201 The question read: "(Let me read you some policies the government might try as part of a national energy strategy.
For example, here are several things the United States could do to reduce our dependence on oil. Please tell me whether
you strongly favor, somewhat favor, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose each one as a method of reducing our
dependence on oil. (Rotate questions))... Providing tax breaks to oil companies for the exploration and development of
new oil and natural gas wells." Opinion survey by Alliance To Save Energy And Union Of Concerned Scientists,
conducted December 8, 1990-December 11, 1990.
202 The question read: "(I'm going to read you some proposals for dealing with the country's energy needs, and I'd like
you to tell me whether you generally favor or oppose each one.)... Providing tax incentives to US (United States) oil
companies to encourage the exploration and development of new oil and natural gas in the United States." Opinion
survey by Cambridge Reports/Research International conducted during March, 1994.
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In chapter two I proposed that the position of U.S. industry towards strategic
intervention, along with state actor policy preferences, together determine policy
outcomes. What then, has been the position of the U.S. petroleum industry towards
strategic intervention?
2.6 Firm Policy Preferences
Strategic intervention remained a policy strategy adopted by presidents through
the 1970s and 1980s, as described above. The changes in outcomes that took place,
therefore, can best be characterized as a restructuring of the instruments of strategic
control, rather than an abandonment of it as a goal of national policy. This may have been
driven in part by the ongoing popularity of national control - under the rubric of energy
independence - among the public, giving the president the incentive to respond.
Industry policy preferences focused on strategic intervention in the form of
increasing domestic production as a ratio of total consumption. This meant that the
preferences of state actors and industry have aligned. This does not mean that U.S. policy
is a case of regulatory capture, for two reasons. First, as shown above, strong public
support for energy independence, coupled with the need of the president to respond to
this public position, meant the president had an incentive to independently support
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strategic intervention. Second, the evidence presented below suggests that the U.S.
petroleum industry has not received everything that it has demanded in policy terms.
Proposals to maintain price controls, for example, were proposed by President Carter
despite the opposition of domestic producers. Industry associations have also commonly
complained that the president has not provided enough incentive to promote domestic
exploration and drilling. Nevertheless, strong ongoing support by industry for strategic
intervention has meant that although the degree of presidential support for domestic
production of petroleum has varied across time, this has nevertheless remained a
component of U.S. policy, even when the president has also focused more on measures
designed to reduce consumption, or shift energy demand away from oil and towards other
fuels.
In this section I examine the position of the U.S. petroleum industry towards
strategic intervention. I find that in contrast to the cases of Japan and France, the position
of firms within industry towards the application of particular policy instruments have
diverged a number of times because of differences in the structure of firms; the integrated
majors have been less supportive of restricting imports, while the independent producers
(with few international reserves) supported import quotas and tariffs. Further, the
competitiveness of the majors and limits to existing U.S. reserves has meant they are
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comparatively less interested in domestic production. This stands in contrast to
independent producers, which consistently supported increasing domestic production of
crude.
Regardless, I find that industry within the United States has taken positions on
the three major policy areas associated with strategic intervention in the petroleum sector:
quotas and tariffs, price controls, and federal lands and OCS leasing, that have aimed to
stimulate domestic production. Industry has commonly used arguments about the
importance of strategic intervention for national security reasons in order to do so. To
identify the policy preferences of U.S. industry I use public statements by representatives
of the major industry associations. The first, and largest of these, is the American
Petroleum Institute (API), which has interests stretching from integrated majors to
refiners and independents but most clearly represents the interests of U.S. integrated
majors. Prior to the reorganization of the firms in the 1990s these were Standard Oil of
New Jersey, Mobil, Shell, Standard Oil of Indiana, Texaco, Gulf and Standard Oil of
California.20 3 The second industry association is the Independent Petroleum Association
of America (IPAA), which represents independent petroleum and natural gas producers.2 04
203 Erwin Knoll, "The Oil Lobby Is Not Depleted," New York Times, March 8. 1970, 27.
204 Murray Seeger, "The Oilmen and Politics," Washington Post, January 17, 1971, 1
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For the IPAA the benefits of promoting domestic production are most obvious;
given most member firms do not maintain substantial operations internationally, domestic
production represents the best way to increase firm size and profits. This means the IPAA
was a strong proponent both of increasing the incentives for domestic exploration and
production, and also for limiting imports of crude oil. Support for import quotas was less
strong in the API, given its most important members maintain significant international
reserves of crude. Increasing trade barriers therefore reduced the competitiveness of oil
produced internationally relative to that produce within the United States. The association
therefore most commonly favored increasing production within the United States through
other instruments, such as price decontrol and the relaxation of federal controls over the
leasing of lands and the OCS. Although exploration prospects within the United States
are lower than before, this position makes sense given that upstream operations are more
profitable than refining and marketing petroleum productions, and the effect of the
nationalizations of the 1970s in reducing the regions available to U.S. industry to explore
for and produce crude oil. Both API and the IPAA supported decontrol of crude oil prices
under the Carter Administration, as well as the relaxation of regulations over the
licensing of federal lands and OCS under the Reagan Administration.
314
The API supported increasing domestic production as a share of total U.S.
consumption during the Carter Administration. Under Carter the API supported the goal
of energy independence, but expressed concern with what it argued was an over-emphasis
on synthetic fuels, to the detriment of developing domestic sources of crude oil and
natural gas. Its position, therefore, was not that reducing the share of imports was a goal
that was not useful, but rather that policies designed to achieve this goal were unlikely
without increasing the incentives to increase the production of fossil fuels.
On the question of trade instruments, first addressed by the Nixon
Administration as noted above, the industry opposed the recommendations of the Nixon
Administration task force and supported ongoing quotas. It did so my arguing that a shift
to tariffs from quotas would harm the industry and U.S. self-sufficiency. Independent
research suggested that it would cost the industry $1.5 billion dollars by 1973, and the
IPAA used its own modeling to argue that under the projected price reductions caused by
shifting from quotas to tariffs, independent producers would be wiped out by 1975.0' In
testimony at a Senate Interior Subcommittee the chairman of the API, Robert E. Mead,
similarly argued it was a "dangerous assumption" that foreign oil would continued to be
available at reasonable prices. John Swearingen, the chairman of the board of Standard
205 willian D. Smith, "Oil Industry Praises Directive by Nixon," New York Times, February 21, 1970; Edwin L. Dale
Jr., "A Cut in Crude Oil Price Viewed as Bar to Independents' Drilling," New York Times, February 6, 1970.
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Oil (Indiana) echoed this sentiment, arguing that the over-reliance on foreign producers
constituted a national security threat because of their unstable politics, and that the quota
system should therefore be maintained.2 06 The president of the API also linked quotas to
national security in a hearing of the House Ways and Means Committee:
"National security remains the cornerstone for oil import controls.. .This is no time for us
to lessen the importance of national security as the governing standard for oil import
policies. 207
On the question of price controls, representatives of the industry associations
similarly argued controls should be removed in order to increase the incentives for
domestic production. The IPAA supported price control as included in the EPCA of 1975,
and argued in response to the first Carter Plan in 1978 that price decontrol should be
brought forward to 1979, rather than delayed.208 In a report produced in response to the
second Carter National Energy Plan the API similarly argued that: ""For the next two
decades the President's program gambles too much on synthetics without giving enough
attention to far more dependable 20th century energy prospects: oil, natural gas, coal, and
nuclear power." The API concluded that the best way to go about increasing the
production of crude within the United States was by price decontrol, which would
increase domestic prices, and therefore the incentives for firms to carry out exploration
206 Associated Press, "Quota Is Backed on Import of Oil," New York Times, March 17, 1970.
207 Ibid.
208 Staff reporter, "IPAA Urged to Step up Controls Fight," Oil & Gas Journal, May 29, 1978.
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work within the United States.209 In a 1979 interview following the April announcement
of President Carter to carry out price decontrol, the head of the API, Charles De Bona,
argued that price decontrol would lead to increased prices and therefore profits for firms,
but that these extra profits would allow oil firms to invest more in domestic exploration
and production. He noted that API estimates showed that price decontrol would lead to an
extra 1.5-2 million barrels a day of crude production by the middle of the 1980s, and
praised President Carter for making the decision to implement the policy:
"Decontrol, separating this from the whole question of taxation, represented a
courageous act on the part of the President to decide to move in that direction and I
certainly would not quibble over the precise details. It deals forthrightly with the decontrol
problem. It deals with it in a phased wad, but it is reasonably equitable. And it meets the
problem in a reasonably prompt way."
On the third question of opening federal lands to exploration and production,
both organizations consistently argued that imports should be slowed through the
relaxation of regulations governing federal lands and the OCS. The president of API
argued in early 1979 just prior to the price spike associated with the Iranian Revolution,
209 Neil Bunis, "The Oil Industry in Transition," Oil & Gas Journal, November 8, 1982.. See also Cochrane, "Carter
Energy Policy and the Ninety-Fifth Congress," 592; J.P. Smith, "Oil Firms Seen winners in Carter's Energy Plan,"
Washington Post, April 23, 1977.
210 Oil and Gas Journal, April 16, 1979. In noting its support for price decontrol, the IPAA also suggested that price
decontrol would lead to two million barrels per day of extra production within a decade. See Oil and Gas Journal,
February 26, 1979.
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for example, that "at a time when -- even with the assistance of North Slope oil -- we are
importing more than 40% of our crude supplies, we cannot refuse to use the potential
reserves of domestic energy that are waiting to be withdrawn from public lands."211 The
API recognized that U.S. production was likely to continue to decline because of the fall
in the reserve base, and did not argue that increasing the incentives to produce within the
United States was likely to reverse the long-term decline in U.S. production. Instead, it
argued for deregulatory measures in the shape of price decontrol and increased leasing of
federal lands and OCS, where the bulk of the remainder of potential reserves was
determined to exist. The API made this argument using the merits of arresting the rate of
import growth relative to total consumption in the national interest of the United States.212
Unsurprisingly, given its commitment to reduced regulation over federal lands, the API
supported the election of Reagan. API President Charles J. DiBona noted at the annual
API meeting of 1980 that they were meeting in "a new political climate for the nation."213
With regard to the leasing plan proposed by the DoI, with the API President Charles J.
DiBona noted that "without any question, this industry endorses the secretary's direction
on OCS leasing and views it as a significant improvement over the past."2 14
211 Staff reporter, "U.S. Oil Groups Intensify Blasts at Land Withdrawals," Oil & Gas Journal, February 19, 1979.
212 _ , "Dibona: Decontrol Could Buoy U.S. Oil," Oil & Gas Journal, April 16, 1979.
213 Oil and Gas Journal, November 17, 1980.
214 Oil and Gas Journal, August 3, 1981.
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At the annual conference of the API in 1981 the spokesperson from Shell,
Robert H. Nanz, similarly argued that significant amounts of oil and other resources lay
under some, 1.77 billion acres of on shore and offshore lands over which the federal
government retained mineral rights. Further, Nanz noted that exploration
development was totally or partially restricted across two-thirds of federal onshore lands,
and that of eighty offshore basins about fifty remained partially or totally unexplored.2"
2.7 Summary
Not all of the positions of the domestic oil industry were achieved in legislation.
On oil price decontrol they were certainly successful in seeing their preferred outcome
realized in policy. Similarly, on the question of leasing of federal lands and the OCS was
expanded under the Reagan Administration, as well as under President Carter (although
the extent of the policy support for domestic production was judged inadequate by the
industry associations). On other issues, however, industry positions were not realized. It
consistently failed to open the Arctic Natural Wildlife Reserve (ANWR) to oil and gas
exploration, for example, and also saw the Energy Security Corporation introduced as the
major initiative under the second Carter National Energy Plan, despite the fact that it
215 Oil and Gas Journal, November 16, 1981, 30.
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and
promised to shift demand away from oil, and also suffered from the imposition of a
windfall profits tax despite achieving the goal of price decontrol which was widely
opposed by the industry.21
Nevertheless, the fact that strategic intervention, in the form of increasing the
incentives for domestic exploration and drilling, remained in the interest of domestic
industry, coupled with the support for such policies by the White House, meant that it
remained a component of U.S. petroleum policies. The abolition of trade restraints and
price controls are best understood, therefore as restructuring of the policy instruments
used to pursue national control, rather than a rejection of strategic intervention itself. This
is further evidenced by the fact that the adjustment of leasing over federal lands and OCS
continued to be a component of national policy debate over petroleum policy under the
rubric of energy independence, although the willingness of the White House and
Congress to pursue this strategy was tempered by public support for domestic drilling to
be balanced by environmental considerations. It is little surprise then, that increased oil
prices saw debate over the merits of strategic intervention reemerge, as described below.
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216 Oil and Gas Journal, July 23, 1979.
4. High Prices and Domestic Production (2000 -)
Energy policy played an important role in the electoral race between George W.
Bush and Al Gore. Bush's proposal during the election included a range of measures
including allowing drilling across eight percent of the ANWR in order to "decrease US
dependence on foreign oil imports." This followed the agreement within the Republican
Party generally to the idea of increasing domestic production of oil, gas and coal.217
Gore's position also supported measures to increase domestic production of oil and gas,
although he opposed the development of ANWR, and the domestic production of fossil
fuels was given far less emphasis than renewable energies.2 18
Bush's Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham reiterated the commitment of the
United States to increasing domestic production after the new president took office,
noting that increasing imports of crude were harming the domestic U.S. economy.
President Bush also tasked the new Vice President Dick Cheney to head a Cabinet Task
Force, including the Secretaries of Treasury, Energy, Commerce, Interior, Transport, and
Agriculture, to draft a national energy strategy.219 The emphasis of the president on
domestic production was echoed in the first bill put to Congress on energy policy. The
217 Staff reporter, "Energy a Hot-Button Issue; in Us Presidential Election Campaign," Oil and Gas Journal, October 9,
2000, 20; Staff reporter, "GOP Platform Calls for Strong Us Energy Policy," Oil and Gas Journal, August 14, 2000.
218 Staff reporter, "Bush, Gore Highlight Energy Strategies in Debate," Oil and Gas Journal, October 9, 2000.
219 , "U.S. Oil and Gas Industry Has High Expectations from Bush Administration on Energy Issues," Oil and
Gas Journal, February 12, 2001, 66.
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bill was submitted by Senators Frank Murkowski (R-Ala) and John Breaux (D-La), and
had the stated goal of lowering U.S. dependence on foreign oil to less than percent by
2011, from current the fifty-six percent it stood at in 2001. A variety of measures were
proposed to accomplish this, including allowing exploration and production work to be
carried out in ANWR, allowing so-called Risk-in-Kind for producers on federal lands,
enabling them to pay royalties in oil, which could then be put in the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve. The bill also proposed that royalty payments be stopped during low oil price
periods, and the placement of a three dollars per barrel tax credit for production from
marginal wells. Unsurprisingly, the API agreed that increasing domestic production was a
useful goal to achieve, and praised the bill. 220 The position of the Democratic Party in
Congress was also supportive of increased domestic production. In a bill prepared by
congressional Democrats prior to the release of the White House's Task Force report, the
Democrats announced their opposition to drilling in ANWR, but supported the idea of
increasing tax benefits for independent producers of oil and gas.221
The final task force report was released on May 17, 2001. It proposed a range of
measures to increase domestic production, including subsidies for enhanced oil recovery
technologies, improved conditions for deepwater and marginal production royalties, and a
220 _ , "Industry Praises Murkowski's Omnibus Energy Bill " Oil and Gas Journal, March 5, 2001, 40.
221 , "House Democrats Unveil Their Own Energy Plan," Oil and Gas Journal, May 21, 2001, 40.
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review of federal laws governing exploration and production on the OCS and coastal
zone.222 The progress of the parts of the proposal that required legislative action in
Congress was cut short, however, because of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
When the House passed a bill the following year, it included measures to
increase domestic production through tax incentives, including drilling ANWR, which
was the centerpiece the initial Bush proposal.223 The Secretary of Energy, Spencer
Abraham, emphasized the importance of reducing imports of crude oil, and boosting
domestic production as one instrument for promoting this:
"We are committed to ensuring that America's energy needs are not held hostage by
politically unstable foreign suppliers. We are taking the necessary steps to encourage
increased domestic production, while protecting the environment and diversifying our
sources of energy..."As our economy expands, however, demand for energy will
increase, and our dependence on foreign suppliers will continue to rise. We are
committed to protecting our economic wellbeing and our national security through an
emphasis on energy efficiency and conservation to reduce energy consumption,
continued reliance on the efficiency of the free market, diversification of foreign suppliers,
increased domestic production, and emergency preparedness for potential supply
disruptions."224
In his State of the Union address of 2003 President Bush also reiterated his
support for increasing domestic production of oil in order to "promote energy
independence for our country."2 Both the House and the Senate took up the energy
debate once again in 2003. In June 2004 the House passed once again the energy
222 , "Energy Policy to Dominate Us Political Agenda," Oil and Gas Journal, May 28, 2001, 20.
223 , "Senate Bill Deemed Interim Step for Comprehensive Us Energy Policy," Oil and Gas Journal, May 6,
2002, 33.
224 ,"U.S. Officials: Policy Should Promote Secure Oil Supplies," Oil and Gas Journal, July 1, 2002.
2 _ ,W"White House, Congress to Push Energy Agenda This Year," Oil and Gas Journal, February 10, 2003, 24.
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legislation HR 4503 that had failed to reach a vote in the Senate. It was the fourth time
that the House passed comprehensive energy legislation, and, as noted earlier, followed
the proposals of the Bush Administration in seeking to increase domestic production.22 In
the Senate the bill stalled over the treatment of an issue unrelated to the problem of
domestic production - liabilities for water contamination from the gasoline additive
methyl tertiary butyl. The Senate was therefore unable to pass a bill by the end of 2003.227
This does not mean there was no consensus on the issue of domestic imports. A
separate amendment passed in 2003, for example, required the president to report
annually to the chamber the degree of U.S. dependence on foreign oil, and also to report
how it intended to reduce oil imports by 2013.228 The failure of the Senate to pass
legislation reflected instead an inability to compromise over environmental issues, rather
than a lack of consensus over the issue of domestic production.
The successful passage of energy legislation through both houses was finally
achieved in 2005, in the second term of the Bush Administration, when both chambers
passed legislation and went to conference. Reflecting the consensus that increasing
domestic production and reducing imports of oil, both versions of the bill promoted
226 Maureen Lorenzetti, "Us House Repasses Energy Legislation," Oil and Gas Journal, June 21, 2004.
227 , "Senate Gop Leaders Affirm Energy Bill Dead for the Year," Oil and Gas Journal, December 1, 2003.
228 Staff reporter, "U.S. Senate Resumes Energy Debate in July," Oil and Gas Journal 2003.
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domestic production as a method of reducing oil imports, with the justification for doing
so given on energy security of supply grounds, although there were differences between
the two. The House version of the bill, which was originally was passed in April 2003,
earlier than that of the Senate, included measures to boost domestic production, including
a measure to increase incentives to produce if the price of oil fell below eighteen dollars
per barrel. This recognized the higher costs of production within the U.S. relative to
international production, meaning that incentives needed to be put in place to stop
domestic production falling when prices were reduced. It also included credits for the
production of non-conventional oil.229
The IPAA, reflecting the strong focus of its membership on domestic
production, argued that increasing domestic production best served U.S. interests in the
name of energy security of supply:
"IPAA would also suggest that Congress consider legislation that would provide the
president with the authority to determine if the nation has reached an energy peril point. If
such a determination were made, energy project permitting would be streamlined to
assure that all substantive environmental analyses would be conducted, but most
procedural requirements would be limited. This would assure that environmentally sound
permits would be developed, but opportunities to litigate over procedural processes
would be curtailed."230
Passage of the House bill preceded that of the Senate. The Senate bill, like that
of the House, had a wide range of provisions designed to lessen imports, as noted above.
229 Maureen Lorenzetti, "U.S. Congress Pushes through Sweeping Energy Bill," Oil and Gas Journal, April 14, 2003.
, "U.S. Energy Bill Faces Tough Sledding Amid Federal Budget woes, Scandals," Oil and Gas Journal,
February 9, 2004.
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Its interest in doing so was made clear by the passing by a 99-1 majority of an
amendment requiring the White House to inform the Congress annually about changes in
U.S. foreign oil dependence, and how imports could be lowered by 2013.23 There was
less of an emphasis in the Senate, however on promoting domestic production as a means
to lowering domestic production. Unlike in the House, for example, where a separate bill
was passed allowing exploratory drilling in part of ANWR, the Senate Bill did not
include such provisions. It did, however, allow for accelerating the assigning of leases for
drilling on federal land and producing an inventory of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
in the Gulf of Mexico. In response to the passing of the bill, Senate Republican from
California and Chairman of the Resources Committee noted that the bill:
"brings Americans one step closer to affordable energy and moves us farther from
unreliable, expensive foreign energy... Developing countries such as China have begun
to seek international energy sources in order to fuel their growing economies. This
should serve as a wake up call for the United States to get as serious about energy
supplies. 232
Both the API and IPPA were supportive of the Senate bill, Reflecting their
broader membership, the API focused on the loosening of environmental regulations
associated with gasoline. The IPAA, on the other hand, was far more explicit in its
support for the measures designed to boost domestic production:
"Domestic oil and has producers have identified three broad policy solutions that could
231 Staff reporter, "Us Senate Resumes Energy Debate in July."
232 Nick Snow, "Us Senate Passes Comprehensive Energy Bill," Oil and Gas Journal, July 4, 2005.
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help domestic production: increased access to non-park, non-wilderness federal lands,
encouraging new capital to flow to the industry, and protecting the industry from
unnecessary regulations.. .All three of these policy issues are addressed, in part, by the
Senate energy bill."233
In conference the bills were reconciled in August 2005 with the provisions to
boost domestic production were maintained. The signing of the legislation by President
Bush in 2005 marked the end of a four year process from the initial proposal of the Bush
Administration through to passage of the Senate and the House and into law.
The passage of the 2005 legislation was not the end of the legislative efforts in
the energy sector undertaken during the Bush Administration. Driven by increasing prices
for oil and natural gas, President Bush announced an "advanced energy initiative" in his
State of the Union Address of 2006. Once again, the focus of the proposals, as explained
by Energy Secretary Samuel W Bodman, was to reduce the levels of imported oil and
natural gas. 4 President Bush also noted in late November 2006 that: "Dependency on
foreign oil is a national security and economic security problem, and it's a problem that
requires bipartisan cooperation." It was complemented by the passing into law in
December 2006 of a law expanding the amount of OCS available for drilling, and which
was expected by Senate Energy and Natural Resources Chairman Pete V. Domenici of
New Mexico, to bring an extra 1.26 billion barrels of oil to the market.
233 Ibid.
34 , "Bodman Repeats Support for Anwr Leasing, Ocs Access," Oil and Gas Journal, April 10, 2006.
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4. Conclusion
Policies in the petroleum sector were restructured in the United States during the
period covered by this study. This adjustment was caused by two significant changes in
the structure of the petroleum market. First, the peaking of U.S. production, coupled with
ongoing increases in domestic demand for crude oil and petroleum products, meant that
the trade quotas placed on imports were no longer viable. Second, the oil shocks led to
price increases and further fueled the inflationary problems already present in the U.S.
economy. As a result state actors - specifically the White House - reviewed petroleum
policies.
Institutional differences between the United States, Japan, and France meant
that there was less continuity between presidencies in policy terms; each president put
forward a new set of proposals focused on the energy sector, including petroleum, and
each was forced to bargain with congressional interests in order to pass their preferred
policies.
Yet despite this comparative lack of continuity, strategic intervention remained
a component of presidential policy preferences across the presidencies examined in this
study. This can be explained not only by the need for the president to take a position on
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problems associated with market volatility in the petroleum sector, but also because
strategic intervention, under the rubric of energy independence, remained publicly
popular. This gave subsequent presidents an incentive to respond to the problem of
relying on the international market for the supply of petroleum by proposing to increase
domestic production as a share of total consumption.
Support for strategic intervention was not only a component of presidential
policy, but was also supported by domestic industry. In particular, independent firms with
a majority of domestic production lobbied to increase the incentives for exploration and
production of crude oil within the continental United States and on the OCS in order to
become more competitive. This meant these firms supported price decontrol, and also the
opening of federal lands for drilling. Their ability to achieve these preferred policy
outcomes varied from president to president, however in each case strategic intervention
remained a component of policy outcomes. This was also the case under conditions of
high-prices from 2001-2006.
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Chapter Seven - Restatement of Findings, and Discussion of Theoretical and Policy
Implications
1. Restatement of Findings
1.1 Findings
In the 1980s and the 1990s a wave of liberalization and privatization swept
across the political economies of the advanced industrialized states. Governments in these
countries reduced and restructured policy instruments that had been applied in the name
of a variety of public policy goals, and increasingly relied on markets to allocate
resources.
Despite this the oil sector appeared insulated from this set of changes. Citing the
dangers of remaining reliant on sources of foreign oil, for example, president George W.
Bush proposed policies designed to increase U.S. oil production as a ratio of total
domestic consumption in the name of energy independence. As crude oil prices increased
in the early 2000s Japanese policymakers also reenergized policies supporting national-
flag oil companies with the stated goal of increasing their control over the petroleum
supply chain. This suggested a willingness not only to actively intervene in the markets
for oil and oil products, but a distrust of diversified markets and non-national firms to
ensure the supply of what remains perceived as a strategic resource.
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In this study I developed and implemented a strategy for determining the extent
to which these policies - which I refer to as strategic intervention (SI) - continue to
implemented in the advanced industrial states, and the extend to which we have seen
variation in their application across time. This allowed me to explore the central
questions addressed in the study: why and do policies designed to enhance national
control over oil continue to be applied when they stand at odds with the convergence on
liberal forms of economic governance in the 1980s and 1990s focusing on national non-
discrimination, and also ignore changes in the international oil market that have
significantly reduced the risk of oil supply interruptions? And what can these changes tell
us about the causes of liberal convergence in the political economies of the advanced
industrial states more generally, and the conditions under which we are likely to see its
reversal?
My findings show that the oil sector was not immune from the broad trend
towards liberalization and privatization. In each of the countries I examined in the study -
Japan, France and the United States, I found that policies of national control were
retrenched and restructured in the 1980s and the 1990s. This change was truly
revolutionary. Since 1934, with the exception of the postwar Occupation, Japan
maintained a robust set of policies designed to protect national oil companies in the
332
domestic refining and distribution market and promote their attempts to explore for,
develop and produce crude internationally. These policies suggested an unwillingness to
trust a reliance on the international oil market to ensure the stable supply of petroleum.
Instead, national oil companies, over which policymakers retained regulatory control,
were identified as more trusted as agents of the government as it sought to ensure supply
of what was defined as a strategic good.
Yet beginning in 1986 Japanese policymakers appeared ready to reject the utility
of these policies and embrace diversified sellers and buyers trading oil and oil products in
the international petroleum market as the best solution for ensuring security of supplies.
As documented in chapter four, beginning in 1986 Japanese regulations controlling trade
in oil and oil products were gradually weakening, and from 1996 they were abolished.
This unified domestic prices for oil and oil products to the international market for the
first time in the post-war era, and removed all support for domestic refining firms. The
result was widespread mergers across the sector as Japanese firms attempted to become
more competitive in the international market.
Support for Japanese oil companies operating internationally was similarly
reduced and restructured to make it more market conforming. The major public firm
used to provide subsidies and low interest loans to private sector companies with interests
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in the exploration, development, and production of oil fields internationally was
abolished. The new body created in its place was designed to manage Japan's strategic
stockpile of oil and oil products, and unwind government holdings in upstream
enterprises over a ten year period before being disbanded.
France, like Japan, maintained a comprehensive set of policies designed to
increase control by national oil companies over the production of oil internationally, and
increase their share of the refining and distribution of oil products domestically. The first
national oil company was established in 1924, and in 1928 a law was established giving
the state the sole right to import oil and oil products, which it then delegated to national
oil firms. Prices for oil and oil products were also fixed higher than the international price
in order to increase the incentives to refine products at home.
Beginning in 1982 these policies were completely dismantled. Price controls
were first loosened and then discarded. The system of import licensing designed to
increase the market share of the national oil firms was first relaxed by granting licenses to
a wider range of firms in order to increase competitiveness in the industry, and then
abolished. The domestic law governing the oil sector no longer aimed to increase the
share of the national oil firms in refining and distribution, but instead relied on strategic
petroleum stockpiling managed through the European stockpiling system to insure
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against potential instability in petroleum supplies. Finally, the firms themselves were
privatized along with other state-owned companies, with the state even relinquishing its
golden share, through which it maintained the ability to veto foreign purchase of the
national firms.
Oil policies in the United States were never as stable as in France and Japan.
Policies vacillated between promoting domestic industry for reasons of national security,
and punishing firms for their manipulation of their market power in order to increase
profits. Nevertheless, policies promoting national control by increasing domestic
production, which necessarily implied supporting domestic industry, were a significant
feature of U.S. policy since at least 1957 when voluntary import controls were
implemented under the Eisenhower Administration. Later price controls originally
introduced for inflationary reasons under the Nixon Administration in 1971 were adapted
to increase the production of oil within the United States for reasons of increasing energy
independence.
Although policies of strategic intervention were less stable in the case of the
United States than in France and Japan, the trend in their application followed the same
path. Mandatory quotas on oil imports were transformed into tariffs in 1974, and then
abolished. Prices were also liberalized by 1981, linking the U.S. and international
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markets for crude once again.
Policy changes therefore appear to confirm the convergence on liberal forms of
economic governance in the advanced industrialized states. Even in the case of oil, which
for 80 years was treated as a strategic resource requiring significant intervention by the
state in order to ensure security of oil supplies, policies were retrenched and restructured,
leaving flows of oil and oil products increasingly determined by the market. This
retrenchment and restructuring suggested in turn that policymakers across these countries
had embraced diversified buyers and sellers operating in the international market as the
best way of ensuring security of supplies, as opposed to increasing the share of the
market supplied by firms over which the government maintained regulatory control.
These changes in the policies governing the oil sectors of Japan, France, and the
United States, not only accorded with the broad transformation of forms of governance
across the advanced industrialized states. They also comported with changes in the
structure of the international oil market that served to reduce the risks of interruptions of
supply, as described in chapter three. To recapitulate, the nationalizations of oil
production by many of the governments in OPEC that began in the 1970s not only had
the effect of transferring ownership of the major centers of crude oil production outside
the United States form international oil companies to national governments, but also
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separated ownership of production of crude oil from ownership over the majority of the
refining and distribution infrastructure. Coupled with the rise in production outside the
OPEC region this created an integrated market for crude oil, replacing a system in which
non-U.S. production was largely managed by an oligopoly centered on the major
integrated oil firms.' These changes also reduced the likelihood of supply disruptions in
oil.
Yet despite these changes, my findings recorded a reassertion of the policies of
strategic intervention in the cases of Japan and the United States, but not in the case of
France. In the former countries these policies were reenergized after this period of
retrenchment and restructuring. In the case of Japan a national target for strategic
intervention was reestablished; after a target was abolished in 2001 it was determined that
the equivalent of 40 percent of crude oil should be held in the form of equity oil by
Japanese firms operating in the upstream of the oil sector. This justified an increase in the
application of a range of policies designed to enhance national control over oil. Similarly,
in the United States trade quotas, followed by tariffs, had been a significant component of
policies designed to enhance national control over the production of crude, but there was
no effort to reintroduce them under conditions of high oil prices. Instead, policy focused
IFor a summary of this arrangement prior to the 1970s see John Malcolm Blair, The Control of Oil (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1976).
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on easing licensing for exploration and production on federal lands and the outer
continental shelf in the name of energy independence. In France, in contrast to Japan and
the United States, a range of policies were introduced in response to increased oil prices.
However policies did not seek to increase national control over the oil supply chain.
1.2 Argument
In the study I argued that the decision to jettison, or retain strategic intervention
as one component of policy can best be explained by the interests and policy preferences
of two sets of actors: domestic firms operating in the oil sector, and political and
bureaucratic actors within the state with interests in oil policy. I further argued that the
ongoing application of policies of strategic intervention in the cases of Japan and the
United States, and their rejection in the case of France, reflected changes in the
preferences of these actors over policy outcomes as they responded to shifts in the
structure of the international oil market. If strategic intervention remained in the interests
of these actors following these shifts in market structure, I argue, they successfully
implemented these policies, while bargaining with one another and other societal and
actors within the state, over the particular instruments of strategic intervention to be used.
In seeking to explain decisions to retain or jettison policies of national control I
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focused on the political actors evidence suggested were most influential in shaping oil
policies across time. I also documented how other actors within the domestic political
economies of the countries examined in this study influenced the particular instruments
chosen in order to intervene. In Japan the most important actor within the state was MITI
(later METI), which retained authority over long-run policy planning in the oil sector in
the period under examination, and domestic oil firms. MITI's ability to dominate oil
policy historically stems from its organizational mission as the line ministry in charge of
industrial policy, as well as the fact that the revenues it used to shape outcomes in the oil
sector were obtained from dedicated taxes on oil imports, meaning the Ministry of
Finance was less interested in limiting spending in the sector for fiscal reasons than in
other sectors of the economy. I found that political representatives also influenced policy
outcomes intermittently, as documented in chapter four, however their influence was
limited to responding to particular events. In the long-run, I found that within the state it
was MITI that was the most important in shaping outcomes.
I also found that the interests of Japanese oil firms were important, despite them
being weak and fragmented. They were important, I argued, because
intervention could only be accomplished through national firms, which made their
interests, and preferences over policy outcomes, an important component of policy.
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strategic
In the case of France, the Ministry of Industry was central to policymaking in the
oil sector, and was interested in promoting national oil firms within its regulatory
purview, as with Japan. The Ministry of Finance maintained control over price-setting
meaning that its interests were also important. I found that the interests of both were met
through strategic intervention prior to the 1970s. For the Ministry of Industry, as with
MITI, the national oil firms were its clients. This meant it had an organizational mission
of supporting these firms against competition from international oil firms through the use
of trade and other regulatory instruments. For the Ministry of Finance also, fixed prices
set above international rates were useful because they reduced the burden of the firms on
the state.
The crucial difference between the cases of France and Japan was the
competitiveness of the firms themselves. In contrast to the weak and non-integrated
Japanese firms, Total and Elf-Aquitaine grew increasingly competitive internationally
both by expanding their refinery operations outside France into the United States and
across Europe, and by increasing the number of countries in which they explored for and
produced oil. This trend began in the 1960s but was significantly affected by the changes
in the structure of the international oil market in the 1970s; nationalization led the
management of both firms to seek new oil fields internationally, and stagnant demand for
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oil products within France led them to invest in new refineries in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere. The French market, and the protection afforded to them by the state, therefore
became less important to the national oil firms, and their preferences towards policies of
protection and state control shifted as a result.
The most important actor within the state in the case of the United States is the
president, who has played a more significant role in oil policy setting than the
bureaucratic analogues of MITI in Japan and the Mol in France: the departments of
energy and interior. Every president since Nixon promised a comprehensive set of
proposals designed to manage problems in the energy sector upon entering office. The
significance of the oil sector, in particular, to the interests of the president stems from its
important foreign policy dimension, and the fact that oil price volatility has an effect on
economic performance. This makes the issue salient, and gives the president an interest in
designing policy in the oil sector that responds to voter concerns. Defining presidential
interests in oil in this way, in particular, solves the puzzle of why subsequent presidents
have proposed strategic intervention, under the moniker of energy independence,
regardless of their political party or region of origin. Voter preferences over policy
outcomes have consistently supported increasing domestic production as a share of total
oil consumption, although this is tempered by environmental concerns.
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Firms operating in the oil sector within the United States, on the other hand,
were categorized into two types. The first, the progeny of Standard Oil, emerged as large,
vertically-integrated oil firms with significant holdings of oil internationally. The second,
the independents represented by the Independent Petroleum Association of America
(IPAA), represents smaller firms within the United States that produce almost 70 percent
of domestic oil. As with the French firms Total and Elf-Aquitaine, the larger vertically-
integrated producers, have relatively less interest in increasing production with the United
States (other than in the Arctic Natural Wildlife Reserve, or ANWR) while the smaller
producers focused on domestic U.S. production have consistently advocated increasing
domestic production through the use of trade barriers, or the opening of federal lands or
the Outer Continental Shelf to greater drilling.
1.3 Alternative Explanations
It is this combination of interests, I argue, and the way their preferred policies
were affected by shifts in the structure of the international oil market, that best explains
outcomes of liberal convergence and partial divergence in the cases examined in this
study. Further, my framework provides a better explanation of outcomes than alternative
explanations of liberal convergence that focus on processes of global competition,
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technological innovation, or learning, for two reasons: first, because it recognizes that
while particular policy instruments of strategic control became untenable because of
changes in the international oil market, domestic actors retained the capacity to shape
new combinations ofpolicy in seeking their interests; and second, because it recognizes
that multiple actors with interests that did not necessarily align were important in
shaping outcomes.
In the case of oil, for example, I find that changes in the structure of the
international oil market served to make the market more competitive, and were a
significant cause of policy change by making some policies redundant that had been
implemented in the name of strategic intervention. In the case of France, for example,
fixed prices became untenable following the nationalizations of the 1970s in the Middle
East as price inputs became variable while outputs remained fixed, which exposed firms
to significant losses. Similarly, in Japan the increase in production of non-OPEC
countries, and consequent loss of market power of OPEC, led the international oil market
to become competitive, as demonstrated by rapidly falling prices in the early 1980s.
These changes in turn served to destroy the system of fiscal incentives used to support
Japanese firms' operations in the upstream.
I also find, however, that these changes did not make domestic actors irrelevant.
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Instead, they demonstrated the capacity to restructure policies in seeking to further their
interests. In other words, rather than simply being forced to retrench existing policies
promoting strategic intervention because of the effects changes in the international oil
market, domestic actors were able to restructure these policies, and to do so in ways that
did not comport with a convergence on liberal market outcomes.
The empirical chapters also demonstrate this was a contested process. Firms and
political and bureaucratic actors within the state were obliged to restructure existing
policies in response to the effects of changes in the structure of the international oil
market. They were also forced to bargain with one another as they sought to shape the
particular portfolio of instruments implemented, as well as other domestic actors within
interests in policy outcomes.
Poor economic performance increased the interests of major consumers of
energy in reducing the costs of inputs in all three cases, for example. Further, this support
for lowering domestic prices and inflation was an important goal of political
representatives seeking to improve economic performance. In the case of France, for
example, Finance Minister Beregovoy supported price decontrol, in addition to the
French national oil companies Elf-Aquitaine and Total, because he determined that
falling oil prices in the international market could contribute to lowering inflation within
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the domestic economy, which was a major goal of the political leadership in the early and
mid-1980s. In the case of the restructuring of Japanese policies in the upstream also,
supporters of the abolition of JNOC within the Koizumi Administration were not focused
primarily on its failures in achieving its mission, but rather had a preference for reducing
government intervention in markets across all sectors of the economy through the
abolition of special government bodies. Supporters of continued strategic intervention
within METI, as well as firms, were therefore forced to negotiate not only with one
another, but also with these other actors as they pursued they sought to maintain the
provision of state subsidies for Japanese firms operating in the upstream.
The existence of multiple actors in Japan, France, and the United States, each of
whom sought to shape policy outcomes to match their own interests, also suggests that
arguments about liberal convergence that focus on processes of learning and emulation
are at best incomplete. My findings suggest that while actors learn from policy failures,
and adapt their preferred policies to changes in the international market, there is no
guarantee that they will all seek to adapt their preferred policies in the same way as they
seek to pursue their interests. Indeed, there is no guarantee that the fundamental interests
of domestic actors will overlap at all.
This implies that arguments that focus on emulation as an explanation for liberal
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convergence are only sufficient to explain outcomes in technocratic policy issues that
have limited distributional implications, because policy outcomes are more likely to be
determined by a small number of actors insulated from broader societal forces.2 In cases,
such as the one examined here, however, emulation can only be one component of a
broader explanation of the causes of liberal convergence and divergence as they must also
take into account the interests and preferences of multiple actors, the causes of changes in
actor preferences over policy outcomes, and how and why they win out over one another
in policy battles that ensue.
2. Implications
2.1 Political Economy of Liberal Convergence and Divergence
The economic problems that beset the advanced industrial states in 2007 raised
fears that domestic interest groups would take advantage of the disarray in financial
markets and poor performance in real economies to successfully lobby for an increase in
trade protection. Elisa Gamberoni and Richard Newfarmer noted in a World Bank report,
for example, that 47 new trade restrictions were introduced in 17 of the G-20 countries
between November 2009 and March 2009, arguing this represented a trend towards
2 For an example of this type of argument see Sarah M. Brooks, "When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread
of Structural Pension Reforms across Nations," Journal ofPolitics 69, no. 3 (2007).
346
protectionism and away from economic openness.3
The increase in oil prices that occurred in the early 2000s represents an analytic
analogue to these economic problems: it undermined the existing policy regime and
changed distributional circumstances for domestic actors, providing a motive as well as
an opportunity for groups with interests in altering the status quo to lobby for policy
change. My findings present two lessons about the conditions under which this is likely to
occur. First, the study confirms that economic nationalism is not vanquished amongst the
advanced industrial economies. In the oil sector the convergence on liberal market
outcomes was not only imperfect (although the retrenchment and restructuring of
government regulation of the sector was certainly deep), but was also reversed in the
cases of Japan and the United States.
Further, my findings suggest that liberal economic convergence cannot be
ascribed to a set of processes over which domestic actors had no control, or a process of
diffusion in which they uniformly learned that the mechanism of the market was a more
effective instrument through which to pursue their interests. Instead, I find that while
each of these processes played a role in shaping policy, the outcomes described in this
3 Elisa Gamberoni and Richard Newfarmer, "Trade Protection: Incipient but Worrisome Trends," Trade Notes, No. 37
(Washington D.C.: World Bank International Trade Department, 2009).
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study involved bargaining between multiple actors who retained the capacity to act, and
did so in the pursuit of interests that did not always coincide. The convergence on liberal
outcomes in oil markets in the 1980s and 1990s was above all else, therefore, a contested
process, and the reversal of policies in Japan and the United States was similarly
contested. By extension, in other sectors ongoing liberalization is unlikely to match the
interests of all economic actors, suggesting the potential for a reversal in liberal economic
outcomes if they are able to successfully lobby to have their interests represented in
policy.
Second, although the reassertion of policies of strategic intervention under
conditions of high prices suggests that a broader reversal in the trend towards liberal
convergence is possible, policies in the wake of the 2001 price rises were a not mirror
image of those used prior to the liberalization and privatization of oil markets in the
1980s and 1990s. This partial reversal of policies can be attributed to the causes and
effects of the liberalization and privatization process itself.4 In the case of France, for
example, protectionism was abolished not because of pressures from the European
Community, but because these policies no longer met the interests of the very firms they
4 Another reason might be that diversification away from oil throughout the 1980s and 1990s meant the economic, and
political, impact of the oil price rises was less significant than during the oil shocks, decreasing the salience of oil as a
political issue.
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were designed to help. As described
internationalization in Elf-Aquitaine and Total began in the 1960s, and was accelerated
significantly by the shocks of the 1970s. This meant that even under conditions of high
prices there was no demand from the firms for the protection of the state; even if the
Directorate General of Hydrocarbons was still interested in providing such support it
therefore lacked a client through which to supply it. Further, these policy preferences
were not undermined by the change in distributional circumstances driven by the increase
in oil prices in the 2000s. There was no-one therefore interested in demanding, or
supplying, protection in the name of national control.
In the case of Japan policies were reversed, but only partially. Subsidies for
exploration and production by national flag firms were increased in the upstream, but in
the refining and distribution sector trade barriers were not increased. Instead, firms
focused on moving upstream and on increasing sales of refined products internationally;
that is, on market-based rather than non-market based strategies to deal with the shift in
market structure. This stood in stark contrast to their response to the oil shocks, when
they lobbied for ongoing protection.'
s An alternative explanation might be that the firms did not consider seeking protection as they thought regulators
would not be receptive. Against this hypothesis is the fact that METI was willing to promote firm activities upstream,
suggested there may be some willingness to support firms domestically against international competition in refining
and distribution.
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asset diversification andin chapter five,
The answer to this lack of demand for protection from firms lies in the effects of
liberalization on firms' preferred policies. Weak and fragmented prior to liberalization,
these firms were forced to merge with one another through the 1980s and 1990s and
reduce refinery capacity, as described in chapter four. This made them more competitive
on world markets in terms of refined products, although they remained uncompetitive
relative to the integrated oil firms that dominated production outside national oil
companies because of a lack of crude reserves held internationally. It made sense,
therefore, for these firms to seek support in order to move upstream in the search for
profits and increased competitiveness, rather than attempt to return to the failed growth
strategy of the pre-1980s. Increased subsidies, but no return to protection through
erecting trade barriers was the result.
Extending these findings to the political economies of the advanced
industrialized states, and the propensity for greater protection more generally, this
suggests that demands for protection will be shaped by the effects of the era of
liberalization and privatization in the 1980s and 1990s on the policy preferences of
domestic actors. For firms that have shifted to become highly integrated into global
supply chains for the manufacture of goods, for example, renewed demands for trade
protection make little sense. For unskilled labor in the advanced industrialized states, on
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the other hand, liberalization and privatization did little to further their interests, or their
ability to compete internationally through their labor power. Their demands for greater
protection are unlikely to be disarmed, therefore, by the changes wrought in the 1980s
and 1990s. What remains an open question is whether political representatives will see
their interests in supplying this protection.
Understanding the propensity for reversals in liberal market outcomes,
ultimately requires us, therefore, to understand how the process itself shifted the
preferences of domestic actors towards different policy outcomes, and whether
exogenous shocks such as the recent economic crisis affect distributional circumstances
so as to change the preferences of these groups once again.
2.2 International Relations of Resource Nationalism
A second set of implications concern resource nationalism and its consequences
for international relations. Government intervention in oil markets is significant firstly
because of its distributive effects: if governments in the major petroleum consuming
states intervene directly in petroleum markets this leads to domestic transfers of wealth
from consumers to producers. Policies designed to 'lock-in' oil supplies can also have
important distributional effects internationally as side-payments by one government to
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another in the form of military arms, public infrastructure, or other forms of support are
used as inducements in seeking to secure national firms' access to reserves upstream.
This can have distributive effects within oil producing countries, either amplifying or
mitigating the effects of the reliance on resources for the majority of state revenues
common in these countries.
There are a second set of problems associated with governmental intervention in
oil markets, however. The rise of new industrial powers in the international system -
most notably China and India - introduces the possibility growing demand will lead to a
secular increase in oil prices over the long-run as demand from consumers within these
countries for oil products continues to outstrip the capacity of producers to meet these
needs while keeping prices constant. More importantly, some analysts have pointed out
that resource nationalism in these new major oil importing states could lead to militarized
disputes as each seeks to secure oil through national control, including using military
means.6
My findings suggest, however, that policymakers can be more sanguine in their
assessment of the likely implications of resource nationalism on the propensity for
6 Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, 1st ed. (New York: Metropolitan Books,
2001); Kent E. Calder, Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, andAmerica's Future in Asia, 1st ed. (New York: W. Morrow,
1996).
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conflict between the major oil importing states, for two reasons. First, throughout the
study I show that national policy has not only been a function of the interests and
preferences of state actors, but rather firms have played an important role in shaping
policy outcomes. This suggests that there is no need to assume, a priori, that governments
are driving policy. Rather, by showing that intervention is a function of the marrying of
public and private interest, I suggest that the constellation of interests driving policy
outcomes in the oil sector belies the utility of using the usefulness of state actor model
when seeking to understand the causes, and implications of strategic intervention. If
policies of strategic intervention in the case of China are primarily driven by commercial
interests, for example, it is unlikely that decisionmakers within the state will be willing to
use military force in the pursuit of these policies.
Second, as the French and US cases show, even when strategic intervention is in
the interests of decisionmakers within the state, firm success increases the tension
between the state as principal, and firm as agent, of national policy. As sales and
investments grow internationally, firms are less likely to do the bidding of the
governments that protect them, and are also less likely to demand protection. In the long-
run, this should lead to a reduction in state intervention in oil markets on behalf of
national firms, rather than its increase, as firms become more competitive.
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Finally, it is worth noting that none of these findings suggest that oil is just
another commodity, like wheat or coal. National ownership of crude in most of the major
oil producing countries, and the limited reserves that exist in non-OPEC areas, mean that
governments in both consuming and producing states will continue to be involved in the
oil sector. Even if we need not fear militarized disputes between the major oil consuming
countries, state-supported competition between firms based in these countries is likely to
be an enduring feature of oil markets so long as domestic actors continue to see it in their
interests.
354
Selected Bibliography
Periodicals
Asahi Shinbun
Le Figaro
Le Monde
New York Times
Nihon Keizai Shinbun
Oil and Gas Journal
Petroleum Economist
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Yomiuri Shinbun
Secondary Sources
Adelman, Morris A. "The Clumsy Cartel." Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 1979.
. "World Oil: Ten Years after The "Energy Crisis"." Cambridge, MA:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1984.
. "Scarcity and World Oil Prices." The Review ofEconomics and Statistics 68, no.
3 (1986): 387-97.
. The World Oil Market to 1970. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Center for Energy Policy Research, 1988.
Adelman, Morris A. "Mineral Depletion, with Special Reference to Petroleum." The
Review ofEconomics and Statistics 72, no. 1 (1990): 1-10.
Adelman, Morris Albert. The Economics of Petroleum Supply: Papers by MA. Adelman,
1962-1993. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993.
. The Genie out of the Bottle : World Oil since 1970. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1995.
Aldrich, John H., John L. Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida. "Foreign Affairs and Issue
355
Voting: Do Presidential Candidates "Waltz before a Blind Audience?"" American
Political Science Review 83, no. 1 (1989): 123-41.
Alhajji, A. F., and David Huettner. "OPEC and Other Commodity Cartels: A
Comparison." Energy Policy 28, no. 15 (2000): 1151-64.
Alt, James E., Fredrik Carlsen, Per Heum, and Kare Johansen. "Asset Specificity and the
Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway." International
Organization 53, no. 1 (1999): 99-116.
American Petroleum Institute. American Petroleum Industry; a Survey of the Present
Position of the Petroleum Industry and Its Outlook toward the Future. New York,N.Y.,: American Petroleum Institute, 1935.
. Petroleum; the Story of an American Industry. New York, 1949.
Andersen, Svein S. "EU Energy Policy: Interest Interaction and Supranational Authority."
ARENA Working Papers WP 00/5 (2000): 1-23.
Anderson, Mark W. "Regulatory Policy toward Domestic Crude Oil Production." Policy
Sciences 12 (1980): 245-64.
Avant, Deborah D. The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Bacon, Raymond Foss, and William A. Hamor. The American Petroleum Industry. Ist ed.
New York,: McGraw-Hill, 1916.
Bahgat, Gawdat. American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003.
Barber, William J. "The Eisenhower Energy Policy: Reluctant Intervention." In Energy
Policy in Perspective : Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions, edited by
Craufurd D. W. Goodwin, xx, 728. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,
1981.
. "Studied Inaction in the Kennedy Years." In Energy Policy in Perspective:
Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions, edited by Craufurd D. W. Goodwin,
287-336. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981.
Barsky, Robert B., and Lutz Kilian. "Oil and the Macroeconomy since the 1970s." The
Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 18, no. 4 (2004): 115-34.
Beach, Derek. The Dynamics of European Integration : Why and When EU Institutions
Matter. Basingstoke New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Bennett, Colin J. "What Is Policy Convergence and What Causes It?" British Journal of
Political Science 21, no. 2 (1991): 215-33.
Berger, Suzanne. "Globalization and Politics." Annual Review of Political Science 3(2000): 43-62.
Berger, Suzanne, and Ronald Dore. National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Cornell
356
Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Berkma, Pelin, Sam Ouliaris, and Hossein Samiei. "The Structure of the Oil Market and
Causes of High Prices." New York: International Monetary Fund, 2005.
Berne, Michel, and Gerard Pogorel. "Privatization Experiences in France." CESifo
Working Paper (2004).
Blair, John Malcolm. The Control of Oil. New York: Pantheon Books, 1976.
Bohi, Douglas R., and Milton Russell. Limiting Oil Imports : An Economic History and
Analysis. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
Bohi, Douglas R., Michael A. Toman, and Margaret A. Walls. The Economics ofEnergy
Security. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Boix, Carles. "Privatizing the Public Business Sector in the Eighties: Economic
Performance, Partisan Responses and Divided Governments." British Journal of
Political Science 27 (1997): 473-96.
Brooks, Sarah M. "Interdependent and Domestic Foundations of Policy Change: The
Diffusion of Pension Privatization around the World." International Studies
Quarterly 49 (2005): 273-94.
. "When Does Diffusion Matter? Explaining the Spread of Structural Pension
Reforms across Nations." Journal ofPolitics 69, no. 3 (2007): 701-15.
. Social Protection and the Market in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
Burrows, James C., and Thomas A. Domencich. An Analysis of the United States Oil
Import Quota, Studies in Business, Industry, and Technology. Lexington, Mass.,:
Heath Lexington Books, 1970.
Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control. "The Oil Import Question." Washington,
D.C.: Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control, 1970.
Calder, Kent E. Pacific Defense : Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia. 1st ed.
New York: W. Morrow, 1996.
Campbell, John L., and Ove K. Pedersen. "The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional
Analysis." In The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, edited by John
L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice. Who Leads Whom? : Presidents, Policy, and the Public, Studies
in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. "The Conditional Nature of Presidential
Responsiveness of Public Opinion." American Journal of Political Science 48, no.
4 (2004): 690-706.
Ching, Chih Chen. "Crude Oil Prices and the Postwar Japanese Refining Industry."
357
Doctor of Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1967.
Cohen, Jeffrey E. "Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda." American Journal of
Political Science 39, no. 1 (1995): 87-107.
Cordesman, Anthony H., and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan. The Global Oil Market : Risks and
Uncertainties, Significant Issues Series, V. 28, No. 1. Washington, D.C.: CSIS
Press, 2006.
Cowhey, Peter F. The Problems of Plenty : Energy Policy and International Politics,
Science, Technology, and the Changing World Order. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1985.
Crouch, Colin, and Wolfgang Streeck. "Introduction: The Future of Capitalist Diversity."
In Political Economy of Modern Capitalism : Mapping Convergence and
Diversity, edited by Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, 1-18. London;
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1997.
Culpepper, Pepper D. "Capitalism, Coordination, and Economic Exchange: The French
Political Economy since 1985." In Changing France: The Politics That Markets
Make, edited by Peter A. Hall and Bruno Palier Pepper D. Culpepper, 29-49. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Dafter, Ray. "World Oil Production and Security of Supplies." International Security 4,
no. 3 (1979): 154-76.
Dahl, Carol, and Mine Yflcel. "Testing Alternative Hypotheses of Oil Producer
Behavior." The Energy Journal 12, no. 4 (1991): 117-38.
Dam, Kenneth W. "Implementation of Import Quotas." Journal of Law and Economics
14, no. 1 (1971): 1-60.
Davis, David Howard. Energy Politics. 3rd ed. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
Davis, Jerome D. The Changing World of Oil : An Analysis of Corporate Change and
Adaptation. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub., 2006.
de Carmoy, Guy. "The New French Energy Policy." Energy Policy (1982): 181-88.
Devarajan, Shantayanan, and Anthony C. Fisher. "Hotelling's "Economics of Exhaustible
Resources": Fifty Years Later." Journal ofEconomic Literature 19, no. 1 (1981):
65-73.
Dumontier, Pascal, and Claude Laurin. "The Financial Impact of the French
Government's Nationalization/Privatization Strategy." EFMA 2003 Helsinki
Meetings (2003).
Edwards III, George C., William Mitchell, and Reed Welch. "Explaining Presidential
Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience." American Journal ofPolitical
Science 39, no. 1 (1995): 108-34.
El-Agraa, Ali. M., and Yao Suhu. "National Versus Supranational Interests and the
Problem of Establishing an Effective EC Energy Policy." Journal of Common
358
Market Studies 22, no. 4 (1984): 333-49.
Feigenbaum, Harvey B. "Review: Public Enterprise in Comparative Perspective."
Comparative Politics 15, no. 1 (1982): 101-22.
The Politics of Public Enterprise : Oil and the French State. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1985.
. "States, Markets and the Politics of Energy." Polity 20, no. 1 (1987): 167-78.
Finon, Dominique. "French Energy Policy: The Effectiveness and Limitations of
Colbertism." In European Energy Policies in a Changing Environment, edited by
Francis (ed.) McGowan, 21-56, 1996.
Fitzgerald, Edward Peter. "France's Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot
Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918." The Journal ofModern
History 66, no. 4 (1994): 697-725.
Foreign Policy Research Institute. Oil Diplomacy : The Atlantic Nations in the Oil Crisis
of 1978-79. Philadelphia, PA.: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1980.
Frank, Helmut Jack. Crude Oil Prices in the Middle East; a Study in Oligopolistic Price
Behavior, Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development.
New York,: Praeger, 1966.
Fusaro, Peter C. "The Future of Oil: Geopolitical Lynchpin or Common Commodity?" In
Global Markets and National Interests : The New Geopolitics of Energy, Capital,
and Information, edited by Lincoln Palmer Bloomfield, xiii, 250. Washington,
D.C.: CSIS Press, 2002.
Garrett, Geoffrey, and Barry R. Weingast. "Ideas, Interests and Institutions." In Ideas and
Foreign Policy : Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, edited by Judith
Goldstein and Robert 0. Keohane, 173-206. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1993.
Gately, Dermot. "A Ten-Year Retrospective: Opec and the World Oil Market." Journal of
Economic Literature 22, no. 3 (1984): 1100-14.
. "Strategies for Opec's Pricing and Output Decisions." Energy Journal 16, no. 3
(1995): 1-38.
Ghosh, Arabinda. Competition and Diversification in the United States Petroleum
Industry. Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1985.
Giraud, Andre L. "Energy in France." Annual Review ofEnergy 8 (1983): 165-9 1.
Gray, Lewis Cecil. "Rent under the Assumption of Exhaustibility." The Quarterly
Journal ofEconomics 28, no. 3 (1914): 466-89.
Grayson, Leslie E. National Oil Companies. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
359
Greenberger, Martin. Caught Unawares : The Energy Decade in Retrospect. Cambridge,
MA: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1983.
Guyomarch, Alain. "The Europeanization of Policy-Making." In Developments in French
Politics 2, edited by Alain Guyomarch and etal, 116-36, 2001.
Hacker, Jacob S. "Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden
Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States." American Political
Science Review 98, no. 2 (2004): 243-60.
. "Policy Drift: The Hidden Politics of U.S. Welfare State Retrenchment." In
Beyond Continuity : Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies,
edited by Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, 40-82. Oxford ; New
York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Hall, Peter A. "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic
Policymaking in Britain." Comparative Politics 25, no. 3 (1993): 275-96.
. "The Europeanization of Policy-Making." In Developments in French Politics 2,
edited by Alain Guyomarch and etal, 172-90, 2001.
Hall, Peter A., and David W. Soskice. Varieties of Capitalism : The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford England ; New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001.
Hamilton, James D. "Oil and the Macroeconomy since World War II" The Journal of
Political Economy 91, no. 2 (1983): 228-48.
Hancke, Bob. Large Firms and Institutional Change : Industrial Renewal and Economic
Restructuring in France. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Heichel, Stephan, Jessica Pape, and Thomas Sommerer. "Is There Convergence in
Convergence Research? An Overview of Empirical Studies on Policy
Convergence." Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005): 817-40.
Hein, Laura Elizabeth. Fueling Growth : The Energy Revolution and Economic Policy in
Postwar Japan. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard
University : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 1990.
Heredia, Blanca, and Ben Ross Schneider. "The Political Economy of Administrative
Reform in Developing Countries." In Reinventing Leviathan: The Politics of
Administrative Reform, 2003.
Hillman, Arye L. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives."
American Economic Review 72, no. 5 (1982): 1180-87.
Hiscox, Michael J. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from
Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation." American Political Science Review
96, no. 3 (2002): 593-608.
Hollingsworth, J. Rogers, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Wolfgang Streeck. Governing
Capitalist Economies : Performance and Control of Economic Sectors. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
360
Horsnell, Paul, and Robert Mabro. Oil Markets and Prices : The Brent Market and the
Formation of World Oil Prices. Oxford: Published by the Oxford University Press
for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1993.
Hotelling, Harold "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources." The Journal ofPolitical
Economy 39, no. 2 (1931): 137-75.
Huntington, Hillard G. "Oil Price Forecasting in the 1980s: What Went Wrong?" Energy
Journal 15, no. 2 (1994): 1-23.
Iguchi, Tosuke [The History of Industrial Development in Japan: Petroleum]. Nihon
Sangyo Hattatsushi: Sekiyu. Tokyo: Gendai Nihon Sangyo Hattatsushi
Kenkyukai, 1963.
Ikenberry, G. John. "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil
Shocks in the 1970s." International Organization 40, no. 1 (1986): 105-37.
. Reasons of State : Oil Politics and the Capacities ofAmerican Government,
Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
. "Market Solutions for State Problems: The International and Domestic Politics
of American Oil Decontrol." International Organization 42, no. 1 (1988): 151-77.
Iwao, Nakatani, and Hiroko Ota. Keizai Kaikaku No Bjon: Hiraiwa Ripot5 Wo Koete [a
Vision of Economic Reform: Beyond the Hiraiwa Report]. Tokyo: T6y6 Keizai
Shinposha, 1994.
John Keeler & Shain, Martin, ed. Chirac's Challenge: Liberalization, Europeanization,
and Malaise in France. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996.
Johnson, Chalmers A. MtTI and the Japanese Miracle : The Growth of Industrial Policy,
1925-1975. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982.
Jones, Donald W., Paul N. Leiby, and Inja K. Paik. "Oil Price Shocks and the
Macroeconomy: What Has Been Learned since 1996." The Energy Journal 25,
no. 2 (2004): 1-32.
Joskow, Paul J. "U.S. Energy Policy During the 1990s." (2001).
Kash, Don E., and Robert W. Rycroft. US. Energy Policy: Crisis and Complacency. 1st
ed. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.
Katz, James Everett. Congress and National Energy Policy. New Brunswick, N.J.,
U.S.A.: Transaction Books, 1984.
Kaufman, Burton I. "Oil and Antitrust: The Oil Cartel Case and the Cold War." The
Business History Review 51, no. 1 (1977): 35-56.
Kaufmann, R. K., S. Dees, P. Karadeloglou, and M. Sanchez. "Does OPEC Matter? An
Econometric Analysis of Oil Prices." The Energy Journal 25, no. 4 (2004): 67-90.
Keohane, Robert 0., and Helen V. Milner. Internationalization and Domestic Politics,
361
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge England ; New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Kerr, Clark. The Future ofIndustrial Societies ; Convergence or Continuing Diversity?
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange, Gary Marks, and John D. Stephens. "Convergence and
Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies." In Continuity and Change in
Contemporary Capitalism, edited by Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, Gary Marks
and John D. Stephens, 427-60. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
Klare, Michael T. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. 1st ed. New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2001.
Knill, Christoph. "Introduction: Cross-National Policy Convergence: Concepts,
Approaches and Explanatory Factors." Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 12, no.
5 (2005): 764-74.
Knill, Christoph, and Katharina Holzinger. "Causes and Consequences of Cross-National
Policy Convergence." Journal ofEuropean Public Policy 12, no. 5 (2005): 775-
96.
Kohl, Wilfrid L. After the Second Oil Crisis : Energy Policies in Europe, America, and
Japan. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982.
Krasner, Stephen D. Defending the National Interest : Raw Materials Investments and
U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.
Levy, Gilles Pierre. "Relationship between Governments and Oil Firms." Journal of
Energy and Natural Resources 2, no. 9 (1982).
Levy, Jonah D. "Economic Policy and Policy-Making." In Developments in French
Politics 3, edited by Alistair Cole, Patrick Le Gales and Jonah D. Levy, 170-94.
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
. The State after Statism : New State Activities in the Age ofLiberalization.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Lieber, Robert J. "Energy Policies of the Fifth Republic: Autonomy Versus Constraint."
In The Fifth Republic at Twenty, edited by William G. Andrews and Stanley
Hoffmann, 1981.
"Energy Policy and National Security: Invisible Hand or Guidling Hand?" In
Eagle Defiant: United States Foreign Policy in the 1980s, edited by Kenneth A.
Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild, 167-90. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1983.
. "Energy Policy and National Security: Invisible Hand or Guidling Hand?" In
Eagle Resurgent: The Reagan Era in American Foreign Policy, edited by
Kenneth A. Oye, Robert J. Lieber and Donald Rothchild, 167-92. Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1987.
Lindberg, Leon N. The Energy Syndrome : Comparing National Responses to the Energy
362
Crisis. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977.
Loriaux, Michael Maurice. France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial
Reform, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1991.
Lucas, N. J. D. Energy in France : Planning, Politics, and Policy. London: Europa
Publications for the David Davies Memorial Institute of International Studies,
1979.
M. Roggenkamp, M, C. Redgwell, I Del Guayo, and A. (eds.) Ronne. Energy Law in
Europe: National, EU and International Regulation. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007.
Mabro, Robert. OPEC and the World Oil Market : The Genesis of the 1986 Price Crisis.
Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
1986.
. "Opec Behavior 1960-1988: A Review of the Literature." Journal ofEnergy
Literature (1988): 3-27.
. OPEC's Production Policies : How Do They Work?, Why Don't They Work?
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 1989.
Matlary, Janne Haaland. Energy Policy in the European Union. New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1997.
Maull, Hanns. "Oil and Influence: The Oil Weapon Examined." In Economic Issues and
National Security, edited by Klaus and Trager Knorr, Frank N., 259-88. Kansas:
Regents Press of Kansas, 1977.
May, Peter J. "Policy Learning and Failure." Journal ofPublic Policy 12, no. 4 (1992):
331-54.
McGowan, Francis. "The Single Energy Market and Energy Policy: Conflicting
Agendas?" Energy Policy (1989): 547-53.
Mendershausen, Horst. Coping with the Oil Crisis : French and German Experiences.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
Meritet, Sophie. "French Perspectives in the Emerging European Union Energy Policy."
Energy Policy 35 (2007): 4767-71.
Meseguer, Covadonga. "What Role for Learning? The Diffusion of Privatization in Oecd
and Latin American Countries." Journal ofPublic Policy 24, no. 3 (2004): 299-
325.
Milner, Helen V. Resisting Protectionism : Global Industries and the Politics of
International Trade. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988.
. "Trading Places: Industries for Free Trade." World Politics 40, no. 3 (1988):
350-76.
363
. Interests, Institutions, and Information : Domestic Politics and International
Relations, Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1997.
Moravesik, Andrew. The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from
Messina to Maastricht, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1998.
Morse, Edward L. Foreign Policy and Interdependence in Gaullist France. Princeton,
N.J.,: Princeton University Press, 1973.
Morse, Ronald A. "Introduction: Japan's Energy Policies and Options." In The Politics of
Japan's Energy Strategy : Resources-Diplomacy-Security, edited by Ronald A.
Morse, 1-14. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies University of California,
1981.
Moss, David A. When All Else Fails : Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002.
Nash, G.D. United States Oil Policy 1890-1964. Pittsburgh, 1968.
Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents : The Politics of
Leadershipfrom Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Maxwell Macmillan, 1990.
Nordhauser, Norman E. The Quest for Stability : Domestic Oil Regulation, 1917-1935,
Modern American History. New York: Garland, 1979.
Noreng, Oystein. Crude Power: Politics and the Oil Market. London ; New York, NY:
I.B. Tauris, 2002.
Nowell, Gregory P. Mercantile States and the World Oil Cartel, 1900-1939, Cornell
Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Oyama, Kosuke. "The Policymaking Process Behind Petroleum Industry Regulatory
Reform." In Is Japan Really Changing Its Ways? : Regulatory Reform and the
Japanese Economy, edited by Lonny E. Carlile and Mark Tilton, 142-62.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
Padgett, Stephen. "The Single European Energy Market: The Politics of Realization."
Journal of Common Market Studies 30, no. 1 (1992): 53-75.
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. "Effects of Public Opinion on Policy."
American Political Science Review 77, no. 1 (1983): 175-90.
Parra, Francisco R. "OPEC and the Price of Oil in 1993." The Energy Journal 15, no. 1
(1994): 17-26.
. Oil Politics : A Modern History of Petroleum. London ; New York: .B. Tauris,
2004.
Pierson, Paul. Dismantling the Welfare State? : Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of
Retrenchment, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge, England;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
364
, ed. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001.
Pollio, Gerald, and Koichi Uchida. "Management Background, Corporate Governance
and Industrial Restructuring: The Japanese Upstream Petroleum Industry." Energy
Policy 27 (1999): 813-32.
Randall, Stephen J. United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and
Security. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005.
Rogowski, Ronald. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." American
Political Science Review 81, no. 4 (1987): 1121-37.
Rosecrance, Richard. The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the
Modern World. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
Ruggie, John Gerard. "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order." International Organization 36, no. 2
(1982): 379-415.
Saad, Farid Wadie. "France and Oil: A Contemporary Economic Study." Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Thesis 1969 Ph D, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
1969.
Samuels, Richard J. The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative
and Historical Perspective, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1987.
Schmidt, Vivien A. From State to Market? The Transformation of French Business and
Government. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
. "Loosening the Ties That Bind: The Impact of European Integration on French
Government and Its Relationship with Business." Journal of Common Market
Studies 34, no. 2 (1996): 223-54.
Schneider, Steven A. The Oil Price Revolution. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1983.
Searight, Amy E. "MITI and Multilateralism: The Evolution of Japan's Trade Policy in
the GATT Regime." Pao Alto: Stanford University, 1999.
Shaffer, Ed. The Oil Import Program of the United States; an Evaluation, Praeger Special
Studies in International Economics and Development. New York,: F. A. Praeger,
1968.
Simmons, Beth, A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. "Introduction: The International
Diffusion of Liberalism." International Organization 60, no. Fall (2006): 781-
810.
Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy
Diffusion in the International Political Economy." American Political Science
Review 98, no. 1 (2004): 171-89.
365
Smith, James L. "Inscrutable Opec? Behavioral Tests of the Cartel Hypothesis." The
Energy Journal 26, no. 1 (2005): 51-83.
Smith, Mitchell P. States ofLiberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated
Europe, 2005.
Soederberg, Susanne, Georg Menz, and Philip G. Cerny. Internalizing Globalization:
The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism.
Basingstoke UK ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Stagliano, Vito. A Policy ofDiscontent : The Making of a National Energy Strategy.
Tulsa, OK: Pennwell Corp., 2001.
Stevens, Paul. "A Survey of Structural Change in the International Oil Industry 1945-
1984." In The Changing Structure of the World Oil Industry, edited by David
Hawdon, 112. London; Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, 1985.
"Understanding the Oil Industry: Economics as a Help or Hindrance." The
Energy Journal 16, no. 3 (1995): 125-37.
Stoff, Michael B. . Oil, War and American Security: The Searchfor a National Policy on
Foreign Oil 1941-1947. London, 1980.
Streeck, Wolfgang, and Kathleen Ann Thelen. Beyond Continuity : Institutional Change
in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press,
2005.
Taylor-Gooby, Peter, ed. New Risks, New Welfare: The Transformation of the European
Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Tetreault, Mary Ann. Revolution in the World Petroleum Market. Westport, Conn.:
Quorum Books, 1985.
Tietenberg, Thomas H. Energy Planning and Policy : The Political Economy of Project
Independence. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976.
Toichi, Tsutomu. "OPEC Export Refineries and the Implications for Japan's Petroleum
Policy." Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1985.
Turner, Louis. Oil Companies in the International System. 3rd ed. Winchester, Mass.:
Allen & Unwin, 1983.
VanDoren, Peter. Politics, Markets, and Congressional Policy Choices. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991.
Venn, Fiona. Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. New York: St. Martin's Press,
1986.
Verleger, Philip K. Adjusting to Volatile Energy Prices. Washington, DC: Institute for
International Economics, 1993.
366
Vernon, Raymond. Two Hungry Giants: The United States and Japan in the Quest for
Oil and Ores. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.
Veron, Nicholas. Farewell National Champions. Edited by Bruegel, Bruegel Policy Brief.
Brussels: Bruegel, 2006.
Vietor, Richard H. K. Energy Policy in America since 1945 : A Study of Business
Government Relations, Studies in Economic History and Policy. Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Weyland, Kurt. "The Diffusion of Innovations: How Cognitive Heuristics Shaped
Bolivia's Penson Reform." Comparative Politics (2005).
"Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform."
World Politics 57, no. 2 (2005): 262-95.
Whitford, Andrew B. "Competing Explanations for Bureaucratic Preferences." Journal of
Theoretical Politics 19, no. 3 (2007): 219-47.
Williamson, Harold Francis. The American Petroleum Industry, Northwestern University
Studies in Business History. Evanston Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1959.
Wilson III, Ernest J. "World Politics and International Energy Markets." International
Organization 41, no. 1 (1987).
Yamamura, Kozo, and Wolfgang Streeck. The End ofDiversity? : Prospects for German
and Japanese Capitalism, Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003.
Yergin, Daniel. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1991.
Zeiler, Thomas W. "Kennedy, Oil Imports, and the Fair Trade Doctrine." The Business
History Review 62, no. 2 (1990): 286-3 10.
Zysman, John. Political Strategies for Industrial Order: State, Market, and Industry in
France. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
. Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
Interview Subjects
Japan
Mitsuo Arai
Committee Member
Petroleum Council (2000-2007)
367
Hiroyuki Fukano
Director of Upstream Division (1998-2000)
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Nobuo Hata
General Manager
Planning and General Coordination Department
Petroleum Association of Japan
Akira Ishii
Chief Economist
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
Kazutomo Irie
Petroleum Division (1985-6)
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Kazuo Kawahara
Director
Petroleum Association of Japan
Takeo Kikkawa
Committee Member
Petroleum Council
Nobuyori Kodaira
Director
Petroleum Planning Division (1995-6)
Administrative Vice Minister
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (2004-2006)
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
368
Hiroshi Kubota
Deputy Director General
Oil and Gas Project Development Group
Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation
Kentaro Morita
Deputy Director
Upstream Division (2000-2002)
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Masahisa Naito
Director
Petroleum Planning Division (1985-6)
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Taro Shoji
General Manager
Planning and Research Department
Japan Petroleum Development Association
Shigeru Sudo
Former General Manager
Planning and General Coordination Department
Petroleum Association of Japan
Katsuhiko Suetsugu
Member
Petroleum Council
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
Toshiaki Tanaka
Exploration and Production Division
Mitsubishi Oil
369
Tsutomu Toichi
Managing Director
Institute of Energy Economics Japan
France
Olivier Abadie
Director, Downstream Oil Europe
Cambridge Energy Research Associates
Olivier Appert
Director of Hydrocarbons (1989-1993)
Ministry of Industry
Gilles Bellec
Director of Hydrocarbons (1984-1989)
Ministry of Industry
Rene Chappaz
Chief Executive Officer
Total USA
Bertrand Deroubaix
Vice President
Strategy and Business Intelligence Division
Total
Dominique Finon
Senior Research Fellow
French National Center of Scientific Research
Xavier Preel,
Vice President
Strategy and Business Intelligence Division
Total
370
Jean du Rusquec
Advisor to the CEO
Total
United States
Charlie Cooke
former Professional Staff Member
United States House Committee on Science and Technology
Maureen Lorenzetti
former Editor in Charge
Energy and Commodities
Reuters
Bob McNally
Advisor (2001-2003)
National Security Council and National Economic Council
Peter Van Doren
Senior Fellow
Cato Institute
371
